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INTRODUCTION: NATIONALISM, STATE AND CULTURE
S tudies of nationalism  ty p ica lly  reveal two prime but re la te d  concerns. 
The f i r s t  r e la te s  to the c e n tra l i ty  of nationalism  in  contemporary 
p o l i t ic s  (p a r t ic u la r ly  in the A frican and o ther Third World c o n te x ts ) : 
the second revolves around the co n tro v e rs ia l nature of nationalism , in 
p a r tic u la r  i t s  ambiguous and incomplete character and, in consequence, 
the d i f f ic u lty  of defin ing  and theo riz ing  about i t .
The r is e  of cap ita lism  on a world sca le  has been p a ra l le l le d  by the 
emergence of n a tio n a lis t  movements and the triumph of the n a tio n -s ta te  
as a ce n tra l organizing p rin c ip le  o f contemporary s o c ie tie s . N ational­
ism is  there fo re  too c e n tra l and pervasive an i s s .e  to ignore in favour 
o f o ther areas  o f research . Yet as a so c ia l and p o liv ic a l phenomenon, i t  
presents  major and seemingly in tra c ta b le  problems o '  d e f in it io n  and 
a n a ly s is , I t  is  common in  the l i te r a tu r e  on nationalism  to  re fe r  to  th is
p o l i t i c a l  phenomenon as "complex", "fuzzy", "obscure", "e lusive" ,
2"incomplete" and "u n stab le" . For Marxist scholars with th e ir  emphases
on modes of production and c la ss  s trugg les  as the ce n tra l determ inants
of c o n f lic t  and change in socie ty , nationalism  has presented spec ia l
d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  and one Marxist w r ite r  has gone so fa r  as to  id en tify
3nationalism  as "Marxism's g reat h is to r ic a l  fa ilu ie " ,
In large p a r t, the d i f f ic u l t i e s  of analysing nationalism  and producing a 
un iversa l d e f in it io n  are associa ted  with i t s  o ften  vague and in su b stan t­
ia l  nature; the d i f f ic u l t i e s  of r e la t in g  i t  to the major s tru c tu re s  and 
processes of s o c ie t ie s ; and to  the d if fe re n t forms th a t i t  has assumed 
in h is to ry . Nationalism has been associa ted  with a broad range of
INTRODVCTION: NATIONALISM, STATE AND CULTURE
Studies of nationalism  ty p ic a lly  reveal twc prime but re la te d  concerns, 
The f i r s t  re la te s  to the c e n tra l i ty  of nationalism  in contemporary 
p o l i t ic s  (p a r t ic u la r ly  in the A frican and o ther Third World con tex ts); 
the second revolves around the co n tro v ers ia l nature o f nationalism , in 
p a r tic u la r  i t s  ambiguous and incomplete character and, in consequence, 
the d i f f ic u lty  of defin ing  and theo riz ing  about i t .
The r is e  o f ca p ita lism  on a world sca le  has been p a r a l le l le d  by the
peergence of n a tio n a lis t  movements and the triumph of the n a tio n -s ta te1
as a ce n tra l organizing p rin c ip le  of contemporary so c ie t ie s .  N ational­
is e  is  there fo re  too c e n tra l and pervasive an issue to  ignore in  favour 
o f  o ther areas of research  Yet as a so cia l and p o l i t i c a l  phenomenon, i t  
p resents major and seemingly in tra c ta b le  problems of d e f in it io n  and 
ana lysis I t  is  common in the l i te r a tu r e  on ra tiona lism  to  re fe r  to  th is
p o l i t ic a l  phenomenon os "complex". "fuzzy", "obscure", "elusive", 
2"incomplete" and "unstab le" . For Marxist scholars with th e ir  emphases
on mode?, of production and c la ss  strugg les as the c e n tra l  determ inants
o f  c o n f lic t  and change in so c ie ty , nationalism  has presented specia l
d i f f ic u l t i e s ,  and one Marxist w rite r has gone so fa r  as to Iden tify
3
nationalism  as "Marxism's g rea t h is to r ic a l  fa ilu re " .
In large p a r t, the d i f f ic u l t i e s  of analysing nationalism  and producing a 
universa l d e f in it io n  are associa ted  with i t s  o ften  vague and in su b stan t­
ia l na ture ; the d i f f ic u l t i e s  of re la t in g  i t  to the major s tru c tu re s  and 
processes of so c ie tie s ;  and to the d iffe re n t forms th a t  i t  has assumed 
in h is to ry , Nationalism has been assoc ia ted  with a broad range o f
d iverse and often  incompatible ideologies and regimes, and even in d iv id ­
ual s tra in s  of nationalism  have manifested con trad ic to ry  elements, com­
bining ra t io n a li ty  with i r r a t io n a l i ty ,  forward-looking with backward- 
looking ideo log ies. This in f in i te  m alleab lity  and assoc ia tion  with both 
progressive and reg ressive  movements has led to  the id e n tif ic a tio n  of 
nationalism  as e s s e n tia lly  "Janus-faced'*
An adequate understanding of nationalism  must there fo re  account fo r both 
i t s  e s se n tia l  or generic c h a ra c te r is t ic s ,  and I t s  v a r ia b lity  o r capacity  
to assume d iffe re n t forms, in re la t io n  to the f i r s t  of these re q u ire ­
ments. i t  may therefore be usefu l to  begin w ith a broad d e f in it io n . In 
the context of th is  study, nationalism  is  defined as e s s e n tia lly  a 
contemporary p o li tic o -c u ltu ra l  p r in c ip le  which seeks a congruence b e t­
ween p o l i tic a l  organization  and a s p e c if ic  u n it o f population, u sually  
id e n tif ie d  as a "nation" or "people". The un it o f population is  u sually  
defined in broad c u ltu ra l terms, but may be based on o th e r c r i t e r i a  such 
as common h is to ry  and experience, geographical lo c a li ty , and even race. 
In o ther words, nationalism  say be regarded as a form of p o l i t i c a l  
legitimacy which requires tha t communal or cu ltu ra l  boundaries coincide 
with p o l i t i c a l  (p r in c ip a lly , s ta te )  boundaries, and is l ik e ly  to  a r is e  
in s itu a tio n s  where there is an incongruence or tension between these 
two se ts  of boundaries.
Contrary to what n a tio n a lis ts  might a sse rt about the "natu ra l"  or "God- 
given" p ro p e rties  of na tions, nationalism  is e s s e n tia lly  a so c ia l con­
s tru c tio n  and may there fo re  be accommodated w ithin a broad range of 
communal id e n tif ic a tio n s , In A frica therefore the term nationalism  would 
include not only the dominant t e r r i to r ia l  nationalism s, but also
" t r ib a l"  or e th n ic  "sub-nationalism s", as well as the broader pan- 
A frican is t and ra c ia l  nationalism s. However, not a l l  communal id e n t i f ic ­
ations  can serve equally  well as bases of nationalism . In keeping with 
the proposed d e f in it io n , nationalism  is  lim ited  by e x is tin g  forms of 
p o l i t i c a l  o rgan ization . More s p e c if ic a lly , as a contemporary so cia l 
phenomenon, nationalism  is  tie d  to  > p a r tic u la r  for# of p o l i t i c a l  organ­
iza tio n . naeely the modern s ta te .  As G ellner argues the problem of 
na tional)**  does not a r is e  fo r s ta te le s s  s o c ie tie s .
If  there is  no s ta te ,  one cannot ask whether or not i t s  
boundaries arc  congruent with the lim its  of nations. I f  there 
arw no ru le r s ,  there being no s ta te ,  one cannot ask whether the> arc o f the saase n ation  as the ru led . When n e ith e r s ta te  
nor ru le rs  e x is t ,  one cannot resent the fa ilu re  to conform to iho rcQ uireaents of the p rin c ip le  of n a tio n a lise .
The ex istence o f p o l i t t t a l l y  ce n tra lize d  s ta te s  is  there fo re  seen as a
nercssar* (although not su ff ic ie n t*  condition fo r nationalism .
One fac to r determ ining the v ia b li tv  of nationalism s is  the ex ten t to 
whlrh Uiov coincide w ith ex is tin g  s ta te  boundaries or the ease or d i f f i ­
cu lty  with which they could bo accommodated w ithin new s ta te  boundaries. 
!n A fn ra . for example, i t  is  c le a r tha t nationalism s which have 
coincided with the boundaries of ex is tin g  s ta te s  have generally  enjoyed 
g re a te r legitimacy than those which have attempted to e s ta b lish  new 
s ta te s  (as tn the case of e th n ic  or s e p a ra tis t  nationalism s), o r which 
have encompassed communal id e n t i t ie s  which were so broad th a t they were 
d i f f ic u l t  to accommodate w ithin any system o f s ta te s  (as in ra c ia l 
nationalism s). T e r r i to r ia l  nationalism s coinciding with e x is tin g  (colon­
ia l  and p o st-co lo n ia l) s ta te s  have enjoyed almost un iversa l legitim acy, 
while s u b - te r r i to r ia l  nationalism s have most o ften  been re legated  to the 
denigra ting  category of " t r i l  sms". As an ideology, pan-Africanism 
has been more e a s ily  accommodated, but only as a subsid ia ry  to  dominant
te r. i t o r i a l  nationalism s.
The second requirement of expla in ing  n atio n alism 's  capacity  to assume 
d iverse and co n tras tin g  forms, is  more problem atic and w ill be d ea lt 
w ith in  g re a te r d e ta il  in  a l a t e r  p a r t o f th is  d is s e r ta t io n , On a purely 
d esc rip tiv e  le v e l, however, Smith , fo r example, argues th a t the 
"o rig in a l"  or "core" d octrine  of nationalism  is  incomplete or unstab le, 
th a t i t  does not furn ish  a complete ideology or programme of so cia l 
a c tion . Other doctrines or ideologies are th ere fo re  needed to supplement 
the core notions of nationalism .
N ationalise and the s ta te
The re la tio n sh ip  between nationalism  and the s ta te  finds i t s  c le a re s t 
expression in the u n iv e rsa liz a tio n  of the n a tio n -s ta te  as the predomin­
a n t form of p o l i t i c a l  o rgan ization  in the tw entieth  century:
The idea of the nation s t ip u la te s  th a t the s ta te  is  not simply a ju ra l  community o r  hegemonic apparatus monojMizing 
force, but also  the h ighest form o f human community.r
The re la tio n sh ip  between s ta te  and nationalism  is  mediated by two funda­
mental c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of the d octrine  or ideology of the contemporary 
s ta te ,  namely the notions o f t e r r i to r ia l i t y  and sovereignty. As Crawford 
Young observes, t e r r i to r ia l i t y  takes on a "q u a li ta t iv e ly  d iffe re n t mean­
ing1' in the modern s ta te .  While a s p e c if ic  sphere of au tho rity  is  a 
necessary a t t r ib u te  of any s ta te  form, pre-modern s ta te s  were generally  
charac terized  by the concentra tion  of a u th o rity  in the cen tre  and i t s  
d iffu sio n  on the periphery.
P re-co lonial Africa supported a r ic h  v a rie ty  of in s ti tu t io n s ,  ranging 
from simple bands to highly developed s ta te s ,  P o li t ic a l  and e th n ic
boundaries ra re ly  coincided and the continent was charac terized  by a
high degree of m obility  between communities and the expansion of the
more powerful s ta te s :
Human ambitions were too pressing  to  allow people to  remain 
s t a t i c  over long periods, S ta tes  expanded when they were 
s u ff ic ie n tly  powerful to  do so, Communities competed with one another to  a t t r a c t  s e t t l e r s  and thereby gain supporters. 
Whether newly attached  persons were trea ted  as s e r fs ,  as second-class or fu l l  c i t iz e n s  depended both on the incentives th a t a t t ra c te d  them and on the amount o f  force tha t could be marshalled to prevent th e ir  escape. Men moved to fin d  b e tte r  
land o r more favourable op p o rtu n itie s  in  th e ir  c r a f t s ,  to engage more p ro f ita b ly  in trad e , to escape d i f f ic u l t i e s  a t 
home, to build  a p o l i t i c a l  following in a region without powerful r iv a ls .
While c e n tra liz a tio n  was a common fea tu re  o f  the more h ighly  developed 
African s ta te s ,  such s ta te s  a lso  faced vofimon problems re la t in g  to  the 
d elegation  o f au th o rity  to ou tly ing  s rs a - ■ n d i f f ic u l t i e s  of commun­
ica tio n .
In ce n tra l and southern Namibia, fo r example the high lev e ls  of tnobil-
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i ty  assoc ia ted  with the dominant forms of production stood in the way 
o f the emergence of s ta te s .  In the north a se r ie s  of kingships had 
emerged among the Ovambos, and although each king ru led  over a sp ec if ic  
t e r r i to r y ,  the boundaries o f such t e r r i to r ie s  appear to have been ch a r­
a c te r i s t i c a l ly  unstab le and ambiguous. These communities were ch a rac te r­
ized by oerlodlc  movements of population, esp e c ia lly  during periods of 
drought, d isease and famine. The imposition of the Western s ta te  form 
on African so c ie tie s  there fo re  affec ted  "a ra d ic a l reo rgan iza tion  of 
p o l i t ic a l  space". The demarcation of c le a r  and f i n i te  boundaries by the 
co lon ial s ta te  in Namibia was there fo re  not only new and a lie n  in  r e la ­
tion  to  the previously d i s t in c t  communities incorporated, but a lso  in 
the fa c t th a t they had no equivalen t in p re -co lo n ia l socie ty .
-6 -
The im plications of a such a re d e fin itio n  of p o l i t i c a l  space are 
immense. Not only were formerly d i s t in c t  and autonomous communities 
brought together under the same p o l i t ic a l  roof, but important sp a t ia l  
d is c o n tin u itie s  were imposed between the newly created  co lon ial s ta te s ,  
8v crea tin g  In ternal un itv  and coherence of s ta te  s tru c tu re s  and admin­
is tr a t iv e  co n tro l, the co lon ial s ta te  thus imposed p o l i t i c a l ,  economic 
and c u ltu ra l demarcations where tv o had previously  ex is ted . Through i t s  
a d a in is tm tv e  apparatus the co lonial s ta te  created  common bureaucratic  
s tru c tu re s  ami a cccaon system of laws and re g u la tio n s , c rea tin g  a 
sin g le  id e n tif ia b le  p o l i t ic a l  community. Along w ith the c rea tio n  of 
p o iu ic a i  and adm in is tra tiv e  u n its , the co lonial s ta te  a lso  bequeathed 
a  fiiaron language which provided a basis  for communication between 
foreerlv  d i t t i n n  rflaam m tles. a? well as a communication in fra s tru c tu re  
whtrh was fo r the cost p art geared to the needs and in te re s ts  o f the 
rok 'n iaS  s ta le  l»  add ition  the co lonial s ta te  helped to define a 
dsatin '* . and u n ified  economic sphere through the im position of common 
fu rre n r ie s . control over trade , taxa tion  and economic re gu la tions , 
Through these and o ther measures, t r a n s - te r r t to r ia l  movement and commun- 
K a lio n w a s i f s l r i r t e d  in s ig n if ic a n t ways.
The h is to ry  of Namibia provides numerous examples o f the ways in which 
the r e s tr ic t io n  o f movement across co lon ia l boundaries contribu ted  to 
the crea tio n  of national consciousness confined w ithin s ta te  boundaries. 
In the ea rly  1920s, for example, an ti-c o lo n ia l re s is tan c e  in Namibia was 
c lo se ly  associa ted  with in te rn a tio n a l and South African p o l i t i c a l  move­
ments such as Garveyisffi and the pop u list trade unionism of the in d u st­
r i a l  and Commercial Workers' Union, A major response of the s ta te  was to 
r e s t r ic t  the movement of blacks both w ithin Namibia and across i t s  
borders, In th is  way Namibian organizations were cut o f f  from th e ir
-w. r l  w . A jW  *  *  , -a .
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headquarters, and th is  contribu ted  to th e ir  d ec lin e . Despite s ta te
measures to  r e s t r ic t  the influence of ou tside p o l i t ic a l  movements in the
t e r r i to r y ,  t 'irn  links were ow e aqam  es tab lish ed , p a r tic u la r ly  with
South African p o l i tic a l  orqant.M ttons in the 1940s and 1010s However.
the s ta te  ow e again intervened H  harassing people who had contacts
with South African o rq a n u a u e n s  refusing  permit* and passports to
tra v e l , and deporting sa m b u n s  who had estab lish ed  tbcm&tlves m  South 18
A frica Thu# while haeibt.i( u s i u m h s t  o rqau i^siions were profoundly 
influenced by th e ir  p w ittic a i f-u n te rp a r ts  in couth Africa and o ther 
p a r ts  of the continent era: tv .a# d t f f s - u ln e s  d irec t)v  re la te d  to  the 
co lonial s ta te  alow! tti t l ^  «av e! cSs-spt c^pera tac ia  with wcveeersts 
ou tside the te m tt- rv  onei" t?u> hiq't trqrce o f « cn tro l e tc rc u c d  tv  the 
co lon ia l s ta te , 'utiithtac n a l ia ts  even e*peneit!"#d d i f f i tu U ie s  in  
m aintaining the n e re s ia r1* c- 'iita .i»  nn.i {v»weh d iffe re n t regions
w ithin the te r r i to r y
th e  co lo n ia l sM te  was t“  pn.vtde the h cq u n in q t of a cm#on c u l t ­
u ra l J a i i s  fur the new t e r r i to r ia l  unit*  i t  «reaied  Awsnq i t s  eost 
important r<>ntributioe5 in  th is  re tp e - t was the provision  of a foreign, 
but cocmori language which waa assnr l a t c d  with ihe ?Utf> apparatus and
the crea tio n  of an eiiurutum al svsteo u h tih  mil w ithstanding I ts
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obvious shortcomings, was ce n tra lize d  am/; s tandard ized . The co lon ial 
s ta te  was a lso  to con tribu te  in nn in d ire c t, but cru c ia l way to theatranscendence of pre -co lon ia l lo y a ltie s  and id e n tif ic a tio n s . As Smith 
has suggested, co lo n ia l domination "created for the most p a r t a kind of 
’p a ra lle l  so c ie ty ' In which the social s tru c tu re s  formed by the admin­
i s tr a t iv e  co lon ia l apparatus were superimposed upon those of the subord­
inate populations." This ’p a ra lle l  so c ie ty ’ often  corresponded to the
d iv isio n  between races , and p a r tic u la r ly  in South A frica and Namibia was 
to assume major importance in shaping nationalism . In general the co­
incidence of ra c ia l  d if fe re n tia t io n  and co lon ial domination was to 
provide the basis  fo r pan-African id e n tif ic a tio n s  which, while d is t in c t  
from t e r r i to r ia l  o r sta te-b ased  nationalism s, helped Africans transcend 
p re -co lo n ia l d iv isio n s and eased the tra n s it io n  to t e r r i to r ia l  
na tion ialism .
The o ther c e n tra l c h a ra c te r is t ic  of the modern s ta te  which was to  have a 
profound e f fe c t  on A frican communities was the doctrine of sovereignty. 
The very idea of a sin g le  source of au th o rity  was a n t i th e t ic a l  and 
undermining to  p re -ex is tin g  forms of au th o rity , even in Europe where the 
modern s ta te  f i r s t  emerged. In A frica where s ta te  forms were ex te rn a l­
ly imposed, the impact was even g re a te r . Sovereignty provided a basis 
for the most far-reaching  claim s, including s ta te  ownership of a l l  
"vacant" land, mineral r ig h ts  and ex tensive claims on labour. The 
notion of sovereignty also  underlay the incorporation and subordination 
o f a l l  p re -ex is tin g  a u th o rit ie s  w ithin the boundaries of the colony. The 
d iary  of the Nana leader, Hendrik Witbooi, for example, contains some 
v iv id  i l lu s t r a t io n s  of the a l ie n  and d isru p tiv e  nature of the claims of 
the ea rly  co lon ial s ta te  in Namibia, tfitb o o i's  responses to these claims 
included attem pts to forge a new unity  among the colonized and represent
what is arguably the f i r s t  expressions of nationalism  in the 
23te r r i to r y .
Notwithstanding notions of in d ire c t ru le , the co lon ia l s ta te  could not 
to le ra te  a l te rn a tiv e  sources of a u th o rity  th a t were not d ire c tly  under 
i t s  co n tro l. In Namibia, for example, the ap p lica tio n  of a system of 
" in d ire c t ru l«" in the northern reserv es , generated considerable contra-
d ic tio n s  fo r both co lo n ia l a u th o rit ie s  and indigenous ru le r s . While 
indigenous ru le rs  were expected to "govern" and to  m aintain law and 
order in th e ir  areas, th e i r  powers were t ig h tly  circum scribed by colon­
ia l  po licy . Where Ovambo ru le r s , for example, showed any independence, 
m ilita ry  force was mobilized against them. As a r e s u lt  the au th o rity
o f the indigenous ru le rs  was eroded to such an ex ten t th a t they were no 
longer able to  maintain con tro l over large sec tions of th e ir  people.
The links between sovereignty and nationalism , however, go s t i l l  deeper. 
Since the French Revolution and the subsequent break-up of dynastic 
empires in  Europe, the notion of sovereignty ham increasingly  found 
expression as popular sovereignty, th a t is the idea th a t  u ltim ate au th­
o r i ty  is  vested in the people or tha t the s ta te  is  the embodiment of the 
w ill o f the community. This doctrine of sovereignty provided a d ire c t  
link between the s ta te  and nationalism . I f  u ltim ate au th o rity  was to l ie  
with the "people", then the "people" needed to be defined , and such 
d e f in it io n  could only take place in re la t io n  to the s ta te  which was to 
embody the w ill o f the "people".
As ea rly  as 1789 Abb6 Si6y6 defined a na tion  as "a union of individuals
25governed by one law, and represented by the same law-giving assembly".
In those s i tu a tio n s  where there was a lack of f i t  between d e f in itio n s  of
community ai.d the e x is tin g  p o lity , the notion of popular sovereignty was
lik e ly  to lead to nationalism .
I t  is  where men feel s trongly  a discrepancy between th e ir  sense of community and the ac tual p o l i t ic a l  arrangements of 
which they are p a r t, th a t p o l i tic a l  nationalism  develops as 
an in te g ra l and fundamental p a rt of the demand fo r popular sovereignty. Here nationalism  attem pts to crea te  a correspon­dence between sense of community and economic and p o l i t i c a l  o rgan isa tion  by irredentism  . . .  and/or by expelling  or assim­
ila t in g  through the s trongest ideologica l pressure what are
. -s' as a l ie n  elements with c o n f lic tin g  in te re s ts  . . .  For wi ’ 1 - m inoritie s organised as communities can be sub jec ts , 
me,' .n  h is to ry  has shown th a t i t  is  very d i f f ic u lt  for then 
to b<. c i t i z e n s ,26
While in A frica and o ther colonized a re a s , the notion of popular sover­
eignty was c le a r ly  not part of the ideo logica l baggage of the co lonial 
s ta te ,  i t  did come to play a cru c ia l ro le  in  the n a t io ia l i s t  p a r tie s  
th a t arose to  challenge co lonial domination. The doctrine of popular 
sovereignty not only underlay the n a t io n a l is t  challenge of co lon ia l 
ru le , but was also  expressed in  the c o n s titu tio n  of n a tio n a lis t  p a r tie s
as ''c o u n te r-s ta te s" , "a so rt o f s ta te  in  embryo, ready to take over the2?co lon ial apparatus once independence was achieved."
There was y e t another way in which the co lo n ia l s ta te  contribu ted  to the 
c rea tio n  of nationalism  in A frica. I t  has already been suggested th a t 
where common c u ltu ra l c r i t e r i a  were absent or too weak to  provide th# 
necessary cohesion for nationalism , the common experience of colonialism  
o ften  served th is  purpose, I t  was e s s e n tia lly  the co lon ial s ta te  which 
provided the major focus for th is  common experience. Thus the co lonial 
s ta te  provided the framework of ru les  w ithin which colonialism  and 
capita lism  operated, and was responsib le fo r the implementation of 
co lo n ia l p o lic ie s  in general, I t  was the s ta te  th a t responded to  the 
in te re s ts  of s e t t l e r s  and foreign c a p ita l , which undertook m ilita ry  and 
po lice  ac tion  ag a in st those who opposed such in te re s ts ,  and which 
created  the basis  for labour e x tra c tio n . Under those circumstances in 
i#hich capita lism  was weak, as in the co lon ies, the ro le  of the s ta te  was 
cru c ia l in crea tin g  a basis fo r c a p i ta l is t  development. The co lonial 
s ta te  there fo re  became the most id e n tif ia b le  ta rg e t of re s is tan c e . 
S im ilarly , the predominant p o l i t i c a l  and m ilita ry  power of s ta te  made 
unity  of re s is tan c e  e s se n tia l.
Moreover besides providing a focus fo r a n ti-c o lo n ia l re s is ta n c e , the 
s ta te  was a lso  to serve as the major "prize" of African n a t io n a lis ts . 
The erosion of a l te rn a tiv e  pre -co lon ia l sources of p o l i t ic a l  power, 
meant th a t co lon ial s ta te s  represented the major sources of in s t i tu t io n ­
a lize d  p o l i t ic a l  power on the con tinen t. As a "boundary-defining u n it, 
with a d i s t in c t  t e r r i to r ia l  focus and ju r is d ic tio n " , the nature of the 
co lo n ia l s ta te  there fo re  " s p i l t  over Into the d e f in it io n  of the nation­
alism th a t arose to challenge the ru le rs  of the s ta te ."
N ationalise and economic in te re s ts  - a d igression
Thus fa r  no mention has been made of economic fac to rs  as possib le  in f lu ­
ences on the development of nationalism , and i t  may there fo re  «. useful 
to pause here to  answer possib le  ob jec tions th a t may be ra ise d  in r e la t ­
ion to  the neglect of m ateria l facto rs as influences on nationalism .
Theories of uneven development are aisongst the roost prominent contempor-
29ary attem pts to r e la te  n a tio n a lise  to economic causes. The basic 
contention of these theo ries is tha t nationalism  is e s se n tia lly  a 
response to uneven development.
Toe Nairn, fo r example, argues tha t nationalism  and c a p i ta l is t  devel­
opment are lo g ica lly  re la te d  because, as an ideology, nationalism  became 
prominent a t  roughly the same time as there was a general acce le ra tio n  
of change associa ted  with c a p i ta l is t  development, However, N airr is se rts  
tha t th is  re la tio n sh ip  is  not derived from the content o f development, 
but ra th e r from i t s  uneven d iffu sio n  through the world, Nationalism is 
there fo re  not a product nf the in te rn a l c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of development, 
but ra th e r of ex te rn al m ateria l fo rces. There has been no steady d if fu s ­
ion of development and i t s  b en e fits  to the periphery, and in general the 
spread of development to new areas has been accompanied by invasion and
Moreover besides providing a focus for a n ti-c o lo n ia l re s is ta n c e , the 
s ta te  was also  to serve as the major "p rize" of African n a tio n a lis ts . 
The erosion a lte rn a tiv e  pre -co lon ia l sources of p o l i t i c a l  power, 
meant th a t co lo n ls l s ta te s  represented the major sources of in s t i tu t io n ­
a lize d  p o l i t i c a l  power on the con tinen t. As a "boundarv-defining u n it, 
with a d i s t in c t  t e r r i to r ia l  focus and ju r is d ic tio n " , the nature of the 
co lo n ia l s ta te  th ere fo re  " s p i l t  over in to  the d e f in it io n  of the n ation ­
alism  th a t arose to  challenge the ru le rs  of the s ta te ,"
N a tiona lise and economic in te re s ts  -  a d ig ression
Thus fa r  no mention has been made of economic fa c to rs  as possib le  in f lu ­
ences on the development of nationalism , and i t  may th ere fo re  be useful 
to pause here to answer possib le objec tions th a t may be ra ise d  in r e la t ­
ion to  the neglect of m ateria l fac to rs  as influences on nationalism .
Theories of uneven development are amongst the most prominent contempor-
29ary attem pts to r e la te  nationalism  to economic causes. The basic 
contention of these theo ries is  tha t nationalism  is  e s s e n tia lly  a 
response to uneven development.
Tom Nairn, fo r example, argues tha t nationalism  and c a p i ta l is t  devel­
opment are lo g ica lly  re la te d  because, as an ideology, nationalism  became 
prominent a t  roughly the same time as there was a general acce le ra tion  
of change associa ted  with cap' a l i s t  development. However, Nairn a sse rts  
th a t th is  re la tio n sh ip  is  not derived from the content of development, 
but ra th e r from i t s  uneven d iffu sio n  through the world. Nationalism is 
therefore not a product of the in te rn a l c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of development, 
but ra th e r of ex te rnal m ateria l fo rces. There has been no steady d if fu s ­
ion of development and i t s  b en e fits  to the periphery, and in  general the 
spread of development to  new areas has been accompanied by Invasion and
domination. The changes wrought wer*- often  uncontro lled  and overwhelm­
ing, wreaking havvc upon e x is tin g  so cia l re la t io n s  and not providing the 
time or opportunity  fo r the establishm ent of new so c ia l r e la t io n s . A.s a 
r e s u lt ,  many areas found themselves economically disadvantaged and ex c l­
uded from the b en e fits  of progress.
As a re ac tio n , nationalism  has been profoundly ambivalent, because while 
those who find  themselves disadvantaged and excluded d e s ire  development, 
they a lso  r e s is t  i t  because of i t s  in tru s iv e  and d es tru c tiv e  nature . 
Furthermore, in  th e ir  strugg le aga inst disadvantage, these communities 
can only f a l l  back on th e ir  own resources, th a t is  th e ir  p a s t, as 
represented by th e ir  h is to ry , myths and symbols. This, Naim argues, 
explains the ambivalent (or Janus-faced) natu re of nationalism , fo r the 
c h a ra c te r is t ic  way in which nationalism  is  ab le to combine p o s itiv e  and 
negative fe a tu res, ra tio n a li ty  and i r r a t io n a l i ty ,  progress and re actio n .
While N airn 's  account, and in p a r tic u la r  the way in  which he explains 
the re la tio n sh ip  between progressive and reactionary  elements in n a tion ­
alism , has considerable appeal as a tool o f an a ly sis , there are a number 
o f d i f f ic u lt i e s  assoc ia ted  with h is  theory of uneven development. I t  
has, fo r example, been argued tha t even on a purely em pirical le v e l, the 
theory docs not stand up to scru tin y , However, the major c r it ic ism  of 
the theory is  tha t i t  does not provide a complete explanation o f n a tion ­
alism ; tha t while i t  may expla in  p a r tic u la r  aspects of nationalism , i t  
does not explain o th e rs . The theory does help to ca st lig h t  on why 
periphera l areas should respond, why they should re so rt  to re s is tan c e , 
p ro te s t and re je c tio n . However, I t  does not expla in  why th is  re s is tan c e , 
p ro te s t o r re je c tio n  should take the form of nationalism . Nationalism is
not simply a response to subjection  or disadvantage, i t  a lso  attem pts to 
construc t a p a r tic u la r  type of p o l i tic a l  o rder, I t  i s  not every form of 
re s is tan c e  tha t q u a lif ie s  as nationalism .
N ationalise and cu ltu re
This d i f f ic u lty  with the theory suggests tha t while economic fac to rs  may 
be important in providing an impetus for nationalism , economic in fluen ­
ces are tangen tia l ra th e r  than d ire c t;  tha t ecenonlc in te re s ts  are 
associa ted  with the sp e c if ic  groups and c la sse s  th a t combine in na tion­
a l i s t  movements, ra th e r  than w ith nationalism  i t s e l f .  An adequate 
theory of nationalism  would have to explain the form th a t the response 
to uneven development has taken and not merely the response i t s e l f ,  In 
h is own v aria n t of uneven development theory, Ernest G eliner has provid­
ed some suggestive po in ters in th is  d irec tio n .
G ellner t ie s  the o rig in s  of nationalism  to the changing ro le  of cu ltu re  
in in d u s tr ia l  s o c ie tie s , sp e c if ic a lly  the cru c ia l ro le  th a t shared or 
common cu ltu res  come to play in in d u s tr ia l s o c ie tie s . On the very broad­
e s t  lev e l, in d u s tr ia l so c ie tie s  are d if fe re n tia te d  from agrarian  so c ie t­
ies  by th e ir  highly in teg ra ted  and standardized c u ltu ra l  systems and 
th e ir  s ing le  s ty le s  of communication, w ithin the context of large and 
w e ll-cen tra lized  s ta te s .  Agrarian so c ie tie s , G ellner argues, were essen­
t i a l l y  characterized  by the d iv e rs i ty , p lu ra l i ty  and complexity of th e ir  
p a r ts , with m ultip le, complex and ambiguous re la tio n sh ip s  to  a v arie ty  
of d iffe re n t cu ltu re s , Under these circumstances the various segments of 
agrarian  so c ie tie s  were often  insu la ted  from one another. In co n tra s t, 
in d u s tr ia l  economies are  dependent on high lev e ls  o f m obility  and comm­
unication  between v ir tu a l ly  a l l  members of the so c ie ty . This in turn
presupposes the s o c ia liz a tio n  and in teg ra tio n  of a l l  members of in d u s tr­
ia l  so c ie tie s  in to  a un ified  and standardized cu ltu ra l  system. Such a 
common c u ltu ra l system can only be reproduced by a m onolithic and c e n tr­
a lize d  educational systfcm,
In d u s tria l so c ie tie s  are a lso  dependent on sustained  and perpetual
cognitive and economic growth, which req u ires  a constan t process of
learn ing  and re learn ing  in a continuing cycle of innovation, improvement
36and progress. "Everything is  open to  re th ink ing", G eliner m aintains, 
and ro les  become optional and instrum ental, The im peratives of constan t­
ly  increasing p roduc tiv ity  requ ire th a t  the d iv isio n  of labour is  not 
only complex, but a lso  perpetually  changing. While the specialism s of 
in d u s tr ia l  so c ie tie s  are more numerous, they are a lso  less  d is ta n t  from 
one another than those of agrarian  s o c ie tie s . This is  because the kinds 
of sp ec ia liz a tio n  c h a ra c te r is t ic  of in d u s tr ia l  so c ie tie s  re s t  on "a 
common foundation of unspecialized and standardized tra in in g " assoc­
iated  with an educational system th a t is  un iv ersa l, standardized and 
c e n tra lize d . In in d u s tr ia l s o c ie tie s  there fo re  the various specialism s 
have a "mutual a f f in i ty  of s ty le " . Training is  no longer a function of 
the family or sp ec ia lise d  groups associa ted  with p a r tic u la r  s k i l l s ,  but 
is  c e n tra lize d , d i s t in c t  from local communities, ami ex ternal to them. 
This standardized educational system is  not only geared to occupational 
m obility , but a lso  to the sp ec if ic  content of work in  in d u s tr ia l 
so c ie tie s :
Work, in the main, is  no longer the manipulation of th ings, 
but of meanings, I t  generally  involves exchanging communicat­ions with o ther people, or manipulating the con tro ls of a rach ine, Most jobs, i f  not ac tu a lly  involving work 'w ith  
p e o p le ', involve the contro l of bu ttons, o r switches or levers which need to  be understood, and are exp licab le , once 
again, in some standard idiom in te l l ig ib le  to  a l l  coiners,38
Under such circum stances, c u ltu re  assumes a ce n tra l ro le  in society .
Culture is  no longer merely the adornment, confirm ation and leg itim a tio n  of a  so cia l o r d e r . . . ;  c u ltu re  is  now the necess­
ary shared medium, the life -b lo o d  or perhaps ra th e r  the 
minimal shared atmosphere, w ithin which alone members of the 
socie ty  can breathe and survive and produce. For a given 
socie ty , i t  must be one in which they can a / /  b reathe and speak and produce; so i t  must be the jams c u ltu re . Moreover, 
i t  ausi now be a g rea t or high ( l i t e r a t e ,  tra in ing -susta ined ) 
c u l tu n ,  i t  can no longer be a d iv e rs if ie d , lo c a li ty  tie d , i l l i t e r a t e  l i t t l e  cu ltu re  or tra d it io n .
G e lln e r 's  emphasis on the necessary dominance of a s ing le  cu ltu re  has
profound im plications fo r the emergence of nationalism . In the most
general sense the need fo r c u ltu ra l homogenuity and i t s  asso c ia tio n  with
the b en efits  o f in d u s tr ia l  development help fo s te r  an a f f in i ty  fo r and
lo y a lty  to a common c u ltu re  th a t  is  undergirded by a s ta te  th a t is  able
to support and reproduce th is  common c u ltu re . In th is  sense nationalism
is  the d ire c t product of the new form of social o rgan izatio  , associa ted
with in d u s tr ia l  so c ie tie s .
More s p e c if ic a lly , as former agrarian  communities are sucked in to  the 
in d u s tr ia l  vortex , conditions are generated fo r th^ a c tiv a tio n  of speci­
f ic  nationalism s, G eliner d is tin g u ish es  between two major s itu a tio n s  
which a c tiv a te  nationalism , in the context of ea rly  in d u s tr ia l iz a tio n , 
latecomers to the in d u s tr ia l  c u ltu re  find  themselves a t  a considerable 
disadvantage In competing with those who have already assim ila ted  to 
'h i s  c u ltu re . Such newcomers may e ith e r  chose to ass im ila te  to the 
e x is tin g  In d u stria l c u ltu re  o r, i f  c o r 'lt io n s  are favourable, take the 
n a tio n a lis t  option of attem pting to crea te  an a lte rn a tiv e  s ta te  to 
support th e ir  own c u ltu re . In th is  s i tu a tio n  nationalism  is  ac tiv a ted  by 
b a r r ie rs  to communication a r is in g  from the contact between incompatible 
c u ltu re s . The tensions a r is in g  from such inequa lity -genera ting  d i f f e r ­
ences are lik e ly  to be resolved in la t t e r  phases through the a ss im il­
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atio n  of cu ltu ra l  m inoritie s ,
Considerable p o l i t i c a l  tensions w ill be generated, however, i f  such 
in e q u a litie s  become associa ted  with what G ellner c a l ls  "entropy- 
r e s is ta n t"  a t t r ib u te s ,  tha t is  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  which do not become 
evenly d is tr ib u te d  throughout the e n tire  so cie ty . The prime example of 
an en tro p y -res is tan t a t t r ib u te  is  racu . Where an e n tro p y -re s is ta n t t r a i t  
becomes associa ted  with in e q u a litie s  based on c u ltu ra l  d iffe rences , 
a ss im ila tio n  to the dominant cu ltu re  is  prevented and the in eq u a litie s  
which might otherw ise have been temporary, are perpetuated , tinder such 
circumstances nationalism  is a lik e ly , but not in ev itab le , response.
I t  should be c le a r  tha t G e lln e r 's  theory escapes the objec tions ra ised  
about Nairn’s version  of uneven development theory. By po sitin g  an 
e x p l ic i t  re la tio n sh ip  between s ta te  and c u ltu re  in  in d u s tr ia l  socie ty , 
G ellner is  ab le to explain why nationalism  (as an ideology with a sp ec i­
f ic  content) is  ac tiva ted  in in d u s tr ia l s e t t in g s . His theory a lso  allows 
one to take more seriously  the claims of n a t io n a l is ts ,  and in p a r tic u la r
the ce n tra l ro le  th a t c u ltu re  plays in th e ir  ideologies, without simply41
reproducing these ideologies as explanations fo r nationalism . How­
ever, a ce n tra l problem of G e lln e r's  theory is  the level a t  which i t  is  
geared. In s p ite  of i t s  a c c e ss ib li ty , most of G e lln e r's  discussion  is  a t 
such a high level of ab stra c tio n  tha t i t  o ften  lapses in to  a func tiona l­
ism in which "needs" are ascribed  to s o c ia l e n t i t i e s  l ik e  in d u s tr ia l 
so c ie tie s , the s ta te  and c u ltu re , For example, Gellner sees nationalism  
as rooted in  the " d is tin c t^ /e  s tru c tu ra l  requirements o f in d u s tr ia l 
so cie ty " . An even more extreme example of functionalism  is  represented 
by the following passage!
So the economy needs both the new type of ce n tra l cu ltu re  and
the ce n tra l s ta te ;  the c u ltu re  needs the s ta le :  and the s ta te  
probably needs the homogenous c u ltu ra l  branding of i t s  
s to c k ...43
While such lapses in to  functionalism  may merely be shorthand methods for 
re fe r r in g  to  the needs and in te re s ts  o f concrete groups and agents. 
G e lln e r 's  attem pts to theo rize sp e c if ic  groups and in te re s ts  a t  a lower 
level of ab stra c tio n  are le ss  than sa tis fa c to ry . For example, he does 
not provide an adequate explanation of how or why "counter-entropic" 
t r a i t s  come to  be assoc ia ted  with s p e c if ic  groups in in d u s tr ia l so c ie t­
ie s , except to suggest tha t the asso c ia tio n  of a s p e c if ic  t r a i t  with a 
low so cia l p o s itio n  w ill e l l i c i t  p re judice from more p riv ileg ed  groups. 
Such p re judice in turn is  re la te d  to the fe a rs  of the p riv ileg ed  tha t 
they w ill be displaced from th e ir  so c ia l p ositions  by those below them. 
Nor does G ellner attem pt to theo rize the groups involved in th is  process 
o f s t r a t i f i c a t io n .  While he sp e c if ic a lly  eschews the use o f c la sse s  to 
explain nationalism , he a lso  does not o ffe r  an a l te rn a tiv e  way of 
conceptualizing groups involved in  n a tio n a lis t  c o n f lic t. In order to 
provide a more s a tis a fa c to ry  an a ly sis  of nationalism , i t  is  e s se n tia l  to 
explore the ro les  of sp e c if ic  groups and c la sse s  in  n a tio n a lis t  
s tru g g les . This w ill be attempted in the next sec tion ,
However, before exploring these issu es , i t  is  necessary to q u alify  the 
concept of cu ltu re  as I t  r e la te s  to G ellner’s theory. Although cu ltu re  
occupies a prominent positio n  in G e lln e r 's  theory, he avoids defining 
i t ,  except in  the loosest sense. In a recen t c r it iq u e  of e x is tin g  appr­
oaches to c u ltu re . Anne Swidler has strongly  challenged the dominant 
in te rp re ta tio n s  of cu ltu re  and in p a r tic u la r  the construc tion  th a t  has 
been put on the re la tio n sh ip  between cu ltu re  and behaviour. Rather than 
seeing ac tion  as determined by c u ltu ra l values, Swidler argues th a t
ac tion  and values are usually  organized to  take advantage of c u ltu ra l 
competence. Such c u ltu ra l competence involves much more than the way one 
d resses , ta lk s , o r performs in examinations. I t  a lso  requ ires "an image 
of the kind of world in which one is  try ing  to a c t , a sense th a t one can 
read reasonably accu ra tely  . . .  how one is  doing, and a capacity  to chose 
between a lte rn a tiv e  lin es  of a c tio n ,"  The causal sign ificance  of 
c u ltu re  there fo re  is  not so much in the defin ing  of ends and goals, but 
in providing the components from which s tra te g ie s  of ac tion  are 
constructed .
In th is  sense, c u ltu re  is  defined as a " to o l-k it"  o f symbols, s to r ie s ,
r i tu a l s  and world views which people use to  solve d if fe re n t kinds of
problems. The views th a t ac tion  is  guided so le ly  by e ith e r  non-rational
values or in te re s ts  "are flawed by excsssive emphasis on the 'u n i t  a c t ' ,
the notion tha t people choose th e ir  ac tions one a t  a time according to
th e ir  in te re s ts  or values, But people do not, indeed cannot b u ild  up a
sequence of ac tions piece by piece, s tr iv in g  with each ac t to maximize a
given outcome. Action is  necessarily  in teg ra ted  into larg e r assemblages,
ca lle d  hsre 's t r a te g ie s  of a c t io n ',  C ulture has an independent causal
ro le  because i t  shapes the ca p ac itie s  from which such s tra te g ie s  of 
45ac tion  are constructed ."
This view of c u ltu re  f i t s  well with G e lln e r 's  theory of nationalism,, and 
in p a r tic u la r  h is emphasis on the s in g le , in teg ra ted  cu ltu ra l  basis  of 
in d u s tr ia l s o c ie tie s . Under such circum stances, anyone who is  not fam il­
ia r  with the dominant cu ltu re  is placed a t  a disadvantage, which w ill
become severe i f  he is  prevented from a ssim ila tin g  in to  the dominant46c u ltu re  by ritea'ii o f exclusion or segregation . G eliner has tended to
iiw» 'efik c i  ,1a 41" % Aiflfe? ..<■ -dUy*", , ..Iftji
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s tre s s  the ro le  of formal education in so c ia liz in g  people in to  the 
in d u s tr ia l c u ltu re . However, while formal education embodied in the 
school system is  undoubtedly of importance, adequate so c ia liz a tio n  in 
the in d u s tr ia l context depends on a v a r ie ty  of o ther processes. As noted 
e a r l i e r ,  the ease with which people are able to  operate w ithin sp ec if ic  
c u ltu ra l m ilieus is  dependent upon a number of su b tle  ca p ac itie s  such as 
the a b i l i ty  to determine the effec tiv e n ess  of th e ir  ac tions and to  
choose among a lte rn a tiv e  lin es  of ac tion . This is  not inconsis ten t with 
G e lln e r 's  positio n  which emphasizes continuous cognitive growth, innova­
tio n , learn ing  and re learn ing  as major c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of in d u s tr ia l 
so c ie tie s . C learly , such processes of growth, innovation and learning 
are dependent on continuous in te ra c tio n  with the major in s ti tu tio n s  and 
ind iv iduals which generate o r communicate the la te s t  knowledge and 
c u ltu ra l norms.
For example, access to the major (and even minor) p o l i t i c a l ,  adm inistra­
tiv e  and f in an c ia l in s ti tu tio n s  is  o ften  dependent on knowledge of the
procedures employed by such organ izations, Without such knowledge i t  is 
o ften  d i f f ic u l t  i f  not impossible to gain access to these in s ti tu tio n s , 
even i f  one is  not formally barred from access, Access to informal
so c ia l c i rc le s  may a lso  be of importance in  y ie ld ing both information 
and con tacts, F ina lly  access to  s p e c if ic  environments such as c i t i e s  and 
towns may y ie ld  sp e c if ic  advantages, not only because of th e ir  concen­
tra te d  p o te n tia l for in te ra c tio n , but a lso  because of the concentration 
of sources of information in such areas.
I t  Is important to emphasize th a t the conception of c u ltu re  employed 
here is  not the ethnocen tric  and re if ie d  concept associa ted  with
attem pts to rank cu ltu re s  and c iv i l iz a t io n s .  The question of c u ltu re  is
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a highly complex and emotive one which cannot be considered here in 
d e ta il ,  but a few comments would be in o rde r, F ir s t ly ,  while the term 
" in d u s tr ia liz ed "  has to  some exten t become assoc ia ted  with s p e c if ic  
geographical a reas , p rin c ip a lly  Western Europe and the United S ta tes , 
there is  no necessary connection between in d u s tr ia l  cu ltu re  and a sp ec i­
f ic  area or p a r tic u la r  people. As G ellner po in ts out , the f i r s t  indus­
t r i a l  transform ation was unique and there fo re  a l l  o thers were im ita tiv e , 
Secondly, the c u ltu ra l f r u its  o f in d u s tr ia l iz a tio n  (with a few excep­
tions which arc  kept sec re t or patented) are widely d iffused  through the 
world. There is  in fa c t a strong sense tn  which in d u s tr ia l  c u ltu re  is  
in te rn a tio n a l c u ltu re .
Thirdly, i t  i s  necessary to  iis tin g u ish  between the lo ca lized , sp e c if ic
or " folk" aspects of c u ltu re  and those aspects which are more d iffused ,
standardized o r even " in te rn a tio n a l" . Thus while language, fo lk  a r t  and
some re lig io u s p ra c tices  are localized , science, technology, managerial
s k i l l s ,  Forms of houslnt,. an I s ty le s  of dress are for the most part
" in te rn a tio n a l1' o r cosmopolitan. Local cu ltu ra l  forms become important
to the ex ten t tha t they supply vehic les fo r the e n tire  in d u s tr ia l
cu ltu re  of a s p e c if ic  s ta te .  In th is  respect the advantage of speaking a
language associa ted  with the dominant in d u s tr ia l cu ltu re  is  not a
product of the language i t s e l f ,  but ra th e r  of the access th is  language
affords to p riv ileged  c irc le s  and resources, S im ilarly  sp ec if ic  c u ltu ra l
procedures and p ra c tices  are accorded Importance by v irtu e  ot th e ir
recognition  by persons holding key positio n s  in the socie ty . As 
48G ellner demonstrates, such d is tin c tio n s  tend to  be confused by n ation ­
a l i s t s  who normally affirm  fo lk  c u ltu re  as a p o s itiv e  value, while in
e f fe c t  nationalism  encourages "the generalized d iffu sio n  of a school-
mediated, academy-supervised idiom" and the "establishm ent of an anony­
mous, impersonal socie ty , with mutually s u b s titu ta b le  atomized in d iv id ­
u a ls , held together above a l l  by a shared cu ltu re ",
Race and c la ss
In the c r it iq u e  of G e lln e r 's  theory of nationalism , i t  was argued th a t 
G e lln e r 's  fu n c tio n a lis t explanations were an e f fe c t  o f the high level of 
ab stra c tio n  a t  which h is theory was p itched , I t  was a lso  suggested tha t 
a more adequate ana lysis of nationalism  would have to  explore the ro les  
of sp e c if ic  groups and c la sse s  in n a tio n a lis t  s tru g g les . These issues 
can now be addressed. In p a r tic u la r  the discussion  w ill focus on the 
re la tio n sh ip  between "race" ano "c la ss" , not only because most A frican, 
and in  p a r tic u la r  southern A frican, nationalism s are e s s e n tia lly  ra c ia l  
nationalism s, but a lso  because the debate about race and c la ss  may be 
used to e lu c id a te  general th e o re tic a l problems which apply a lso  to  
nationalism .
In a seminal a r t i c le  on the problems of theoriz ing  ra c ia l domination, 
Deborah Posel has argued th a t the d i f f ic u lt i e s  of conceptualizing the 
re la tio n sh ip  between "race" and "class"  in southern African h i s to r io ­
graphy may be d ire c tly  re la te d  to the r ig id  h eira rc h lc a l terms in which 
the " ra ce-c lass  debate" has been c a s t, so tha t e i th e r  "race" or "class"  
are given an a ly tic a l primacy. The re s u lt  has been a neglect of c la ss  by 
those who give primacy to race, o r functionalism  and reductionism  by 
those who give primacy to c la ss . Posel does not, however, address a 
c e n tra l problem in  most attem pts to  r e la te  "c lass” and "race” , namely 
th a t the two concepts are trea ted  as i f  they were a n a ly tic a lly  equival­
en t. This is  c le a r ly  not the case, because while c la ss  rep resen ts  a 
sp ec if ic  (and complex) th e o re tic a l e n t i ty ,  "race" (o r more s p e c if ic a lly , 
ra c ia l  domination) is  generally  a d esc rip tiv e  term, used to  designate 
un- or under-theorized so cia l processes. To attempt to r e la te  "race" and 
"class"  w ithout assigning a th e o re tic a l content to "race" is  meaningless 
and f u t i l e ,  and can lead only to  the primacy of c la ss  and the re le g atio n  
o f "race" to a purely contingent, ideo log ica l e f fe c t .
To solve th is  problem, "race" must be reconceptualized as a th eo re tic a l
e n t i ty  which is  both d i s t in c t  from c la ss  and transcends the s p e c if ic i ty
o f "race” as e i th e r  a b io log ica l category or ideology. The Weberian
concept of s ta tu s  or f /a / r a 's a t is f ie s  both o f these c r i t e r i a .  (An attempt
to  provide a comprehensive d e f in it io n  o f s ta tu s  is  made in the next 
5)se c tio n .)  F ir s t ly ,  as Michael Hechter has pointed out, "the  s ig n if ic ­
ance of the concept Stand is  th a t i t  countenances a basis fo r group 
formation - and consequently - s t r a t i f i c a t io n  - tha t is  a n a ly tic a lly  
independent of tho re la tio n s  of production", and there fo re  d is t in c t  from 
c la ss . Furthermore, the concept of s ta tu s  allows one to  transcend tho 
s p e c if ic i ty  of "race", in  th a t s ta tu s  may be applied to a v a rie ty  of 
o ther bases of so cia l d iscrim ination  and exclusion such as sex, level of 
income, re lig io n , e th n ic ity , and even nationalism ,
Recasting race as s ta tu s  does not, however, represent a fu l l  so lu tion , 
nor meet a l l  ob jec tions ra ised  about i t s  th eo re tic a l adequacy, The 
reconceptualization  of race as s ta tu s  does not mean th a t cla ss and 
s ta tu s  can be assigned equal th eo re tic a l weights, In a recent c r it iq u e
of O liver Cromwell Cox's pioneering attem pts to  grapple w ith the coopl-52e x i t ie s  o f "race" and "c lass" , Robert Miles has argued th a t "race" and
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"c lass"  cannot be regarded as equivalent concepts because
a? a so cia l construc tion , "race" presupposes the existence of 
p consciousness of physical d iffe ren ces  whereas a conscious- m is  of c la ss  presupposes both the ex istence of a d e f in ite  
mode of production o f m ateria l l i f e  and a consciousness of 
the c la ss  forces to which i t  g ives r is e .
This ob jec tion  is  a common one, although i t  has been formulated in 
d if fe re n t ways. Thus Wilraot James, fo r example, argues th a t ra c ia l  
domination co n s titu te s  a weaker system of so c ia l re la t io n s  than c la ss  
because, un like c la ss , i t  has "no s tru c tu ra l  dynamic o f growth, develop­
ment and expansion". Class determ ination is  th e re fo re  "superior to 
ra c ia l  domination as a determining so cia l force". S im ilarly , Ernesto 
Laclau in  an ea rly  attempt to formulate non-reduction ist analyses of 
fascism and populism, d istingu ished  between two types of so cia l co n fl­
ic t :  c la ss  con trad ic tions  and "people/power bloc" co n tra d ic tio n s . These
antagonisms, he argues, are dominant a t  “ the ab s tra c t level of the mode 
of production" and the " level of a concrete so cia l formation" re sp ec t­
ively . Although they have d iffe re n t emphases, a l l  th ree of these 
approaches suggest tha t there are two leve ls of so cia l ana lysis to  which 
c la ss  on the one hand and "race" (o r a lte rn a tiv e ly  populism, nationalism  
and fascism i are respective ly  associa ted .
This d is tin c tio n  largely  coincides with th a t made by David Lockwood
between the level of so cia l in teg ra tio n  and level of system in teg ra -
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tion . E ssen tia lly  the d is tin c tio n  between so cia l and system in teg ra ­
tion  re fe rs  to  lev e ls  of so cia l ana lysis re la t in g  to the so cia l linkages 
or re la tio n sh ip s  between purposive o«* decision-making ac to rs  or c o lle c t­
iv i t ie s  (soc ia l in te g ra tio n ) , and those between p arts o f a so cia l system 
(system in te g ra tio n ) . Social in teg ra tio n  has been seen as re s tr ic te d  to 
the o rganizational or in te ra c tio n a l leve ls of socie ty  in  which concrete 
so cia l groups and ac to rs  are re la te d  to one another in face-to -face
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s i tu a tio n s  o r as purposive ag e n ts , while system in teg ra tio n  is  located 
on a more a b s tra c t  level and re fe rs  to  the s tru c tu ra l underpinnings of 
so cia l systems.
The d is tin c tio n  between so c ia l and system in teg ra tio n  coincides with 
tha t between c o n f l ic t  and contradiction. C onflict, the stru g g le  between 
two opposing groups of people is  a "problem" of so c ia l ac to rs and is  
there fo re  located a t  the level of so c ia l in teg ra tio n . C ontradiction, on 
the o ther hand, re fe rs  to tonsionr or incom patib lities between s e t s  o f  
so c ia i  r e la tio n s  or p arts of a so cia l system, such as th a t between the 
forces and re la tio n s  of production or between p riv a te  appropria tion  and 
so cia lized  (c o lle c tiv e ) production, C ontradictions th ere fo re  represent 
' problems" of the so cia l system as they re fe r  to tensions, incom patibl­
i t i e s  or a lack of f i t  between elements of the systea , and no t necess­
a r i ly  between indiv iduals or groups, although obviously con trad ictions 
a t the systemic level can, and usually  do, fo s te r  c o n f lic ts  a t  the 
so cia l lev e l.
The d is tin c tio n  tx ‘weon so c ia l and system in teg ra tio n  is  important 
because i t  re la te s  d ire c tly  to  the d if fe re n tia t io n  of c la ss  and s ta tu s  
as th e o re tic a l e n t i t i e s ,  and there fo re  to the ways in which c la ss  and
"race" (and therefore nationalism ) are a r tic u la te d  with one another.56
While c la sse s  may be located a t  both levels of in teg ra tio n , they are 
e s se n tia lly  defined a t  the system level of in teg ra tio n , tha t is  by the 
positions they occupy in the s tru c tu re  of production. Race on the o ther 
hand is  e s se n tia lly  a contingent fa c to r, in tha t i t  has no d ire c t  r e la t ­
ionship to the level of system in teg ra tio n . The same app lies to  n a tion ­
alism , and a l l  o ther s ta tu s  id e n tif ic a tio n s . While the sp e c if ic  s t r u c t ­
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ura l c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of contemporary in d u s tr ia l  so c ie tie s  crea te  the 
conditions fo r the ex istence of nationalism , these conditions do not 
specify  the boundaries of the groups th a t w ill be mobilized by 
nationalism .
That the p rin c ip le  o f nationalism  w ill be operative can be pred ic ted ; ju s t  which groupings w ill emerge as i t s  c a rr ie rs  can be only loosely  ind icated , fo r i t  depends on too many 
h is to r ic  contingencies, Nationalism is  fated to p re v a il, b i t  
not any one p a r tic u la r  nationalism .
In o ther words, s ta tu s  groups are the d ire c t  products o f in te ra c tio n  and
are only located a t  the so cia l in teg ra tio n  leve l.
S ta tus, so c ia l closu re and c la ss
I t  i s  now possib le to  provide a comprehensive d e f in itio n  of s ta tu s . As 
argued a’ , e, s ta tu s  groups are a d ire c t  product of so cia l in te ra c tio n  
( ra th e r than the systemic q u a li t ie s  of so c ie tie s )  and can only be d e f in ­
ed a t  the level of so cia l in teg ra tio n . This provides a key to the 
ambiguous and unpredictable ideologica l o rien ta tio n s  of n a tio n a lis ts  
(and indeed -rther s ta tu s  id e n tif ic a tio n s ) . Ijoceusf? nationalism  is  essen­
t i a l l y  a product of immediate so cia l in te ra c tio n , i t  is  impossible to 
predict, the configuration  of groups and in te re s ts  th a t w ill become 
involved in a sp e c if ic  nationalism , nor the sp e c if ic  h is to r ic a l  facto rs 
th a t might shape th K  ra tiona lism .
Sta tus is  e s se n tia lly  a g radational or h e ira rc h ic a l concept. Weber 
conceptualized the h e ira rc h ic a l p ro p e rties  of s ta tu s  in  terms of " s ta tu s  
honour", tha t is  "a sp e c if ic , p o s itiv e  o r negative so c ia l estim ation of 
honour", S ta tus honour re fe rs  not only to  re la tio n sh ip s  of deference 
and p re stig e , su p e r io r ity  and in fe r io r i ty ,  but a lso  to  the assignment of 
so cia l values o r worth to ind iv iduals on the basis of th e ir  group memb­
e rsh ip . The assignment of such so c ia l values in a s ta tu s  order can have
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profound im plications, not only in  re la t io n  to p riv ileg es  and access to 
m ateria l resources, but a lso  to  so cia l recognition  (in  terms of respect 
or contempt) and there fo re  to  the co n s titu tio n  of sub jective id e n t i t ie s .
S tatus honour may be linked to any q u a lity , re a l o r imagined, th a t is 
shared by a so cia l c o lle c t iv i ty .  Weber sp e f ic a lly  s tressed  " s ty le s  of 
l i f e "  in h is account of s ta tu s ,  but i t  is  c le a r  th a t s ta tu s  honour may 
be linked to almost any q u a lity  including c u ltu re , language, skin- 
colour, sex, property and p ro fessional c re d e n tia ls . Such q u a li t ie s  or 
d is tingu ish ing  marks are contingent and only assume importance when they 
are used as a b as is  for s ta tu s  formation, group demarcation and 
exclusion.
60Status honour "always re s ts  upor d istance and exclusiveness" which
r e s t r ic t s  social re la tio n s  with groups defined as in fe r io r  or lacking in
s ta tu s  honour. Central to  s ta tv s  s t r a t i f i c a t io n  there fo re  are processes
o f exclusion or so c ia l closure .
In content, s ta tu s  honor is  normally expressed by the fac t 
tha t above a l l  e ls e  a sp e c if ic  s iy J e  o f  . l i fe  can be expected from a l l  those who wish to  belong to the c i r c le .  Linked with 
th is  expectation are re s tr ic t io n s  on 's o c ia l ' in te rc o u rs e .,. ,As soon as there is  not a mere ind iv idual and so c ia lly  
irre le v a n t im ita tion  of another s ty le  of l i f e ,  but an agreed- upon communal ac tion  of th is  closing  ch arac ter, the 's t a tu s ' 
development is  underway, 61
As Weber pointed out, " s t r a t i f i c a tio n  by s ta tu s  goes hand in hand with a
62monopolization o f ideal and m ateria l goods or o p p o rtu n itie s ."  S tatus 
therefore provides an a lte rn a tiv e , although not necessarily  unre la ted , 
bas' '  inequa lity  and ex p lo itio n  to c la ss  d i f fe re n tia t io n . I t  is
im portant, however, not to  overemphasize economic ex p lo ita tio n  as a 
basis of s ta tu s  orders. Economic e x p lo ita tio n  is  not always the most 
obvious or Immediate grievance aga inst s ta tu s  o rde rs. The s ta tu ses
a llo ca ted  to  subordinate groups in ra c ia l  o rd e rs , fo r example, are 
d ire c tly  linked  to  notions of human worth and as such place a value not 
only on the so c ia l ac to r as an economic producer, but determine a lso  the 
recognition he receives as a so cia l being as well as the value th a t is  
placed on h is  l i f e .  Given the undue emphasis placed on economic 
e x p lo ita tio n  by c la ss  th e o r is ts , i t  is  perhaps not too obvious to point 
out th a t (although there is  an obvious causal re la tio n sh ip  between the 
two) physical surv ival takes p r io r i ty  over economic in te re s t.
The concept o f so cia l closu re requires fu r th e r e lab o ra tio n . By so cia l 
closu re Weber re fe r re d  to  the process whereby socia... -aoups monopolize 
advantages by r e s tr ic t in g  access of o u ts ide rs  to re s c v itfs  and opportun­
i t ie s  which they co n tro l. This monopolization is  aimed a t  p o ten tia l 
com petitors who are defined as in fe r io r  and in e lig ib le  in terms of 
s p e c if ic  physical or so cia l a t t r ib u te s  such as race, language, re lig io n , 
so cia l o rig in  or s k i l l s ,  closure there fo re  e n ta ils  two e sse n tia l 
aspects: a process of a sso c ia tio n , of de lim iting  the boundaries of a 
group, and an ac tiv e  attem pt to exclude o u ts id e rs  by means of the id en t­
if ic a tio n  of s p e c if ic  a t t r ib u te s  associa ted  with such o u ts id e rs . In a l l  
cases the purpose of closu re is  to maximize the advantages of the 
excluding group.
Frank Parkin has extended the notion of so cia l closure to  include the 
co lle c tiv e  so c ia l ac tions of both subordinate and superordinate social 
groupings, Closure s tra te g ie s  are there fo re  used not only to  crea te  
p riv ileg es  by means of excluding o u ts id e rs , but a lso  by those who are 
excluded, as a d ire c t  response to th e ir  exclusion and as a means of 
reversing  or undermining the p riv ileg es  appropriated by dominant s ta tu s
groups. I t  is  th is  second type of closure , which Parkin c a l ls  "usurpat- 
ionary closu re", tha t may be d ire c tly  re la te d  to nationalism , C learly  
forms of usurpationary closure are tied  to  exclusionary closure in  tha t 
the c rea tio n  of p riv ile g e  by exclusion , n ecessarily  defines a subordin­
a te , excluded or n eg a tiv e ly p riv ile g e d  group. In P ark in 's  words, usurp­
ationary  closure is  "the o ther h a lf  o f the so cia l closu re equation",
In the context of South A frica and Namibia, racism and black nationalism  
are re la ted  to one another in  th is  way.
A fu rth e r usefu l d is tin c tio n  made by Parkin is  th a t between ind iv idua l­
i s t  and c o l le c t iv is t  forms of closu re , th a t is  closure affec ted  on the 
basis of individual c h a ra c te r is t ic s  such as property o r c re d e n tia ls , and 
closure based on c r i t e r i a  of descent or lineage. This d is tin c tio n  la rg e ­
ly coincides with the fa m ilia r d is tin c tio n  between "achievement" and 
"asc rip tio n " , terms which are re je c ted  by Parkin because they erroneous­
ly a t t r ib u te  v o lu n ta ris iic "  q u a li t ie s  to  the former and " n a tu ra lly -67given" q u a li t ie s  to the l a t t e r .  In d iv id u a lis t c r i t e r i a  of closu re are 
closely  associa ted  with contemporary c a p i ta l is t  s o c ie tie s , and while 
these forms of closure were id ea lly  su ited  to the needs of a r is in g  
bourgeoisie in the process o f challenging the c o l le c t iv is t  c r i t e r i a  of a 
feudal ar is to c rac y , they ra is e  problems fo r the reproduction of dominant 
cla sse s  in c a p i ta l is t  s o c ie tie s . That is ,  in d iv id u a lis t c r i t e r i a  of 
closure help to ensure a high ca lib re  of new re c ru its  to  dominant 
groups, but are not always able to ensure safe transm ission of group 
p riv ileg es  to descendants.
In P ark in 's  theory, cla sses  are defined in  terms of th e ir  mode of 
closure ra th e r than in re la t io n  to th e ir  positio n s  in the productive 
process. This is  a form of reduction and is  equivalent to the c la ss
reductionist!! o f some Marxist th e o r is ts , although i t  works in the oppos­
i te  d ire c tio n . Such an emphasis leads Parkin to  conclude, fo r example, 
tha t white workers in South A frica, whose p ositions  o f p riv ileg e  owe
more to  closure against blacks than th e ir  strugg le  with the white bourg-
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e o is ie , there fo re  form p art o f the dominant c la ss . Such reasoning
tends to rob c la ss  of a l l  meaning, reducing i t  to  a mere so cia l ca teg­
ory, and appears to be an in ev itab le  r e s u it  o f not c le a rly  d is tin g u ish ­
ing between c la ss  and s ta tu s  as a n a ly tic a lly  d i s t in c t  ca teg o ries .
C learly  white workers who mobilize aga inst blacks are not ac ting  in
terms of c la ss  in te re s ts  tha t may be defined in  r e la t io n  to  the s tru c t-
M \ure of production, but ra th e r  in terms of in te re s ts  as a segment of a \
ra c ia l  or s ta tu s  group. As such they share in te re s ts  with members of | \
o ther c la sse s . While these common in te re s ts  may influence th e ir  p o l i t i -  ^
ca l s tra te g ie s  and ideologies, i t  lo g ica lly  does not, and cannot, a l t e r
\th e ir  c la ss  p o s itio n . ( I t  is  o f course possib le fo r jewe members of the
white working c la ss  to use th e ir  positions as members of a dominant L 11
ra c ia l  group, to  gain entrance to  other c la sse s , ju s t  as in n o n -rac la lly  C
s tructu red  c a p i ta l is t  so c ie tie s  some members of the bougeiosie may be V
rec ru ited  from the working c la ss , Such m obility  between c la sse s ,
however, does not a l t e r  the c la ss  system nor the positions o f workers
who do not change th e ir  c la s s .)  As workers they are s t i l l  subject to
sp e c if ic  re la tio n s  of production tha t define th e ir  c la ss  p o sitio n , and
share c la ss  in te re s ts  with workers of o ther ra c ia l  groups, even i f  these
In te re s ts  may be overshadowed by ra c ia l  in te re s ts .  There is  no iron law 7
th at white workers w ill always id en tify  with a ra c ia l  group ra th e r than
a c la ss , even in the context of a r a c ia l  o rder. This suggests th a t two
d is tin c t  se ts  of c r i t e r i a  e x is t  fo r group formation.
#P ark in 's  re in te rp re ta t io n  of c la ss  in  terras of modes of closu re is  
d ire c tly  re la te d  to  h is  awareness of the "lack of f i t  between a l l  p o s it­
ional or system atic d e f in itio n s  of c la ss  and the actual behaviour of 
c lasses in the course of d is tr ib u tiv e  strugg le" His s tra te g y , however, 
does not solve th is  problem, but merely avoids i t  by reducing c lasses to 
mare social ca tegories  with no d is tin c tiv e  fe a tu res  from o ther so cia l 
groupings,
This d iscussion underlines the need to  d is tin g u ish  between c la ss  and 
s ta tu s  re la t io n s  and to  r e la te  these two forms o f so cia l re la tio n s  to 
the levels of social and system in teg ra tio n . As argued above, classes 
are d i s t in c t  from s ta tu s  groups in tha t they are defined a t  the system 
in teg ra tio n  lev e l, while s ta tu s  groups are re s tr ic te d  to the level of 
so c ia l in teg ra tio n . In the case of classes  there fo re  the c r i t e r i a  fo r 
c la ss  formation, for the d elin ea tio n  o f group boundaries, are pre-given 
by the s tru c tu re  of production, Classes are there fo re  not dependent on 
the id e n tif ic a tio n  of sp ec if ic  contingent a t t r ib u te s  as a basis  for 
d i f fe re n tia t io n  and exclusion, S tatus groups may be influenced by the 
systemic properties of so cia l systems, but are never determined a t  th is
However, c la sse s  can only become conscious and involve themselves in 
class struggle a t  the social lev e l, At th is  level they compete with 
s ta tu s  d is tin c tio n s  and become only one of many possib le a l te rn a tiv e s  of 
group formation. At the level of so cia l in teg ra tio n , i t  may be d i f f ic u lt  
to d isen tangle classes  from s ta tu s  groups, c la sse s  may indeed conceive 
o f themselves or a f fe c t  closure in  s ta tu s  terms, as, fo r example, in  the 
common "lower-middle-upper c la ss"  d is tin c tio n . Not even M arxists seem
,  " S l i  -  A i t o *  u . A L * f i t e  ^  « >  -
immune to  confusions about c la sc  and s ta tu s  d iv is io n s , as w itnessed, for
example by the debate about the "middle c lasses"  in  contemporary c a p it­
al
a l i s t  s o c ie tie s . There is  no » /W<zr/method of determining whether
c la ss  or s ta tu s  d is tin c tio n s  w ill provide the dominant forms o f social 
m obilization:
The answer to the question, why does exclusion and domination 
assume a predominantly ra c ia l  form in  one so cie ty , a r e l i g ­ious form in  another, and a la rge ly  c la ss  form in a th ird , is 
only explicable in h is to r ic a l  terms. There is  no general 
theory th a t could explain  why some s o c ie tie s  and not others 
experience the migratory and demographic movements tha t f in a lly  r e s u lt  in communal d iv is io n s .72
There is  also  no method of determining in advance the ways in which
"class"  and' "race" might be a r tic u la te d  with one another except through
em pirical research  a t  the social in teg ra tio n  le v e l, Although certain.
system ic q u a l i t ie s  may favour p a r tic u la r  outcomes, the allignm ent of
gioups and c la sse s  in s p e c if ic  social formations is  the product of
complex in te ra c tio n s  and h is to r ic a l  developments requiring  d eta ile d
em pirical research . To s t a r t  out from the assumption th a t a p a r tic u la r
mode of production is  determ inate without d e ta ile d  in v estig a tio n  of the
level of so c ia l in teg ra tio n  can only lead of d i f f ic u l t i e s .  In a recent73
c r it iq u e  of Marxist development sociology, David Booth has argued tha t 
rad ica l development sociology has reached a general impasse which is
characterized  by an in a b lity  to generate th e o re tic a lly  informed 
research , increasingly  a r id  and re p e ti tiv e  analyses, and uncertain ty  
about the way forward, This impasse, Booth argues, can be traced  to a 
common in sis te n ce  on the p art o f Marxist th e o ris ts  " tha t the s a lie n t  
features of c a p i ta l is t  n a tio n a lis t  economies can be 'r e a d - o f f  from the 
concept of the c a p i ta l is t  mode of production and i t s  laws", o r a l te r n a t­
ively derived from the nature o f th e ir  in se rtio n  in the world c a p i ta l is t
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There a re , however, some in te re s tin g  po in ters in the l i te ra tu r e  to the
ways in which c la sse s  and s ta tu s  groups may be re la te d  to one another,
I t  has been suggested, fo r example, th a t  in c a p i ta l is t  so c ie tie s , s ta tu s
h eira rc h ie s  are jometimes used to  s ta b i l iz e  and leg itim ize c la ss  p o s it-
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ions. P ark in 's  d iscussion of in d iv id u a lis t  and c o l le c t iv i s t  forms of 
closu re is  a lso  suggestive in th is  regard. As already  argued, the p re­
dominantly in d iv id u a lis t  closure employed by dominant c la sse s  in  c a p i t ­
a l i s t  so c ie tie s  c rea te s  v u ln e ra b litie s  in the reproduction o f such 
c la sse s . Recourse is  therefore o ften  made to the use of c o l le c t iv is t  
c r i t e r i a  to b o ls te r  the predominantly in d iv id u a lis t forms of class 
reproduction. I t  i s  s ig n if ic a n t th a t c o l le c t iv is t  exclusion of the 
working c la ss  was most evident in  ea rly  and ciid-19t,h century Europe:
The badge of p ro le ta rian  s ta tu s  ca rrie d  with i t  the kinds of stigm ata commonly associa ted  w ith subordinate r a c ia l  and 
ethn ic  groups, H  was a to ta l  condition which perm itted 
l i t t l e  leeway fo r the c u ltiv a tio n  of those small part-tim e 
id e n ti t ie s  that bring temporary re le ase  from the hum ilities  of s e rv ile  s ta tu s .7 5
This resemblance between p ro le ta rian  s ta tu s  in ea rly  c a p i ta l is t  Europe
and the se rv ile  s ta tu ses  of subordinate groups in ra c ia l  orders suggests
tha t the .onstruction  of ra c ia l orders may be associa ted  with the vuln-
e ra b li ty  ra th e r than the strengths o f c a p i ta l is t  c la sse s . Stanley
Greenberg, for example, has argued th a t the e a rly  stages of c a p i ta l is t
development are characterized  by an in te n s if ic a tio n  of ra c ia l  domination
77associa ted  with the needs of sp ec if ic  c la sse s . Jeffery  Paige is even 
more e x p lic i t  in tha t he d ire c tly  links the in te n s if ic a tio n  of c o n f lic t  
to  the v u ln e ra b lity  of sp e c if ic  c la sse s , In Namibia the e laboration  o f a 
r a c ia l  order and rep ressive  labour system was closely  associa ted  with 
the labour requirements of economically-marginal s e t t l e r  farmers and, to 
a le sse r  e x te n t, ea rly  mining c a p ita l . In p a r tic u la r , the labour needs
_  *  , - . a . -  A * .  -
of white farmers helped to  crea te  not only a ra d ic a l d is tin c tio n  between
whites and b lacks, but a lso  the d if fe re n tia t io n  of northern contract
labour from local or po lice zone labour, and even d is tin c tio n s  among
78con trac t labourers themselves.
In much the same way as dominant groups or c la sse s  strengthen th e ir  
positions by manipulation of the s ta tu s  o rde r, so subordinate groups 
a lso  use so c ia l closu re to  challenge the dominance of superordinant 
groups. The most obvious example of th is  l a t t e r  s tra te g y  in the African 
context is  the re v ersa l of s e rv ile  ra c ia l  s ta tu ses  through black nation­
alism Racial nationalism  of th is  so rt  serves two major purposes. F ir s t ­
ly , i t  c rea te s  a c le a r basis  fo r the d e f in itio n , u n if ic a tio n  and mobil­
iza tio n  of subordinate groups to challenge the dominant classes  and to 
transcend sm all-sca le , communal id e n t i t ie s .  In Namibia, ra c ia l  consc­
iousness provided a basis fo r u n ified  re s is tan c e , long before any c le a r  
notion of a t e r r i to r ia l  o r sta te-based  nationalism  had emerged.
Secondly, ra c ia l  nationalism  allows subordinate s ta tu s  groups to  c h a l l ­
enge and even reverse the degradation of a ra c ia l  o rder. Whereas in the 
c o lo n ia l-ra c ia l context "black has s ig n if ie d  fo r everyone a l l  tha t was
v i le  and co rrup t, now the reversa l is  true: black is  pure, black is
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noble, black is  b e a u tifu l."  A c le a r  example of s ta tu s  reversa l in
Namibia is provided by the Ot/j'sersm/u or "Truppenspieler" organizations
which adopted the m ilita ry  procedures, uniforms and ranking systems of
th e ir  co lo n ia l o verlo rds. In th is  way these movements were ab le to
c rea te  an a lte rn a tiv e  and p a ra lle l  s ta tu s  order to th a t of co lonial 
80society .
S ta tus manipulations may a lso  be m anifest In c o n f lic ts  between d is tin c t
groups and in te re s ts  w ithin n a tio n a lis t  movements. A c le a r  example of 
such s ta tu s  c o n f lic ts  i s  represented, fo r example, by the strugg le 
between the in te l l ig e n ts ia  and the Nerero indigenous leadership for 
contro l over the n a tio n a lis t  movement in the la te  1950s and ea rly
1960s. The Herero indigenous leadersh ip  during the 1940s and 1950s had 
been able to construct a strong power base by appealing to p re-co lonial 
symbols and s tru c tu re s  of au th o rity . Their dominance was, however, 
challenged by the in te l l ig e n ts ia  who attempted to undercut the au th o rity  
of the indigenous leadersh ip  by crea ting  a a new s ta tu s  order based 
p rin c ip a lly  on c re d e n tia ls  such as l i te ra c y  and lev e ls  of education.
Alas and preview o f the d is s e r ta t io n
Having s e t  out a broad explanatory framework for nationalism , i t  is  now 
necessary to show how these th e o re tic a l considerations r e la te  to  the 
main body of the th es is , to examine the underlying aims and assumptions 
o f the d is s e r ta t io n , to id en tify  lim ita tio n s  and possib le weaknesses in
i t s  s tru c tu re , and to suggest ways in  which the issues explored here
might be extended. Before addressing these issues, however, i t  is
e s se n tia l  to s e t out the aims of the th esis  and to provide a b r ie f  
preview of tne d isse rta t io n  in order to introduce the reader to  the 
major issues and underlying s tru c tu re  of the study,
th e  ce n tra l aim of the th esis  is  to explore the so cia l fo/ces which have 
shaped the development o f a movement of national l ib e ra tio n  in  Namibia 
and in  th is  way con tribu te  to a deeper understanding of nationalism  in 
general. The emphasis is  there fo re  on the o rig ins of Namibian n a tio n a l­
ism and the various groups and in te re s ts  tha t brought i t  in to  being, 
ra th e r than on the h is to ry  of the n a tio n a lis t  movement i t s e l f ,  A second-
ary aim Is to provide an h iu to r t .  1 overview of the development of black
nationalism  in Namibia, C learly  th is  aim Itfs to be seen in the context
of the re la t iv e ly  ex tensive period covered a,id the p le tho ra  of themes 
and issues tha t are re le v an t, The various d i f f ic u l t ie s  assoc ia ted  with 
th is  secondary aim w ill be d iscussed in g re a te r d e ta il  towards the end 
o f th is  in troduction .
The d is se rta t io n  is  divided in to  fourteen  c h a p te rs , organized in  four 
major sec tions- Two of the sec tions deal with the so c ia l context w ithin 
which Namibian nationalism  arose, in the "police zone" (c e n tra l and 
southern Namibia) and the northern reserves re sp ec tiv e ly . The two
remaining sec tions are devoted to analyses of the two d i s t in c t  phases of 
Namibian nationalism .
In keeping with the emphasis placed on the ro le  of the s ta te  in  th is  
in troduction , sec tion  one (chapters one to three) e s s e n tia lly  focus on 
the ro le  of the colonial s ta te  in the e laboration  of a r a c ia l  order and 
in crea tin g  the conditions fo r the f i r s t  phase of n a tio n a lis t  re s is tan ce  
in the 1920s, The ro le  of the s ta te  is  considered w ithin the context of 
a number of sp ec if ic  conditions. The f i r s t  of these re la te s  to  the 
nature of im perialism . Both German and South African p o lic ies  in 
Namibia, i t  i s  argued, were e s s e n tia lly  products of s o - ' i l ,  ra th e r  than 
economic, im perialism . That Is , im perial in te re s ts  in Namibia were
shaped by the d isrup tive  consequences of in d u s tr ia l cap ita lism  in 
Germany and south A frica, ra th e r than by the d ire c t  economic re q u ire ­
ments o f the c a p i ta l is t  metro^oles One major consequence o f th is  form 
o f impfc.’ialism  is tha t i t  made the co lon ia l s ta le  highly recep tive  to 
s e c tle r  in te re s ts  and provided one of the bases for the e labora tion  of a 
ra c ia l order in Namibia,
A second v i ta l  fa c to r in explaining co lon ia l p o lic ie s  and th e ir  outcome 
in  a highly re p ressiv e  ra c ia l  o rder, re la te s  to the ecological and 
c lim atic  conditions o f Namibia. The sp e c if ic  ecology of Namibia, i t  is  
argued, not <.•"./ in te n s if ie d  the strugg le  fo r contro l over the t e r r i t ­
o ry 's  resources, but rendered s e t t l e r  a g ric u ltu re  extremely vulnerable, 
c rea ting  pressures fo r rad ica l s ta te  in terven tion . These pressures were 
m anifested i n i l i a .  in  demands fo r the tra n sfe r  of ag r ic u ltu ra l resour­
ces, p rin c ip a lly  land and liv esto ck , to the s e t t l e r s ,  and la te r  fo r 
rad ica l control over black labour. In s p ite  of ea rly  -.(.tempts by the 
s ta te  to r e s is t  such pressures (during the governorship of Leutwein, and 
the South African m ilita ry  period , for example), the ra c ia l  order that 
emerged was a d ire c t  r e f le c tio n  of s e t t l e r  in tere .A s and in p a r tic u la r  
those of the s e t t l e r  farms
Relations between colonized, s e t t l e r s  an^ the s ta te  also  developed 
w ithin a p o l i t ic a l  context shaped by rad ica l notions of s ta te  sovereign­
ty and t e r r i to r ia l i t y .  These doctrines of the s»ate  played a prominent 
ro le  in ea rly  c o n f lic ts  between indigenous communities and the s ta te ,  
affec tin g  a ra d ic a l re d e fin itio n  of economic and p o l i t i c a l  space and
opening the way for new p o l i t ic a l  id e n ti t ie s  th a t  transcended pre-
co lonlal bases of group formation,
Section one also  focus'1 s on the cru c ia l consequences of the tra n s itio n  
from German to South African ru le , emphasizing d isc o n tin u itie s  in the
change of regimes, The con trad ictions and c o n s tra in ts  generated in
colonial p o lic ies  during th is  tra n s it io n a l  period, i t  is  argued, are 
d ire c tly  re la te d  to the in te n s if ic a tio n  of re s is ta n c e  between 1920 and
These f i r s t  three chapters there fo re  se t the stage fo r the an a ly sis  of 
the f i r s t  phase of n a tio n a lis t  re s is tan c e  in sec tion  ;wo (chapters four 
to seven). Previous analyses of th is  cru cia l period of Namibian h is to ry  
have tended to focus on the d isc re te  reb ellio n s  of 1922 and 1925 and 
have generally  fa ile d  to show the clf-se in te r- re la tio n sh ip  and ex tens­
iveness of an ti-c o lo n ia l re s is tan c e . A primary purpose of th is  sec tion  
therefore id '.o provide a d e ta ile d  ana lysis of the various p o l i t ic a l  
o rganizations and instances of re s is tan c es  as p a rt of a broad movement 
of popular a sse rtio n .
e s se n tia lly , th is  p o p la r  movement was a product of a tra n s it io n a l  and 
so ia l ly  fragmented socie ty  in  which p re -co lo n ia l p o l i t i c a l  id e n ti t ie s  
wer* in  a process of d is in te g ra tio n  and transform ation, but in which no 
fin e ly  based a lte rn a tiv e  id e n t i t ie s  had yet emerged. The movement was 
th ere fu re  characterized  by a loosely defined pan-A fricanist o r ra c ia l  
nationalism  associa ted  with the Garveyist movement.
While the co lonial s ta te  had succeeded in affec tin g  a rad ica l reorganiz­
atio n  <m p re -co lo n ia l communities, the new stru c tu re s  had not been in 
ex istercti '(ing enough to crea te  the conditions for a t e r r i to r ia l  or 
sta te-base^  ra tiona lism , which was to charac terize  the sdcond or contem­
porary phase of Namibian nationalism , Furthermore, the temporary weak­
nesses of the s ta te  during the tra n s it io n a l  period , allowed fo r g rea ter 
physical mobii ty  and for the d iffu sio n  of ex te rnal p o l i t i c a l  i d e o l c 'e s  
and movements across s ta te  boundaries. However, w ithin the context of a 
co lon ial s ta te  which was rap id ly  recovering from thn confusions .\nd 
un ce rta in tie s  of the tra n s it io n  o f regimes, id e n tif ic a tio n  with ex te rnal
movements proved very tenuous, Under p ressures from a re v ita liz e d  s ta te , 
the movement d is in te g ra te d  and there was a reversion  to  p o l i tic a l  
id e n tif ic a tio n s  based on p re -co lo n ia l and communal d iv isio n s.
Sections one and two re la te  p rin c ip a lly  to developments in the po lice  
zone, the nucleus of co lonial power and the area of white settlem ent. 
Section 3 (chapters e ight and nine) s h if ts  the discussion  to  the areas 
beyond thi-' p o lice  zone, and in  p a r tic u la r  to Ovamboland. in s p ite  of 
being incorporated in to  both the German and South African co lonies, the 
northern reserves re ta in ed  an id e n tity  of th e ir  own and were kept i s o l ­
ated from the p o lice  zone by s t r i c t l y  enforced regu la tions con tro lling  
movement between the two sec to rs . The e s s e n tia l  link  between the no rth ­
ern reserves and the police zone, however, was migrant labour, and with 
time the northern reserves (and in  p a r tic u la r  Ovamboland) came to occupy 
the po sitio n  of major supp lie r of labour to the p o lice  zone.
Section three therefore focuses on the impact of co lon ial adm inistration  
on the northern reserves and on the o rig in s  and development of the 
system of c o n tra c t labour, in re la t io n  to the l a t t e r ,  i t  is  argued tha t 
environmental fac to rs  are c ru c ia l in explaining the o rig ins of the 
contract labour system. Following an ana lysis of the re la t iv e  in te re s ts  
and changing fortunes of mining ar s e t t l e r  ag r ic u ltu re  in Namibia 
between 1925 and 1948, i t  is  conclu 'ed th a t the in te re s ts  of s e t t l e r  
farmers played a ce n tra l ro le  in shaping the con tract labour system. 
Through the vehic le of the con tract labour system, white a g ric u ltu re  
introduced new com plexities in to  the ra c ia l  order by supplementing 
s ta tu s  d is tin c tio n s  between blacks and whiter with add itio n al d is t in c ­
tions between con tract and local labour, as well as d is tin c tio n s  between
d iffe re n t "grades" of contract labour.
These developments ore d ire c tly  re la te d  to the undermining and d is in te ­
g ra tio n  of p o l i t ic a l  and economic s tru c tu re s  in Ovamboiand between the 
two world wars. The dominance of s e t t l e r  a g ric u ltu re  was to  lead to the 
t ra n s fe r  of the bulk of migrant labourers from mining to farm labour, 
with a consequent drop In wages and the weakening of the bargaining 
ca p ac itie s  of migrant workers. These strugg les were played out against 
the backdrop of drought, depression and severe food shortages, in cre a­
sing pressures on the land, tax a tio n , and the erosion of the au tho rity  
of the indigenous ru le rs  in Ovamboiand. A c ru c ia l aspect of th is  
process, however, was tha t in  s p i te  of the erocion o f p re -co lo n ia l 
s tru c tu re s , Ovamboiand was prevented from adapting to i t s  new in d u s tr ia l 
context by i t s  enforced iso la tio n  and the in sis te n ce  of the co lon ia l 
au th o ritie s  in propping up decaying " tra d it io n a l"  in s ti tu tio n s  and prac­
t i c e s ,  Even w ithin the context of the r ig id  ra c ia l  o rder, Ovamboiand 
therefore represents a spec ia l case of re s tr ic te d  access to  the common 
" in d u s tr ia l cu ltu re".
Together these f i r s t  th ree sec tions lay the foundations fo r the analysis 
of the second or contemporary phase of Namibian nationalism  in the fin a l  
sec tion  (chapters ten to th ir te e n ) . E ssen tia lly  th ree groups of 
in te re s ts  helped to bring the contemporary n a tio n a lis t  movement in to  
ex is tence . These were the indigenous (" tra d it io n a l" )  leadersh ip  which 
took i t s  bearing from p re-co lon ial symbols and s tru c tu re s ; the con tract 
labourers who fo r the most part, were also  Ovambos; and a group of 
educated and urbanized persons id en tified  as the " in te l l ig e n ts ia 1'.
Perhaps because nationalism  o rig in ated  in the West and because of the
coHmon assumption that e th n ic  or s u b - te r r i to r ia l  nationalism s are 
irreconc iab le  with sta te-based  nationalism s, accounts of African n ation ­
alism  have tended to underestimate the importance of .ndigenous inpu ts. 
Section four therefore begins with a discussion  of the d iffe re n t strands 
th a t came to c o n s titu te  the indigenous leadership of the n a tio n a lis t  
movement, and in p a r tic u la r  of the Herero C hiefs’ Council.
E ssen tia lly  two d i s t in c t ,  but re la te d  responses of the Herero grouping 
in  the post-1925 period may be id e n tif ie d . The f i r s t  o f these coalesced 
around the indigenous leadership which had been incorporated in to  the 
co lonial adm in istrative s tru c tu re  of the police zone. The second was 
tied  to the more p ro le ta rian ize d  and "d etrib a lize d "  Hereros in  the towns 
and on the farms, who formed themselves in to  a pa ra -m ilita ry  organisa­
tion  known as the Otjiserandu. This p ro to -n a tio n a lis t movement provided 
for the expression of re s is tan c e  in a .o v ert or symbolic manner and 
offered  an a lte rn a tiv e  s ta tu s  heirarchy and basis of p o l i t i c a l  au th o rity  
to th a t o f co lonial society  The development of powerful symbols for 
both Herero and Namibian nationalism  was closely  associa ted  with these 
two s trands, which a f te r  a period of strugg le  for dominance, were incor­
porated in to  one p o l i t i c a l  body. This body, the C hiefs' Council, emerged 
as the most powerful p o l i t ic a l  force in Namibia and was largely  respons­
ib le  for laying the foundations fo r the n a tio n a lis t  movement which 
emerged in the la te  1950s.
The ro le  of con trac t workers in the launching of the n a tio n a lis t  move­
ment is  closely  re la te d  to the fundamental changes th a t  took place in 
th e ir  so cia i .onsciousncss and p o l i t i c a l  responses in  the 1940s, This
change, i t  is  argued, should be seen not only aga inst the background of 
th e ir  dual involvement in the subsistence and wage economies, but also  
in terms of th e ir  employment in both the in d u s tr ia l and ag r ic u ltu ra l 
sec to rs of the wage economy. With the developing c r is i s  in Ovaraboland 
(described in sec tion  th ree ), northern con trac t workers became more 
dependent on wage labour, However, while th is  en ta ile d  a g re a te r degree 
o f p ro le ta r ia n iz a tio n  of the con tract labour force, migrant labourers 
were a lso  subject to sp ec if ic  conditions which d if fe re n tia te d  them from 
other labourers. In s p ite  of th e ir  increasing dependence on wage labour, 
con tract labourers were forced to re tu rn  to th e ir  sending areas and were 
consequently subjected to the re s tra in in g  influences of the peasant 
economy and indigenous au th o ritk -s . Furthermore, the nature of the 
con tract system meant th a t there was a constant turnover of the contract 
labour force in sp ec if ic  lo c a li t i e s .  These s tru c tu ra l  conditions, i t  is  
argued, made co n trac t workers p o l i t i c a l ly  vulnerable and o rien ted  them 
towards a n a t io n a l is t ,  ra th e r th; . a c la ss  s tra teg y .
Moreover, the p a r tia l  p ro le ta rian iza tio n  o f the co n trac t labour force
took place in the context of a number of o ther changes, including 
unprecedented growth of the co lonial economy a f te r  World War I I ,  a new 
in flux  of white s e t t l e r s ,  fu r th e r development of commercial ag ric u ltu re  
and the In te n s if ic a tio n  of competition between d iffe re n t sec to rs  of the 
Namibian and South African economies for co n trac t labour. These develop­
ments helped to d iv e rs ify  employment opportun itie s fo r con trac t workers 
and provided new opportunities fo r m obility  between d iffe re n t work 
s e tt in g s . The harsh conditions of farm labour - to which nearly  every
con trac t worker was subjected a t one or o ther time in h is l i f e  - served
to  ra d ic a liz e  them and encouraged the development of a v arie ty  of s t r a t ­
eg ie s, including the boycotting of sp ec if ic  employers, dese rtion  and the
assumption o f a lte rn a tiv e  ethnic id e n t i t ie s  in order to escape the 
con tro ls of the con tract labour system. On the o ther hand, in d u s tr ia l 
employment with i t s  concentration of workers in sp e c if ic  lo c a li t ie s ,  
allowed new opportunities fo r c o lle c tiv e  organization  and re s is tan c e .
Most important, however, were the opportunities fo r m obility  between 
a lte rn a tiv e  work s e ttin g s  and in  p a r tic u la r  the access Ovambo workers 
were able to  gain - both le g a lly  and i l le g a l ly  - to  employment in  South 
Africa, This m obility  not only undermitted the r ig id  con tro l, f the 
con tract labour system, but a lso  exposed a ce n tra l weakness of the 
t e r r i to r ia l  s ta te ,  namely i t s  In a b lity  to  contro l events beyond i ts  
boundaries. This weakness was to prove cru c ia l f i r s t l y  in the launching 
of the ovamboland peop le 's  Organization by migrant workers in  Cape Town, 
and la te r  in the launching of diplom atic and m ilita ry  o ffensives against 
the co lonial s ta te  from abroad.
Development during the post-World War II period, and in  p a r tic u la r  
urbanization  and the expansion of black education, a lso  playeu a key 
io le  in transform ing p o l i tic a l  responses to co lonialism . These develop­
ments were p a r tic u la r ly  crucial for the emergence of the th ird  component 
of the Namibian n a tio n a lis t  movement, the in te l l ig e n ts ia .  Just as 
Increased m obility helped to free  con trac t workers from tlw bondage of 
the con tract labour system, so the in te l l ig e n ts ia  was ab le to  break away 
from the co n s tra in ts  uf the indigenous leadership and the "ethnic" 
organization  of p o l i t ic s ,  by means of the opportun ities th a t arose from 
urbanization  and changes in the education system fo r po lice zone blacks. 
Not only did urbanization concentrate the black labour force in sp ec if ic  
locations - thus f a c i l i ta t in g  communication and m obilization - but i t
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a lso  encouraged the transcendence of e th n ic  or parochial id e n t i t ie s .  I t  
was e s se n tia lly  the towns which served as centres fo r the common Indust­
r i a l  cu ltu re  associa ted  with the c a p i ta l is t  economy and t e r r i to r ia l  I
s ta te .  Furthermore, s ta te  p o lic ies  which attempted to lim it the Influx 
o f blacks in to  the urban areas, in te n s if ie d  the c o n f lic ts  inherent in a 
r a c ia l  order w ithin an indusv .'ia liz ing  contex t, and served to ra d ic a lize  
the urban black population. I t  is  no coincidence there fo re  th a t the 
f i r s t  major issue taken up by the newly-formed n a tio n a lis t  organizations 
in  the la te  )U50s was the forced removal to the Katutura township in 
Windhoek
Education played a. s im ila r ro le  to urbanization . I t  too offered  a source 
of access to the shared or standardized c u ltu re , and opportun itie s to 
transcend parochial id e n ti t ie s  and the contro l of indigenous a u th o rit­
ie s . Like urbanization , Western education with i t s  e g a lita r ia n  emphases, 
ch tllenged the e x is tin g  s ta tu s  orders of both the broad ra c ia l system 
and the indigenous leadersh ip , and helped to  ra d ic a lize  those blacks who 
had obtained an above averape education. Jn p a r tic u la r  education allowed 
the in te l l ig e n ts ia  to put forward a lte rn a tiv e  c red en tia ls  fo r leadership 
of the n a tio n a lis t  movement from those o f the indigenous a u th o rit ie s . 
Thus the in te l l ig e n ts ia  emphasized i t s  education and "modernity’ ; in 
r e la t io n  to the lack of education and "backwardness" of the indigenous 
leadersh ip . Of the th ree major groupings tha t made up the n a tio n a lis t 
movement, the in te l l ig e n ts i i  were also  the most ardent n a t io n a lis ts . 
This was re la te d  nut only to th e ir  p a r tic ip a tio n  in a broad c u ltu ra l 
d iscourse , but a lso  in the nature of th e ir  id e n tity  as in te l le c tu a ls  and 
the consequent tenuousness of th e ir  bases of popular support, The 
in te l l ig e n ts ia  were e s se n tia lly  id e n tif ie d  by th e ir  education, and were 
not p a rt of an ex is tin g  social group in the same sense as a c la ss  or
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e th n ic  group is ,  As o ther avenues of p o l i t ic a l  power and support were 
closed to them, they were most lik e ly  to use the boundaries of the s ta te  
as a basis for group formation and p o l i t ic a l  m obilization.
The main body of the th e s is  ends with an ana lysis of the n a tio n a lis t 
movement u n ti l  1966 when SWAPO launched i t s  g u e r r i l la  war, S p ecific a lly , 
th is  analysis focuses on two major issues: the fa ilu re  of the n a tio n a l­
i s t  movement to achieve unity  and the ascendancy of SWAPO as the major 
popular grouping, i t  is  argued th a t the reso lu tion  of these issues can 
be re la te d  to the sp e c if ic  in te re s ts  and o rien ta tio n s  of the three 
groups tha t made up the movement, and also  to the p e c u lia r i t ie s  of the 
in te rn a tio n a l environment th a t the major leaders of the movement moved 
in to  a f te r  1960.
Namibian n a tio n a lise  in  context
I t  is  c le a r from the preview that considerable emphasis has been placed 
on loca ting  the r is e  of Namibian nationalism  w ithin i t s  so c io -p o litic a l 
contex t. In p a r tic u la r , emphasis has been placed on the ro le  of the 
co lonial s ta te  and co lonial p o lic ie s , on the elaboration  of a ra c ia l  
order ?n Namibia and on ea rly  "p ro to -n a tio n a lis t"  forms of re s is tan c e , 
Thise emphases require explanation because they are re la ted  to  some of 
the key assumptions and o rien ta tio n s  of th is  study and also  touch on a 
number of v i ta l  th e o re tic a l issues in  the ana lysis of nationalism  In 
general. The re levant issues revolve around the questions o f what may 
leg itim a te ly  be c la ss if ie d  as nationalism , the re la tio n sh ip  between 
nationalism  and o ther forms of p ro tes ' and re s is tan c e , the location  of 
nationalism  w ithin the broad processes of so cia l change in developing 
so c ie tie s , and the assumptions tha t guide our thlnkirw about change or
"development".
In the ea rly  l i te ra tu r e ,  African nationalism  was d istingu ished  front 
o ther forms of p ro te s t and re s is tan c e  by recourse to the concepts of 
"primary" and "secondary" re s is tan c e . These concepts were firm ly located 
w ithin the e thnocentric  and te leo lo g ica l framework of modernization 
theory which saw developing so c ie tie s  as progressing through a s e r ie s  of 
evolutionary stages towards more "western" and " ra tio n a l"  forms of 
so cia l o rganization . Thus one of the e a r l i e s t  proponents of the primary 
/secondary d is tin c tio n , charac terized  primary re s is tan c e  as "negative 
and spontaneous" because i t  was an attem pt " to  p ro tec t o r rec re a te  the 
o ld by p ro testin g  against the new". "Secondary re s is tan c e"  or n a tio n a l­
ism, on the o ther hand, was seen as d i s t in c t ,  " ra tio n a l and positive"  
la rge ly  because o f i t s  acceptance of Western innovation. These 
concepts are based on a model of social change which assumes tha t a l l  
s o c ie tie s  develop in e s se n tia lly  the same d ire c tio n  and p laces a higher 
value on one end of the sca le of "evolution" than the o th er. Without 
these normative assumptions, primary and secondary re s is tan c e  .come 
l i t t l e  more than residua l sequential terras, ind icating  th a t primary 
re s is tan c e  occurred p rio r to secondary re s is tan c e  - a necessarily  tru e , 
but not very enligh ten ing  proposition .
Although the o rig in a l formulations of modernization theory no longer
enjoy re sp ec ta b lity , the d is tin c tio n  between "primary" and "secondary" 83re sis tan c e  has remained in f lu e n tia l , and evolutionary assumptions 
s t i l l  shape much of our thinking about developing so c ie tie s , in Marxist 
and underdevelopment w ritings on the Third World, the crude notion of 
the evolution o f " tra d it io n a l"  so c ie tie s  in to  "modern" so c ie tie s  is  
replaced by an emphasis on c o n tin u itie s  associa ted  with processes of
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c a p i ta l is t  and im p eria lis t pene tra tion . The underlying tendency of
both modernization and ra d ic a l th e o ris ts  therefore Is to depic t the
development oC social movements as a succession of stages or as a 
85progressively  unfolding consciousness,
Besides re s tin g  on a number of dubious assumptions about change in 
general, evolutionary approaches to so c ia l change impose a number of 
c o n stra in ts  on our thinking about nationalism , F ir s t ly ,  they tend to 
s h if t  the burden of the explanation of nationalism  onto foreign  and 
imposed s tru c tu re s  (such as cap ita lism . Western industria lism  or the 
co lon ial s ta te )  and there fo re  devalue the unique con tribu tions of ind ig­
enous communities to  the development o f nationalism . A c i t r a l  assump­
tion  guiding th is  study there fo re  was th a t  e x is tin g  th e o re tic a l perspec­
tives  need to  be adjusted to accommodate ':he indigenous as well as the 
e x te rn al, the "cu ltu ra l"  as well as the " s tru c tu ra l" , c h a ra c te r is t ic s  
and o rig ins  of nationalism . More sp e c if ic a lly , there is  a need to 
address the question of what is  uniquely African about A frican  
nationalism ,
Secondly, the evolutionary approach c rea te s  too sharp a break between 
nationalism  as a "modern", " ra tio n a l"  or "progressive" movement and 
e a r l i e r ,  supposedly " tra d it io n a l" , " irra tio n a l"  and "regressive" forms 
of p ro test and re s is tan c e . I t  is  indeed possib le to d is tin g u ish  between 
nationalism  and in i t i a l  responses to co lon ial conquest, but there was 
nothing " ir ra tio n a l"  or "reg ressiv e '1 about such responses because they 
involved the reactions of in teg ra l communities to  foreign  invasion. 
Later responses, following co lonial conquest and the im position of 
co lonial domination, also  do not e a s ily  lend themselves to c la s s i f ic ­
atio n  in terms of r a tio n a l/ I r ra t io n a l  and progressive/reg ressive
re actio n s , While not a l l  of ' ise  la te r  responses can be c la s s if ie d  as
n a tio n a lis t ,  those which were not n a tio n a lis t  could only be seen as
"regressive" i f  one assumes tha t " t ra d it io n a l"  so c ie tie s  remained s ta t ic
and that a l l  no n -n a tio n a lis t responses were aimed a t  th e  re s to ra tio n  of
an old order, in as fa r  as indigenous so c ie tie s  were transformed by
co lon ial domination, th e ir  perceptions of the "old order" are lik e ly  to
have bet^n influenced by these changes. This is  why attem pts to  e s ta b lish
"connections" between primary and secondary re s is tan c e  (or 88
nationalism ) are  doomed to  fa ilu re  because they remain rooted in  a 
paradigm which has erected  an a r t i f i c i a l  and inpenetrable b a rr ie r  
between " tra d it io n a l"  and "modern" s o c ie tie s . In the fin t 'l  ana lysis , 
however, whether an act of re s is tan c e  or a so c ia l movement can be under­
stood as "progressive" or "reg ressive"  is  an em pirical question and not 
one which can be s e tt le d  a p r io r i  by means of over-sim plified  
typologies.
Third ly , the evolutionary approach p laces the emphasis on c o n tin u itie s , 
on a  "natu ra l" and progressive se r ie s  of s t  ^  which emulate the 
sequences o f b io lo g ic a l growth. Besides the b u i l t- in  ethnocentic  assump­
tions about the "immaturity" of n o n-industria l so c ie tie s , th is  approach 
tends to obscure the d isco n tin u itie s  in the development of nationalism  
and o ther forms of re s is tan c e . Again, whether nationalism  develops in a 
progressive or sequen tia l manner is  a m atter fo r em pirical in v estig a tio n .
In th is  study there fo re  assumptions about the evolution o f so c ie tie s  and 
ideologies were "bracketed". That is ,  the study was embarked upon w ith­
out the assumptions th a t nationalism  developed in  a "natu ra l" or sequen­
t i a l  manner; th a t nationalism  was a more progressive or ra tio n a l
#
response than o ther p o l i t ic a l  responses; o r th a t nationalism  arose <
so le ly  in response to  ex ternal s tim u li. The d e f in itio n  of nationalism  
u ti liz e d  i:> th is  study s p e c if ic a lly  focuses on the re la tio n sh ip  between -jj
"ex ternal" conditions (such as the s ta te  and the im peratives of indust" 
r i a l  society) A W ^'internal" p o l i t i c a l  and c u ltu ra l  Id e n tif ic a tio n s . In /
th is  way nationalism  (e sp ec ia lly  in a co lo n ia l context) way be seen as a 
process of adaptation and re d e fin itio n  in response to externally-im posed 
s tru c tu re s . P a rt ic u la r ly  in  A frica, nationalism  has been c lo se ly  assoc­
ia ted  with so cia l transform ation, I t  has been a t  i t s  s trongest during 
periods of change, of tra n s it io n  from one so cia l order to another. Once 
the tra n s it io n  was made, once co lon ial c o n f lic t  came to  an end and 
independence was gained, African nationalism s have generally  lost 
momentum and waned, From th is  perspective there fo re  nationalism  may be 
regarded as more of a so cia l process  than a so c ia l product.
This in te rp re ta tio n  o f nationalism  has a number o f cru c ia l im plications. 
F ir s tly ,  i t  suggests tha t as a response and adaptation to  ex te rn ally  
imposed s tru c tu re s , nationalism  cannot be understood except w ithin i t s  
p o l i t ic a l  and socio-economic context or p o l i t i c a l  economy. This is  not 
only because i t  is  impossible to understand a response or adaptation
without understanding tha t which e l ic i te d  the response or adaptation,
but a lso  because the so cia l u n it tha t responds o r adapts is  a t  le a s t  
p a r tly  defined by ex ternal contextual fa c to rs , in  Namibia the cru cia l 
cw t^xtM al fa c to r was the ra c ia l  order, I t  has already been argued th a t 
most, i f  not a l l ,  African nationalism s were r a c ia l  nationalism s, (.hat 
they were responses to  the ra c ia l  orders assoc .^ted  with the co lon ia l 
system. As such the r a c ia l  o rder provides one of the bases (together
witu the boundaries of the co lo n ia l s ta te )  of n a tio n a lis t  id e n t i f ic ­
a tions  In A frica.
Nationalism and time
The in te rp re ta tio n  of nationalism  adopted a lso  has important im plicat­
ions fo r the re la tio n sh ip  between nationalism  and o ther forms of r e s i s t ­
ance. At the r isk  of s ta t in g  the obvious, nationalism  tand in p a r tic u la r  
A frican nationalism ) is a form of re s is tan c e  or s trugg le , This is  c le a r, 
for example, from the close assoc ia tion  and a t  times even id en tity , 
between nationalism  and the stru g g le  aga inst co lonialism . At the same 
time, i t  must be borne in mind th a t nationalism  represents a sp ec if ic  
type of re s is tan c e  in th a t i t  aims to e s ta b lish  a sp ec if ic  kind of 
p o l i t i c a l  o rde r. The sp e c if ic i ty  of nationalism , however, must be seen 
w ithin the context of our understanding of i t  as a process. What th is  
/Mans o ssn n tta lly  is  tha t although i t  is  possib le to id en tify  "pure" or 
" fu lly  developed'1 v a r ie t ie s  of nationalism  w ithin contemporary A frica, 
such nationalism s d id  not a r is e  in a vacutnn, nor did they emerge fu lly - 
developed from the womb of co lon ial society , but were ra th e r  born in
processes of c o n f lic t, adaptation and the re d e fin itio n  of so cia l and
p o l i tic a l  id e n t i t ie s ,  The fa ilu re  to understand th is  leads to the
confusion of nationalism  (the process) with n a tio n a lis t  o rganizations
(the products).
These arguments may be i l lu s t r a te d  by reference to the forms of r e s i s t ­
ance th a t occurred in Namibia during the ea rly  1920s. While these forms 
of re s is tan c e  d iffe red  from the more developed m anifestations of na tion­
alism th at emerged in the la te  1950s, they nevertheless represent a 
s ig n if ic a n t phase in the development of Namibian nationalism , Analysis 
of th is  phase of re s is tan c e  reveals a number of c h a ra c te r is t ic s  tha t 
e s ta b lish  a close connection with "purer" forms of nationalism , F ir s tly ,
<*1
i t  is  c le a r  th a t th is  phase of Namibian h is to ry  was marked by a profound 
re d e fin itio n  of p o l i t ic a l  and so cia l id e n t i t ie s . This was most c le a rly  
manifested i., the doctrine of ra c ia l  un ity  espoused by Namibian Garvey- 
i te s ,  but i t  was a lso  apparent in  less  obvious attem pts to  forge 
a llian c es  th a t transcended pre -co lon ia l id e n t i t ie s .  As already argued, 
ra c ia l  nationalism  is  one of the d istingu ish ing  c r i t e r ia  of contemporary 
A frican nationalism s, but Namibian Garveyism went fu r th e r than simply 
asse rtin g  blac.. In th e ir  c a lls  fo r black, u n ity , Namibian
Garveyites repeated ly  mentioned the '« .jo r .i'tfib ian  groupings, the 
Ovambos, the Hereros, the Damaras, the Namas and sometimes even the San. 
Im plicit in these c a l ls  for un ity  therefore was the idea of un iting  a l l  
black groups included w ithin the boundaries of the co lonial s ta te . 
S im ilarly , th is  ea rly  notion of Namibian unity  was im p lic it in the idea 
of a general re b e llio n  which would involve a l l  the major black commun­
i t ie s  , in the close co llab o ra tio n  of B asters. Hereros, Namas and Damaras 
in the Rehoboth re b e llio n , and even in  the fa ile d  attempts of the 
Bondelswarts to draw o ther black communities in to  i t s  re v o lt aga inst the 
co lon ia l s ta te .
, ! The one c h a ra c te r is t ic  of contemporary nationalism s th a t was absent or, 
more <tely, only weakly present during th is  ea rly  phase, was the
idea of the p o l i t ic a l  order tha t would succeed colonialism , Except for 
one reported  comment of the UNIA leader Mungunda to the e f fe c t tha t a 
new adm inistration  should be es tab lish ed , the "new p o l i t ic a l  order" 
remained undefined - a t  le a s t  within the sources consulted in  th is  
study. However, i t  i s  possib le to argue that the m illenarianism  la te n t 
in Namibian Garveyism was no I simply an ir ra t io n a l  and reg ressive 
response, but that i t  represented an attempt to  come to  terms with the 
present and crea te  a new fu tu re . As there is  no evidence to suggest that
Namibian Garveyites expected to re e s ta b lish  the pre -co lon ia l p o l i tic a l  
order a f te r  expelling  the c o lo n ia lis ts , th is  suggests tha t the idea of a 
"new age" la te n t  in  m iilenarianism  may have su b stitu ted  fo r more conven­
tional notions of a national p o l i t ic a l  order.
This attem pt to  demonstrate the v i ta l  links between the re s is tan c e  of 
the 1920s and la te r  m anifestations of nationalism  ra ise s  questions about 
the d isco n tin u ity  between the two sa jo r  phases of re s is tan c e  in Namibia. 
I f  the re s is tan c e  of the l R20s represented an ea rly  and "underdeveloped" 
expression of nationalism , why was there a gap of more than th i r ty  years 
before a c le a r  form of nationalism  manifested i t s e l f ?  This is  an issue
which is  explored in some depth in  the study, and which again underlines
the importance of locating  expressions of nationalism  w ithin th e ir  
appropriate contex ts. The reasons for the disappearance of expressions 
o f nationalism , and indeed of almost a l l  forms of re s is tan c e  barring  the 
most covert m anifesta tions, from the mid-1920s, must be sought in  the 
rep ressive c a p ac itie s  of the s ta te .  Thus besides ac ting  as a major 
stim ulus for nationalism , the co lonial s ta te  a lso  ac tiv e ly  sought to 
repress a l l  expressions of nationalism  or black un ity  in Namibia, The 
b rie f  upsurge of re s is tan c e  in the 1920s is  associa ted  with a short 
t ra n s itio n a l period in which the co lon ial s ta te  was not ab le to  exercize 
fu ll  con tro l over the colonized, while the re asse rtio n  of nationalism  in 
the 1950s was linked to changes in the balance of power between colon­
ized and co lonizers tha t followed changes in  the colonial economy and 
the in te rn a tio n a l order,
These issues and re la te d , questions such as how the co lonial s ta te  was
able to suppress nationalism  for such a long period, are discussed a t
some length in the body of the d is se rta t io n . The most re levant issue to
emerge from th is  d iscussion , however, is  the general o r th eo re tic a l
point which links expressions of nationalism  to  the resources con tro lled
91by colonizers and colonized respective ly . As Theda Skocpol has argued
in her study of revo lu tion , the occurence of re s is tan c e  is  not simply
linked to  ob jec tive co n trad ic tions , o r even the consciousness o f such
c o n trad ic tions , but a lso  to the re la t iv e  resources and ca p ac itie s  of
p o l i t ic a l  ac to rs:
I t  is  one thing to id en tify  underlying, p o ten tia l tensions 
rooted in ob jec tive c la ss  re la tio n s  understood in a Marxist manner. I t  i s  another thing to  understand how and when class members find themselves abJe to strugg le e f fe c tiv e ly  fo r 
th e ir  in te re s ts .  When and how can subordinate classes figh t successfu lly  against those who ex p lo it them? And when and how do dominant classes  have the capacity  fo r c o lle c tiv e  p o l i t ­
ic a l ac tion? For answering such questions, the p o l i t ic a l  
c o n f lic t  argument th a t c o lle c tiv e  ac tion  is  based upon group organization  and access to  resources, o ften  including coercive resources, is  esp e c ia lly  f r u i t f u l .
When applied to the issues under consideration , th is  d iscussion suggests 
th a t even when nationalism  is  not m anifest, i t  might continue to subsis t 
as a p o ten tia l which can again become ac tive  when the balance of resour­
ces between p o l i tic a l  ac tors changes in favour of subordinate groups. 
Thus re s is tan c e  was not completely absent between the mid-1930s and 
1950s although s tra te g ie s  d iffe re d . While markedly d iffe re n t from the 
forms of re s is tan c e  of the 1920s, the 'T ruppenspieler" movement in part 
addressed s im ila r concerns to those of the 1920s movement. In s p ite  of 
the co llapse of dreams of black un ity  and deliverance from abroad, the 
"Truppenspielers” continued to challenge the ra c ia l  o rder, not by r is k ­
ing confrontation  with the co lonial s ta te , but by crea ting  an a l t e r ­
n ative s ta tu s  order. M obilization on the basis  of ethn ic groups, espec­
ia l ly  by the Hereros, bears a c loser resemblence to  n a tio n a lis t  s tra te g ­
ie s . Although th is  m obilization had a narrower b as is  of un ity  than the
movement of the 1920s, th is  is  not cru cia l to the d e f in itio n  of na tion­
alism , p a r tic u la r ly  as the Hereros showed l i t t l e  in c lin a tio n  to re tu rn  
to  a p re-co lon ial o rder. As already observed, e th n ic  or c u ltu ra l  n a tio n ­
alisms belong to the same genre as t e r r i to r ia l  and ra c ia l  nationalism s, 
even though they were less  favoured than t e r r i to r ia l  nationalism  in
This d iscussion of d isc o n tin u itie s  in Namibian nationalism  should not, 
however, d e tra c t from the recog ition  of co n tin u itie s  in the n a tio n a lis t  
s tru g g le . While the organizations of the 1920s did not survive, the 
ideological links between the two phases of re s is tan c e  have already been 
demonstrated. Furthermore, there were some c o n tin u itie s  in  personnel, 
p a r tic u la r ly  of the Herero leaders. Thus riosea Kutako, one of Namibia's 
longest surviving p o l i tic a l  leaders was prominent in the Garvey move­
ment , in Herero p o l i tic s  during the in terlude  between the two phases of 
nationalism , and in the founding of the n a tio n a lis t  o rganizations in the 
1950s. A con tinu ity  in the symbols of re s is tan c e  is  also  ev ident. This 
is  p a r tic u la r ly  apparent in the contemporary n a tio n a lis t  movement's 
inheritance of symbols from the "Truppenspieler" movement and Herero 
nationalism . I t  is  suggested also  by s im ila r i tie s  of s ty le  between the 
m illenarianisra of Oarveyism and the troop movement of the la te r  period, 
p a r tic u la r ly  in the manipulation of symbols to redefine communal 
id e n ti t ie s .
N ationalise and space
In general therefore th is  study adopts a more " h o lis tic "  or in teg ra ted  
approach to the p eriod iza tion  (loca tion  in lime) of Namibian nationalism  
and re je c ts  typologies which draw rad ica l d is tin c tio n s  between d iffe re n t 
phases in the development of nationalism  and an ti-c o lo n ia l re s is tan c e .
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The emphasis of the analysis is  ra th e r on exposing the v i ta l  links and 
su b tle  changes between d iffe re n t periods o f re s is tan c e  ra th e r than 
ca tegorizing  and c la ssH in g  the responses associa ted  with these periods, 
A sim ilar approach is  adopted to the loca tion  of nationalism  w ithin i t s  
spatial, contexts.
Throughout the d is s e r ta t io n , sp a tia l  issues ion* a recu rren t theme. This 
is  re la te d  to  the th e o re tic a l model adopted in  the study. The colonial 
s ta te , i t  was argued, created  the conditions for the emergence of 
nationalism  by the rad ica l re d e fin itio n  of p o l i t ic a l  space. This was 
accomplished both by the crea tio n  of sp a tia l  d isc o n tin u itie s  where none 
had previously ex isted  and by the incorporation of formerly d isc re te  
communities w ithin a s ing le sovereign s ta te .  This re s tru c tu rin g  of 
p o l i tic a l  space in turn created  tensions or con trad ictions between 
ex is tin g  so c io -c u ltu ra l and p o l i t ic a l  id e n tif ic a tio n s  and new p o l i tic a l  
boundaries, and fostered the need for the re d e fin itio n  of p o l i t ic a l  and 
c u ltu ra l communities.
The re d e fin itio n  of space did not simply involve the drawing of ex te rnal 
s ta te  boundaries, but a lso  the reorganization  and contro l of space 
within such boundaries, This reorganization  of space was re f le c te d  in 
such p ra c tices  as the crea tio n  of re serves, the d is tin c tio n  between the 
po lice zone and northern te r r i to r ie s ,  the demarcation of privately-owned 
s e t t l e r  farms and white dominated urban areas, and the rad ica l contro l 
over movement between the d iffe re n t areas . Moreover, th is  reorganization  
of space was imposed on p re -ex is tin g  communities with th e ir  own d efin ­
itio n s  and dynamics of sp a tia l  management. I t  is  for th is  reason th a t 
considerable a tten tio n  has been devoted to  ecology and i t s  formative
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impact on p re-co lon ial d e f in itio n s  of space, on p attern s  of physical 
movement, and c o n f lic ts  between competing s p a tia l  systems, Ecologically- 
orien ted  d e f in itio n s  of space, i t  is  argued, played a cru c ia l ro le  in 
ea rly  c o n f lic ts  between co lonizers and colonized,
However, the reorganization of space a lso  had more d ire c t  im plications
for the development of nationalism  in Namibia. For example, the la te  
emergence of formal n a tio n a lis t  organizations say be d ire c tly  linked to 
the crea tio n  o f re serves, cite r ig id  enforcement of the d iv isio n  between 
police zone and northern ac>as, and the s t r i c t  contro l exercized over 
movement.
Each of the th ree groups which helped launch the contemporary n a tio n a l­
i s t  movement was subject to sp e c if ic  sp a tia l  conditions w ithin the broad 
co lonial o rder, and these profoundly influenced th e ir  respective p o l i t ­
ic a l responses, That the Herero indigenous leadership constructed i ts  
power base in the reserves proved decisive in conditioning i t s  ideolog­
ica l and p o l i tic a l  o rien ta tio n s , i t s  re la tio n sh ip  to the co lonial auth­
o r i t i e s ,  and u ltim ate ly  the kind of nationalism  i t  espoused. Sim ilarly
the in te l l ig e n ts ia 's  sp ec if ic  approach to nationalism , I t s  re la tio n sh ip  
with the indigenous leadersh ip  and i t s  f'-a.'cr sources of support were 
intim ately tied  up with i ta  rel& tionsh-p to  the urban area j and I ts  
urban and western c u ltu ra l  o r ie n ta tio n s . Perhaps the most in te re s tin g  
products of the co lon ial s p a tia l  order, however, were the northern
co n trac t workers. Their involvement in both the northern reserves and
the po lice  zone as well as t lie ir  d is tr ib u tio n  between s e t t l e r  a g r ic u l­
tu re  and the in d u s tr ia l sec to r , i t  is argued, profoundly influenced 
th e ir  p o l i tic a l  responses to colonialism . Furthermore, the s tra te g ie s  
they devized to deal with the s p a tia l  co n stra in ts  of the con trac t system
is  shown to be re la te d  to the development of SWAPO in  e x ile .
S tructu re of the d is s e r ta t io n , lim ita tio n s  and gaps 
To conclude th is  in troduction  i t  is  necessary to say something about the 
underlying s tru c tu re  of the d is s e r ta t io n , i t s  lim ita tio n s , and those 
areas and issues which are in need of fu rth e r research.
The cen tra l aims of the d is se rta t io n  to trace the o rig ins  or roots of 
Namibian nationalism  and provide an overview of i t s  development, 
presented the researcher with a number of problems and d i f f ic u lt
decisions. As Namibia's p o l i t ic a l  h is to ry  is re la t iv e ly  under-researched 
and the h is to r ic a l  period covered by the study re la tiv e ly  ex tensive , a 
number of cru c ia l choices had to be made about the issues t h ' ; would be 
addressed in the study- On a more general lev e l, the researcher was 
faced with the choice of s a c rif ic in g  d e ta il  in order to  cover a broad 
range o f issues and events, o r to narrow the focus to  a sm aller range of 
issu es . In keeping with the general th eo re tic a l o rie n ta tio n , and i.i 
p a r tic u la r  the emphases on nationalism  as a process, the importance of
the p o l i tic a l  economy id the sign ificance  of indigenous and pre-colon­
ia l  inputs, i t  was decided to concentrate on sp e c if ic  s tra te g ic  themes 
ra th e r than present & more general and necessarily  su p e rfic ia l account. 
A g reat deal has already been said in the preceding d iscussion to
ju s ti f y  the decision  to t re a t  the f i r s t  phase of re s is tan c e  in d e ta il .  A 
fu rth e r reason fo r doing so was to e s ta b lish  a basis of comparison for 
the assessment of la te ' (its and changes. As th is  phase and the
period leading up to  k  only ten years, i t  d id  not present major
problems of se lec tio n ,
The second phase (and the period leading up to i t ) ,  however, cover a
f a i r ly  extensive period and there fo re  required a ca refu l se lec tio n  of 
themes. Here the s tra te g y  was to  focus on the major components of the 
n a tio n a lis t  movement, namely migrant workers, Kerero indigenous leaders, 
and in te l le c tu a ls . These themes and th e ir  associa ted  Issues were s e le c t­
ed on the basis of a number of c r i t e r ia :
(1) A comprehensive ana lysis of secondary source m ateria l;(2) a broad survey of s ta te  arch ival sources; and
(3) in-depth interview s with leaders of the n a tio n a lis tmovement.
While each of these sources has i t s  J im ita tio n s , i t  was f e l t  tha t in 
combination they offered  a broad enough overview from a v a rie ty  of 
d iffe re n t perspectives. S ta te  arch iv al m ateria l in  p a r tic u la r  was useful 
in iden tify ing  those organizations and movements considered a th re a t to  
the co lonial s ta te ,  c le a rly  not every f i l e  in the archives could be 
read, but the t i t l e s  of f i le s  (where l is te d )  served as a useful guide, 
and use was a lso  made of the knowledge of a rc h iv is ts  in iden tify ing  
re levant m ateria l.
This approach to  f  > i,udy meant tha t a number of in te re s tin g  issues and 
topics had to be sac rifice d  for the sake of a more thorough ana lysis of 
issues considered to L"- of g re a te r importance. The decision  to  focus on 
indigenous leaders, cc-ntraet labourers and in te l l ig e n ts ia  as the major 
groups co n stitu tin g  the n a tio n a lis t  movement a f te r  World War II  has 
n ecessarily  meant the neglect of o ther groups and in s ti tu tio n s  which 
contributed to Namibian nationalism . One major area of neglect is  
re la te d  to the various church groups and re lig io u s movements in the 
te r r i to r y .  Of p a r tic u la r  importance were the breakaways from the Rhenish 
Mission Society and the establishm ent of independent churches such as 
the African Methodist Episcopal Church and the Oruuano o r P ro testan t
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Unity Church in the 19-IOs and 1950s. Although there was a degree of 
con tinu ity  between these churches on the one hand and the Nama and 
Herero indigenous leaderships and the African Improvement Society on the 
o th e r, the ro le  of these re lig io u s  movements was of a d iffe re n t order 
from that of the th ree key groups which launched the n a tio n a lis t 
movement in  the 1950s.
Because of the prominent ro le  of the Ovambos (contrac t workers) and 
Hereros (indigenous leadership and in te l le c tu a ls )  a tte n tio n  has been 
focused on these groups while the ro les  o f o ther groups such as the 
Namas and Damaras have been re la t iv e ly  neglected. The s tru c tu re  of the 
thesis has also  meant a bias towards ir" ^ p o l i tic s  and the neglect of 
ru ra l p o li tic s  during the second phi ,u ily  because the major th ru st 
o f contemporary n a tio n a lis t  p o li tic s  in Namibia has been in the urban 
areas . This does not of course mian th a t ru ra l p o li tic s  were irre lev an t 
or even unimportant, but ra th e r r e f le c ts  a major s h i f t  in  the d irec tio n  
■ n a tio n a lis t  p o l i tic s  towards the urban areas a f te r  World War I I .  A 
u m ila r  s h i f t  in the focus of n a 'io n a lis t  p o li tic s  occurred in the ea rly  
19605 when the major n a tic n a lis t  leaders moved in to  e x ile  and in te rn a t­
ional issues assumed increasing importance. The fin a l chapter of the 
th esis  therefore concentra..-ii on e x ile  p o l i t ic s .
The basic s tru c tu re  of ' bus is  thus bears much in common with a 
pyramid in tha t the focr- >i- themes and issues is  progressively  sharp­
ened in order to accommor. ’■ major s h if ts  in  n a tio n a lis t p o l i tic s  and to 
focus on s p e c if ic  and cruv.la: is tu e s , Thus the study s ta r t s  out from a 
broad-based analysis of the p o l i t ic a l  economy and re s is tan c e  involving a 
wide range of groups and communities in both the ru ra l and urban areas, 
including the reserves. The focus then narrows to two key ethn ic groups,
# 1
the Ovamboo who made up the g re a te r p a rt of the con tract labour force, 
and the Hereros who played ,ie leading ro le  in  re s is tan c e  during the two 
major phases. From the mid-1950s the focus is  again sharpened to concen­
tr a te  on developments in the urban areas and more sp e c if ic a lly  on events 
re la te d  to the launching of the n a tio n a lis t  o rganizations, From 1960 the 
focus is  narrowed s t i l l  fu rthe r in order to  concentrate on ex ile  
p o li tic s  and the re la t iv e  performance of the two major n a tio n a lis t
groupings.
I t  i s  c le a r there fo re  th a t a number of topics and issues have had to be 
neglected. The neglect of these top ics and issues do not n ecessarily  
re f le c t  on th e ir  importance or relevance to the h is to ry  of Namibian
nationalism , but are  ra th e r a product of the lim ita tio n s  imposed by the 
scope and nature o f the study. Given th a t  Namibian h is to ry  is  re la t iv e ly  
under-researched, i t  would be absurd for a s ing le  s u d y  to  attem pt to 
cover a l l  issues re levant to the development of national'sm  in  Namibia. 
Nevertheless th is  discussion provides a number of po in ters in respect of 
issues which require fu rth e r research.
In conclusion, a few words need to  be said  about the sources used in
th is  study, Although a re la t iv e ly  large range o f sources were consulted, 
c le a rly  there was a lim it to the number of sources th a t could be used 
and the time tha t could be devoted to each source, For example, m ission­
ary and church arch ival sources represent one major area of neglect, 
Because of the extensiveness of these sources and the marginal relevance 
of th e ir  major concerns with re lig io n  and evangelization , i t  was consid­
ered more appropriate to  concentrate on othermore d ire c tly  re levant 
sources, than to  attempt a su p e rf ic ia l and piecemeal study of church
and mission sources, These sources therefore represent another area 
which could be addressed by futhdr research,
The interview s conducted with n a tio n a lis t  and o ther leaders was also  
lim ited in some re sp ects . For a number of p ra c tic a l considerations,
interview ing had to be re s tr ic te d  to those persons w ithin Namibia. As
the rf.ajnrity of yw#.P0 leaders (and esp e cia lly  those who were involved in 
the n a tio n a lis t movement p rio r  to 1966) were s t i l l  in ex ile , th is  
represented a s ig n if ic a n t r e s tr a in t ,  Furthermore persons involved in 
rad ica l n a tio n a lis t  p o li tic s  were understandably re lu c ta n t to discuss 
th e ir  p o l i t ic a l  involvement and the s tra te g ie s  of theiv  o rganizations. 
On the o ther hand, those leaders who were only m arginally involved in 
p o li tic s  a t  the time of the study or who had changed th e ir  p o li tic a l
a f f i l ia t io n s  were the best sources of inform ation. The study therefore
re lie s  ra th e r heavily  on SWANU and former SWAPO leaders. To compensate 
for these co n s tra in ts , however, interview s were conducted in depth, in 
some cases extending over a number of sessions each, consisting  of 
several hours of in tensive interview ing.
To sum up therefore th is  study does not s e t out to provide a d e f in itiv e  
p o l i t i c a l  analysis or h is to ry  of Namibian n a tio n a lise . At the most i t  
aims to  ra is e  some pertin en t issues re la t in g  to the r is o  of nationalism  
in Namibia and to c le a r some of the ground for the massive and 
challenging task awaiting fu ture h is to r ian s  and p o l i t ic a l  analysts.
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ECOLOGY AND CONFLICT IN GERMAN SOUTH WEST AFRICA
The relevance o f ecology
Ecology occupies a cen tra l position  in the unfolding drama of Namibian 
h is to ry . The s truggle with the environment not only la id  the foundations 
o f forms of production and the so c io -p o litic a l organization  of p re­
co lonial social formations, but a lso  s trongly  conditioned the responses 
of s e t t l e r  farmers who entered the environment in d ire c t competition 
with e x is tin g  forms of production. The sp ec if ic  fe a tu res  of Namibia's 
na tu ra l environment have thus had a d i s t in c t  impact on both the evolu­
tion of co lonial p o lic ies  and the developing co n f lic t between co lonizers 
and colonized.
In a c r i t i c a l  review. John Tosh has argued th a t the major theories of 
ag r ic u ltu ra l production in A frica have not taken su ff ic ie n t  cognizance 
of environmental c o n stra in ts  and the r e s tr ic t io n s  imposed on African 
communities by the demands of food production:
What passes for 'a g r ic u ltu ra l  h is to ry ’ is  a l l  too often
agrarian  h is to ry  with most of the ag ric u ltu re  l e f t  o u t.l
Although Tosh's a r t i c le  deals s p e c if ic a lly  with crop production in 
tro p ica l A frica, h is  co rrec tiv e  emphasis is  also  applicable to the more 
a r id  conditions and predominantly pasto ra l economies of Namibia, in  the 
drought-prone and eco logically  f ra g ile  regions of south-western A frica, 
physical and economic survival is even more in tim ate ly  linked with human 
s tra te g ie s  evolved to meet ecological and c lim atic  contingencies. 
Namibia has the d rie s t  clim ate in A frica south of the Sahara, I t  f a l ls  
within the ra in -d e fic ie n t zones of A frica which extend as a broad band
over the northern and easte rn  p a rts  of the con tinen t, as well as cover­
ing a sm aller area in the south-west. Some of A frica 's  poorest countries 
f a l l  w ithin these a r id  zones and although Namibia, with i t s  substan tia l 
mineral wealth, may be an exception to  th is  general ru le , ag r ic u ltu ra l 
production has, for the most p a r t, remained marginal.
Physiographically, Namibia is  dominated by a high, and in  p arts mount­
ainous, p lateau  which extends over most of the ce n tra l areas of the 
te r r i to r y ,  with narrower p ro jec tions ju ttin g  in to  the southern and 
northern p a r ts . Marginal to the p lateau  are two o ther major physio­
graphic regions, the Namib dese rt in the west and the sandveld of the 
easte rn  and northern areas. The Namib coasta l b e l t ,  a narrow s t r ip  of 
d ese rt between 130 and 60 kms in width, runs p a ra lle l  to the A tlan tic  
Ocean, extending along the e n tire  c o a s tlin e . This region which has an 
average ra in f a l l  o f less  than 25 mm, supports very l i t t l e  vegetation,
and has been described as "a barren d ese rt, wholly unsuitab le for any 
5form of ag ric u ltu re" . In co n tras t to the p lateau  and p arts  of the 
Namib, the sandveld areas are c h a ra c te r is t ic a lly  f l a t .  The northern 
sandveld which l ie s  in two d is tin c t  drainage basins, the Etosha and 
Okavango p la in s , has a higher ra in f a l l  than the easte rn  or Kalahari 
sandveld. However, the s o ils  of the sandveld are less  f e r t i l e  than the 
p lateau  hardveld, and p a r tic u la r ly  in the easte rn  sectors are d efic ien t 
in n u trien ts  such as phosphates. The sandy so ils  of these areas also 
tend to  absorb r a in f a l l  quickly so tha t surface water soaks away ea rly  
in the dry season.
The p lateau  and sandveld regions are in turn in tersected  and d iv e rs ifie d  
by s ig n if ic a n t v a ria tio n s  in  r a in f a l l  and o ther sources of water supply,
Moving from north -east to  south-w est, the average r a in f a l l  decreases
«’ w if ic a n tly  while i t s  v a r ia b i li ty  increases, Thus while the Caprivi
2>.-ip and the Okavango region have a maximum r a in f a l l  o f 625 mm, th is
decreases to  375 ram in the ce n tra l areas, and between 250 and 50 mm in
the extreme south. In s p ite  of these regional v a ria tio n s , nearly  the
whole of the te r r i to r y  is  sub jec t to  prolonged and devasta ting  droughts,
Only the Caprivi and Okavango reg ions, which together accommodate less
than 15 per cent of the to ta l  population, appear to  be exempted from the
more d estruc tive  e f fe c ts  of drought, which render food production and
commercial ag ric u ltu re  marginal, For the g re a te r part of the te r r i to r y
r a in f a l l  is  both variab le and unpredic tab le. An o f f ic ia l  report
described Namibia as having
no 'norm al' ra in f a l l  as expressed by the mean annual amount 
of p re c ip ita t io n . What must be accepted in th is  connection is  th a t drought and flo o d s are normalities', a lso  tha t there is  no re g u la rity  in the occurrence thereo f; no cycle or secular 
change can be worked out on the av a ilab le  data tha t w ill have 
any value in the planning o f farm management.8
On the basis of annual r a in f a l l  figures for the years 1683/84 to
1959/60, Wellington ca lcu la tes  tha t southern and northern Namibia have
experienced 34 and 30 years of drought re sp ectiv e ly  w ithin the 77-year 
9period. Even in years of normal ra in f a l l ,  seasonal varia tio n s  in p re c i­
p ita tio n  c rea te  "hunger periods" in which the n u tr i t io n a l  value of 
grazing dec lines, leading to a weight loss of livestock  unless they are 
provided with supplementary fodder. Even a s l ig h t  defic iency  of r a in f a l l  
can be s ig n if ic a n t, because i t  can exacerbate defic iencies  in subsequent 
years. The timing and d is tr ib u tio n  of the r a in f a l l  is  also  of import­
ance, Because of high ra te s  of evaporation, ea rly  ra ins followed by an 
extended dry period may do as much damage to crops and grazing as a 
severe drought. R ain fa ll a lso  tends to  be unevenly d is tr ib u te d  w ithin
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reg ions, so th a t the location  of showers can determine the d ifference 
between norm ality in one area and drought in an adjacent or neighbouring 
area. As most of Namibia's ra in f a l l  comes in  convectional thunder­
storms , heavy downpours ran do extensive damage by sweeping away the 
12to p so il. Besides the problems associa ted  with ra in f a l l ,  Namibia also  
su ffe rs  from a sca rc ity  of surface water. Th? te r r i to r y  is  charac terized  
by an absence of perennial r iv e rs  in  the in te r io r  and high ra te s  of 
evaporation linked to the hot and a r id  clim ate. Furthermore, sub ter­
ranean water in some regions is  charac terized  by a high level of 
13s a lin ity .
These general ecological and clim atic  conditions have had important and 
far-reaching  im plications throughout the known h is to ry  of the te r r i to ry . 
For p re-co lon ial so cia l formations, the c h a ra c te r is tic  response to  eco­
lo g ica l c o n stra in ts  was a high degree of physical m obility . This applied 
not only to the p a s to ra lis ts  and hunter-gatherers of the more arid  
ce n tra l and southern regions, bu t, to  a le sse r e x te n t, a lso  to the more 
sendentary cu ltiv a to r-p a s to ra l i s ts  of northern Namibia and southern 
Angola, The in troduction  of s e tt le d  and commercial farming during the 
colonial period had enormous repercussions on pre -co lon ia l pa tterns of 
m igration, and therefore on food production, Although even s e t t l e r  
farmers reso rted  to moving th e ir  stock, by road or r a i l ,  during periods 
of drought, th is  option was gradually  closed o ff by the occupation of 
a l te rn a tiv e  pastures by the 1940s.
In order to meet the contingencies of ecology and clim ate, s e t t l e r  or
commercial farming was heavily  dependent on s ta te  aid and on extensive 1?farming areas. These s tra te g ie s  of survival in turn produced consequ­
ences a t  o ther leve ls . Extensive s ta te  aid  to s e t t l e r  a g ric u ltu re , had
m,, a j IBZ > .. # '  «.
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the e f fe c t o f increasing the commitment of the co lon ial s ta te  to s e t t l e r  
farming, and allowed white farmers considerable influence in the formul­
atio n  of co lonial p o lic ie s . The extensive tra c ts  of land, required by 
se t t le d  stock farmers not only in te n s if ie d  c o n f lic t tJver land, but also  
made heavy demands on the te r r i to r y 's  labour supply.
With farm sizes ranging from 3,000 to  20,000 ha, (7,400-49,00 a c re s ) the a v a ila b lity  of labour becomes a m atter ofutmost importance to the farm er.19
I t  was estim ated th a t in  1946 out of the to ta l  bltxk labour force of 52 
000 involved in the s e t t l e r  economy. 34 000 were employed on farms. 
However, in s p ite  o f these favourable conditions, s e t t l e r  farming has 
not escaped the devasta tions of period ic droughts, and i t s  e sse n tia l 
raarginality  has contribu ted  extensively  to the in te n s if ic a tio n  of 
c o n f lic t  in the te r r i to r y ,
Pre-co lonial economic and p o l i tic a l  d iv isions
Regional v a ria tio n s  in r a in f a l l  and o ther water supplies have largely 
determined land usage in Namibia. Moorsom has d istinguished  four major 
a g r ic u ltu ra l zones in  Namibia. A mixed farming zone, where crop c u l t i ­
vation is  combined with s to ck -ra is in g , is  located in  the north-eastern  
pa rts  of the te r r i to r y .  This zone comprizes only 6,5 per cent of the 
to ta l  land surface of Namibia. With a ftiw minor exceptions where i r r i g ­
ation  from natura l springs or dams have allowed sm all-scale c u ltiv a tio n , 
the re s t  of the country is  only su ita b le  for s to ck -ra is in g , The large- 
stock zone is  more extensive and covers a large p a rt of the ce n tra l and 
northern areas of the country adjacent to the mixed farming zone. This 
zone has a r a in f a l l  of above 350mm which provides fo r the denser p astu r­
age -needsd by c a t t le .  However, the large-stock  zone is  d iffe re n tia te d  by 
so il conditions which ensure b e tte r  grazing in  the p lateau  hardveld than
in  the sandveld with i t s  mineral d efic ien cies  and high s a l in i ty .  Between
the large-stock and sm all-stock areas is  a tra n s itio n a l zone, where
lim ited  c a t tle - ra is in g  may be combined with sm all-stock farming. The
remaining sm all-stock area covers 30 per cent of the land area of the
te r r i to r y ,  including the whole of the p lateau  hardveld between Rehoboth
and the Orange River. Here an average ra in f a l l  o f less  than 250nm
23provides pasturage which is  too sparse Cor c a t t le .
As previously s ta ted , reg ional varia tions  have also  played a ce n tra l 
ro le  in  the determ ination of p re -co lo n ia l forms of production and social 
o rganization . In p re-co lon ial Namibia the cu ltiv a tio n  of crops was 
re s tr ic te d  to the northern areas, p rin c ip a lly  Ovamboland and the 
Okavango and Caprivi areas. P a rtic u la r ly  in  Ovamboland, mixed farming 
allowed for a g re a te r concentration of population and fo r the evolution 
o f more cohesive and cen tra lized  social and p o l i t ic a l  s tru c tu re s . The 
ce n tra l and southern regions of the p lateau  were doainated by pastora l 
groupings, although the more a r id  conditions and poorer pasturage of the 
south required both g re a te r m obility and a heavier re lia n ce  on hunting 
and foraging as a supplement to s to ck -ra is in g . In the periphera l areas 
of the Namib and the Kalahari sandveld, hunting and gathering 
predominated.
In terms of population figures alone, the Ovambos are the most important 
grouping in Namibia and maintained dominance over the northern sec to r of 
the te r r i to r y .  Estimates of the population of Ovamboland range between 
46,5 and 53 per cent, o f the to ta l  population of the country, While the 
r a in f a l l  of Ovamboland (400-550mia) is  marginal to ;ub-marginal for the 
c u ltiv a tio n  of crops, ra in f a l l  is  supplemented by the overflow of the 
floodwaters of the Cuvelai River in southern Angola. These floodwaters,
known as the efundja, flow southwards through the f l a t  te rra in  of 
Ovamboland by means of a network o f shallow channels ca lle d  oshanas. 
The major crops are m ille t  K omaihangtti and sorghum. The combination of 
floodwaters and seasonal ra in s  make possib le both crop c u ltiv a tio n , and 
sto ck -ra is in g  which requires g re a te r m obility, Food supplies of gra in , 
milk aid  meat are supplemented by f r u i t ,  and fish  brought down by the 
floodwaters. Intensive land-use and the re la t iv e ly  sedentary form of 
production allowed for dense settlem ent and more cohesive and c e n tra l­
ized p o l i tic a l  s tru c tu re s  in  pre -co lon ia l Ovamboland, which was domin­
ated by a se r ie s  of independent kingdoms,
The powers and functions of the Ovambo kings included the "ownership" 
and d is tr ib u tio n  of land, supreme adm in istrative and ju d ic ia l  powers 
(under the supervision of a council of commoners), the determ ination of 
the plan ting  season, the conservation of na tu ra l resources such as f r u it  
trees and fo re s ts , and the exaction of m ilita ry  serv ice. However, before 
the la te  n ineteenth century surp lus-appropriation  was minimal and social 
mechanisms allowed for the re d is tr ib u tio n  of wealth. Production was 
organized around the extended family, and the sexual d iv isio n  of labour 
provided for the involvement of men in herding, hunting and heavy a g ric ­
u ltu ra l  work, while women were responsible for cu ltiv a tio n , fish ing  and 
domestic work. The dense p a tte rn  of settlem ent, and the " th irs tv e ld "  
which separates Ovamboland from the re s t  o f Namibia afforded a degree of 
p ro tec tion  to the Ovambos against p re-co lonial and colonial 
in trusions.
Other "ethnic" groups in the northern sec to r of the te r r i to r y  have 
played fa r less  s ig n if ic a n t ro les in Namibian h is to ry  than the Ovambos,
la rge ly  on account of th e ir  sm aller numbers and th e ir  location  in even 
less accessib le p a r ts  of the country. Although under co lon ial ru le  a 
d is tin c tio n  has been made between the people liv in g  in Ovamboland and 
those who occupy the area along the Okavango River to  the e a s t, the 
l a t t e r  consis t o f Ovambo communities which have developed independently
of the main group in  Ovamboland. In s p ite  of th e ir  ethnological s im il­
a r i t i e s ,  the Okavango and Ovamboland formations are d i s t in c t  in th a t the 
l a t t e r  liv e  in a region with a higher r a in f a l l ,  are less  densely s e tt le d  
than in Ovamboland and have therefore suffered  less  pressure on land
resources. The easte rn  Caprivi is populated by a v a r ie ty  of ethnic
communities, the major groupings being the Masubia and the Mafue both of
which are re la ted  to communities in Zambia. In the extreme west of the
northern sec to r , the marginal Kaokoveld is  inhabited by a d iv e rs ity  of
groupings, including Herero sub-groups, such as the Ova-Himba and the 
29Ova-Tjimba, Namas, Daraaras, and San.
The re s t  of the te r r i to r y  (which during the co lon ia l period became known 
as the "police zone") was dominated by two major groupings, the Hercros 
and the Namas. Although they were challenged from time to  time by Nama 
incursions from the south, the Hereros held sway over the prime hardveld 
areas of the cen tra l and northern p la teau . Widely recognized as ou t­
standing and dedicated c a t t l e  farmers, the Hereros maintained the most 
exclusively  pasto ra l form of production in p re-co lon ial Namibia. Wagner 
maintains tha t the Hereros have "p e rs is te n tly  clung to the pastora l mode 
o f l i f e " ,  and in s p ite  of repeated d isa s te rs  which have resu lted  in 
heavy stock losses, have "displayed & proverbial s k i l l  in replenishing
th e ir  herds a f te r  every major ca tastrophe."  As in o ther pastora l 
communities c a t t l e  played a ce n tra l ro le  in the economic l i f e  anti social 
organization of the Hereros. Other forms of production such as crop
el
cu ltiv a tio n  and the ra is in g  of small stock were regarded with d isdain , 
and the Hereros were less  re lia n t  on hunting than the Namas. Social 
s ta tu s  was also  largely  determined by the size  of a person 's herd, and 
the au tho rity  of an oautiona (ch ief) was determined less  by h is following 
than by the number of c a t t l e  he owned.
A person who owned no c a t t l e  had l i t t l e  standing in pre-co lonial Herero 
communities, and even today many urbanized Hereros maintain c a t t l e  in 
the reserves. Various re lig io u s and ideological p rescrip tio n s  governed 
the acqu isition  and disposal of c a t t l e .  According to Wagner, for 
example, c a t t l e  were regarded as "more than ju s t  a m ateria l possession" 
and l i t t l e  value was attached  to  o ther goods. Although during the mid- 
nineteenth century the Hereros appeared re la t iv e ly  w illin g  to  b a r te r  or 
s e l l  th e ir  c a tU e , th is  was probably a r e s u lt  o f the need fo r arms and 
ammunition created  by the increasing incursions of Kama ra id e rs  in to  
Hereroland during th is  period.
As in o ther pasto ra l communities, in te rm itte n t migration was an essen­
t i a l  feature of the Hereros’ form of production. Although they e s ta b l­
ished v illages  and family yerfts.. seasonal expeditions were undertaken 
with large herds and herding p a r tie s  to  d is ta n t  c a ttle -p o s ts . Land was 
not alloca ted  fo r p riva te  ownership or u se. Largely because of th e ir 
physical m obility and communal ownership of land, the Hereros had no 
fixed idea of boundaries, and th is  was la te r  to become a major source of 
c o n f lic t with s e t t l e r  farmers and co lonial au th o rities :
To the Herero boundaries are vague; in pre-European 
times the a t t i tu d e  was the c h ie fs ' claim "where my c a t t le  have grazed is  H ereroland".S3
During the p re-co lon ial period the Hereros lived  mainly from the milk of
th e ir  c a t t l e  and from foraged veldkos. L i t t l e  or no aieat was eaten 
except on ceremonial occasions or when stock died. M obility and en v ir­
onmental c o n stra in ts  also  conditioned the forms of so cia l and p o l i tic a l  
organization. Although the Hereros possessed a complex kinship system 
and displayed a g re a te r degree of so cia l cohesion than the Nanas, th e ir  
form of production required a wide d isp ersa l o f population and decentr­
a lize d  p o l i tic a l  au th o rity . The l a t t e r  was vested in  the 'p r ie s t - c h ie f s '
35of which there appeared to be many in the pre-co lon ial formation, A 
'paramount c h i e f  did not emerge u n ti l  the co lon ia l period, and then 
only as a r e s u lt  o f d ire c t  co lonial in tervention .
Although the form of production of the Namas (or Khoi-Khoi) bore much in 
common with tha t of the Hereros, th e ir  pasto ra l a c t iv i t ie s  were rendered 
more marginal by the a r id  conditions of the southern regions, and as a 
re su lt  they were forced to re ly  more heavily  on s tra te g ie s  more commonly 
associa ted  with hun ter-gatherers. As in the case of the Hereros, the 
Namas regarded stock as personal property, while land was a, communal 
resource to which a i l  the members of the community had access. Boundar­
ies a lso  tended to be flu id . However, the m arginality  of th e ir  environ-
36ment compelled the Nama to be even more mobile than the Hereros. The 
Nama herds were sm aller, and they re lie d  to  a g re a te r ex ten t on small 
stock, Constant m obility and the sca rc ity  of water and grazing made 
necessary sm aller migratory u n its  than those of the Hereros. F urther­
more, the Namas had a g re a te r re liance  on meat from th o ir herds and from 
hunting, the l a t t e r  providing an important supplement to  pasto ra l 
a c tiv ity . F ina lly  the Namas can be d istinguished  from the Hereros by 
th e ir  g re a te r dependence on ra id ing . The m arginality  of the environ­
ment a lso  found expression a t  the so cia l and p o l i t ic a l  le v e ls , p a r t ic ­
u la r ly  in thb re la t iv e  lack of social cohesion and ce n tra lize d  au tho rity
among the Nama groupings. P o li t ic a l  and ju d ic ia l  au tho rity  was vested
in a ch ie f or cap tain  ass is ted  by councillo rs and m agistrates,
In times of peace the powers of the ch ie f are very lim ited . 
Without having consulted a mass meeting and without the
decision of the counc illo rs the in stru ctio n s  of a ch ief are
o f very l i t t l e  consequence. The form of government of ac h ie fta in sh ip  is  very dem ocratic.39
Only in the case of war, were the captains allowed to assume absolute
powers.
The marginal pasto ra l economy and fragmented s o c io -p o litic a l s tru c tu re s
of the Nama were not purely a product of ecological fa c to rs , but a lso  of
th e ir  proximity to  white settlem ents in the Cape and the rip p le  e f fe c t
th is  produced on the social formations of Namiiqualand and southern
Namibia. In general a d is tin c tio n  has been made between "indigenous"
Nama groupings in Namibia, and the Oorlam or emigrant Khoi whose close
contact with Cape s e t t le r s  had re su lte d  in th e ir  assim ila tion  of
elements of Boer c u ltu re . In response to pressures from white settlem ent
in the Cape and the expansion of trade and a g r ic u ltu re , the Oorlams had
begun moving in to  southern Namibia from about 1800, The o rig ins  of the
"indigenous" Nama formations have not been firm ly es tab lish ed , and
Hoorsom has suggested that they may have been the product uf e a r l ie r  40migrations from the northern Cape. Whatever the explanation of the 
o rig ins of the "Indigenous" Nama groupings, the penetration  of Oorlam 
bands in to  the area  during the n ineteenth century had profound e f fe c ts  
not only on Namaland, but on cen tra l and even northern Namibia. Not only 
did these incursions place fu rth e r pressures on the meagre grazing and 
water resources of Namaland, but the Oorlams were instrum ental in in tro ­
ducing guns and horses in to  Namibia and disp lacing  pasto ra l forms of 
social and economic organization  with the highly mobile 'commando'
dependent on hunting, ra id ing  and trad ing ,
As refugees from white expansion in the Cape, the Oorlams brought l i t t l e  
stock with them and were therefore dependent on s tock-raid ing  to es tab ­
l ish  themselves as p a s to ra lis ts . Perhaps even more important, these 
immigrant bands had through th e ir  sustained contact with s e t t l e r  and 
trading communities in the Cape, become fam iliar with, and thus depend­
ent on, the implements and trappings of Western trade and c u ltu re . They 
introduced innovations such as guns, horses and ox-wagons in to  Namibia, 
and th e ir  presence and impact on ex is tin g  so cia l formations a ttra c ted  
and helped to consolidate the positions vf both traders and m issionaries 
in the area. F in a lly , the c o n f lic t generated between the d iffe re n t 
groups of Namas and Hereros fo r land and livestock , helped to  crea te  a 
p o l i t ic a l  vacuum, a "no-man's land", in c e n tra l Namibia. Into th is  
vacumn moved f i r s t  an immigrant "coloured group", the B asters, and 
la te r ,  and with more far-reaching consequences, the f i r s t  colonizers of 
Namibia,
On the margins of the dominant Nama and Herero social formations of 
southern and cen tra l Namibia, lived the Damaras and San, conquered 
groups which had been forced into the periphera l ureas of the Namib and 
the Kalahari, or who had attached themselves to the Hereros and Namas as 
servants and dependants. E ssen tia lly  both the San and the Damaras were 
hun ter-gatherers, although the l a t t e r  combined hunting and gathering 
with sm all-sca le s to ck -ra is in g  and c u lt iv a tio n , trading and c ra fts  such 
as iron smithing, Ambiguity and controversy surrounds the question of 
the ethnological o rig ins of the Damaras, Although the Damaras speak the 
same language as the Namas the tendency among most h is to rian s  and ethno­
lo g is ts  is  to see them as a d is tin c t  group, basing th is  d is tin c tio n
la rgely  on the negroid features and dark skin colour of the Damaras, 
However, i t  has been argued th a t there is  no evidence to suggest that 
the Damaras were ever a d is t in c t  community or formed a coherent group, 
before co lonial a u th o rit ie s , e th n o lo g is ts , and h is to rian s  created a 
d is tin c t  id e n tity  for them. While an investiga tion  of the orgins of 
the Damara - who today form a re la t iv e ly  d is tin c t  ethn ic  stratum  of the 
Namibian social formation - f a l l s  outside the scope of th is  d is s e r ta ­
tio n , i t  i s  re levan t to  th is  study tha t the Damaras possessed very 
l i t t l e  so cia l cohesion. Even the h is to r ia n  and e thno log is t, Heinrich 
Vedder, who has w ritten  ex tensively  on the Damaras as a d is tin c t  ethnic 
group, conceded in 1936 that
no re a l t r ib a l  community e x is ts  amongst them and a c h ie f ta in ­ship is  unknown to them, every family o f any s ize  leading a separate l i f e  . ,,"4 5
The dan had also  been forced in to  the a g r ic u ltu ra lly  periphera l areas, 
p a r tic u la r ly  the Kalahari dese rt areas along the easte rn  and north­
easte rn  borders of present-day Namibia. Unlike the Damaras, they were 
exclusively  hunter-gatherer«, and because of the extreme a r id i ty  of the 
areas they inhabited, organized in to  small, highly mobile, and widely 
sca tte red  hunting bands, in p re-co lonial Namibia some of the San had 
attached themselves to dosiinant groupings lik e  the Hereros and the 
Qvambos (and la te r  the white s e t t l e r s )  as herders and servants. Each 
h u n t b a n d  operated w ithin a sp ec if ic  area, separated from other areas 
by "neu tra l" zones- T e r r i to r ia l  boundaries were scrupulously observed 
even by cloi$ely re la ted  groups.
Pre-co lonial production and co lon ia l co n flic t
P re-colonial forms of production and th e ir corresponding forms of social
organization have played an im portant, but l i t t l e  researched, ro le  in 
shaping the re la tio n s  between indigenous and colonizing groups. The 
dense settlem ent pa tterns and cohesive social organization of the 
Ovambos, for example, provided an important co n tra in t on co lonial penet­
ra tio n  of the area. In i t i a l ly  settlem ent and co lonial land appropriation 
was re s tr ic te d  to  the more sparsely  populated p lateau  regions, and 
p a r tic u la r ly  the large-stock  areas of the northern and cen tra l p lateau. 
This brought the white s e t t l e r s  in to  d ire c t c o n f lic t with the Herero and 
Nama p a s to ra lis ts  of these regions. Although hunter-gatherer groupings 
were a lso  affec ted  by co lonial pene tration , p a r tic u la r ly  when white 
settlem ent began expanding in to  the more periphera l areas of the sand- 
veld and fringes of the Namib, they were c le a rly  less  c e n tra lly  involved 
in the colonial strugg le than were the pasto ra l coumunities, The social 
cohesion of p re-co lon ial formations a lso  appears to  have played a ro le  
in  the responses of indigenous grouping to  co lonial in trusion . The two 
most cohesive p re-co lon ial groupings, the Ovambos and the Hereros, have 
offered  the most intense and consisten t re s is tan ce  to colonialism . The 
example of the Hereros is  espG'cially s tr ik in g . In s p ite  of concerted 
e f fo r ts  by the co lonial a u th o ritie s  to destroy the economic and p o l i t i ­
cal bases of th is  pastocal grouping (e f fo r ts  which during the 1904-07
wars took on the dimensions of genocide), the Hereros were able to  re-
emerge in the 1940s and 1950s ait the most powerful indigenous p o l i tic a l  
force in the police zone, i f  not. in the e n tire  te r r i to r y .  In con tras t, 
the more dispersed and poorly in tegra ted  Damaras, who account for a
s l ig h tly  higher percentage of the population th a t the Hereros, have
continued to play a peripheral ro ls  in the p o li tic s  of re s is tan c e .
These broad-based generaliza tions are d i f f ic u lt  to su sta in , and require 
more d e ta ile d  research  and ana lysis , A more sp e c if ic , and possibly more
f r u it f u l ,  avenue of explora tion  is  the re la tio n sh ip  between c o n f lic t and
s o c if ic  forms of production. In p a r tic u la r , the inherent c o n f lic t
between p a s to ra lis ts  and s e t t l e r  farmers is  suggestive. Although the
p re-co lon ial h is to ry  of Namibia provides c le a r  i l lu s t r a t io n s  of the
c o n f lic ts  between pre-co lon ial forms of production, such as those bet- 
48
ween p a s to ra lis ts  and h un ter-gatherers , and those between sp ec if ic49groups of p a s to ra l is ts ,  none of these come near to matching the fe ro ­
c i ty  and single-mindedness of the co n f lic t between p asto ra l groupings 
and white s e t t l e r  farmers, p a r tic u la r ly  during the ea rly  phases of 
co lonial settlem ent in  Namibia. To a tt r ib u te  the In ten sity  of th is
c o n f lic t  to the imperatives of c a p ita l accumulation, as some w riters50
have attempted, begs ra th e r than answers the question, p a r tic u la r ly  i f  
one bears in mind tha t the most intense and d estruc tive  co lon ia l con­
f l i c t ,  the 1903-0? wars, took place in a period preceding the penetr­
atio n  of the colony by s ig n if ic a n t c a p ita l in te re s ts .
In order to expose the inherent con trad ictions between pastoralism  and
s e tt le d  livestock  farming, i t  is  necessary to explore some of the basic
c h a ra c te r is tic s  of pastora l economies. In common with hunter-gatherers,
p a s to ra lis ts  are characterized by "low overa ll human population density
52in re la t io n  to land, and high physical m obility". These two forms of 
production share another common t r a i t .  Doth hunter-gatherers and p asto r­
a l i s t s  have been regarded as remnants of archaic (and therefore in e f f ic ­
ien t) socio-economic systems, while th e ir  persistence  has been seen as 
an irra t io n a l  response and a b a r r ie r  to "progress" or "development’’ . 
Such assumptions of course conceal evolutionary biases against pre-
technological forms of production, which recent research  has shown to  be 54groundless.
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While prejudice against pasto ra l forms of production s t i l l  e x is t  among
government planners and aid  organizations, researchers are becoming
increasingly  aware of the economic ra tio n a li ty  and "ecological fine
tuning" of pastora l s tra te g ie s , Comparisons between p a s to ra lis ts  and
commercial ranchers in Kenya, fo r example, have shown that in s p ite  of
the heavy c a p ita l and technological inputs in the l a t t e r ,  indigenous
nomadic pastora l economies are capable of supporting 15 per cent more56
people on the land than are s e t t le d  commercial farmers. By means of 
high physical m obility, p a s to ra iis ts  are able to maximize the intake of 
the most d ig e s tib le  forage over large areas, leaving u n ti l  la s t  forage 
o f low n u tr i t iv e  value. Pasture quantity  and q u ality  and water supplies 
vary considerably over both time and space in the a r id  clim atic  zones. 
In p a r tic u la r , grazing has g re a te r n u tr i t iv e  value during the growing 
stag,* when p lan ts contain a higher quantity  of d ig e s tib le  pro teins and 
carbohydrates, Pastoral m obility may also  be re la te d  to  a v arie ty  of 
o ther facto rs such as the need for mineral s a l t s ,  avoidance of disease 
and predato rs, and the displacement of game (in  many cases an. emergency 
food supply for pastora l communities! from the most favourable 
p as tu re s .
On the basis of on-going research , Swift concludes th a t pasto ra l systems 
are eco log ically  more e f f ic ie n t  than commercial ranching, even though 
p a s to ra iis ts  often  share th e ir  environment with w ild life  competitors for 
grazing. In re la tio n  to  extensive dryland a g ric u ltu re , pastoralism  has 
been shown to have lower land productiv ity , but higher labour product­
iv ity . Perhaps most important, however, is  the re s il ie n c e  and s ta b i l i ty  
of pasto ra l economies in extremely a r id  and flu c tu a tin g  environments. 
During years of drought p a s to ra iis ts  tend to increase m obility over both 
time and space to compensate fo r de te rio ra tin g  pasturage. Besides
th e ir  s tra te g ie s  of m obility , p a s to ra lis ts  a lso  compensate fo r environ­
mental fluc tua tions by the expansion of th e ir  herds, sometimes beyond 
the carrying capacity of ava ilab le  pasturage. Konczacki argues th a t the 
stock accumulation and overs vcking so often  associated with pastora l 
economies, is a form of insurance or sec u rity  against the d isa s te rs  of 
drought and livestock  epidemics. The large r the he"d, the larg e r the 
number of animals that are lik e ly  to survive droughts and epidemics, and 
thus the g re a te r the p o ten tia l of recovery by rebuilding depleted herds. 
P a s to ra lis ts
tre a t  livestock  as c a p ita l , and . . .  the harsh environment
made i t  imperative on them to  accumulate i t . 60
Tne im peratives of accumulation are probably a lso  re la te d  to the 
re lia n ce  of such groupings as the Hereros on milk ra th e r  than meat, to 
the assoc ia tion  between s ta tu s  and c a t t l e  ownership, and to the various 
ideological p rescrip tio n s  attached to the disposal of stock,
This b rie f  discussion of pasto ra l forms of production allows one to 
ch art some of the points of c o n f lic t  between p a s to ra lis ts  and se tt le d  
livestock  farmers. I t  w ill be argued that c o n f lic t between these two 
forms of production go beyond the mere competition fo r scarce resources 
such as land, livestock  and labour, although c le a rly  such competition is 
an esse n tia l component. The p a s to ra l is ts ' imperatives of m obility  and 
stock accumulation in te n s ifie d  competition foi Im d with s e tt le d  farmers 
because both s tra te g ie s  were premised on the a v a ila b ili ty  of large 
t ra c ts  of land. D ifferen t conceptions of land ownership and land bounda­
r ie s  are, however, also  of v i ta l  importance. In common with pastora l 
communities in o ther areas, those in Namibia regarded land and water 
supplies as communal and open resources. P astoral communities la id  claim 
to those areas where th e ir  stock grazed or had grazed in the p ast.
However, both seasonal m igrations and the use of periphera l reserve 
areas during periods of drought made for flu id  and i l l-d e fin e d  bound­
a r ie s , The con trasting  emphasis of white s e t t l e r  farmers and colonial 
o f f ic ia ls  on p riv a te  property and c le a rly  demarcated boundaries provided 
considerable scope for c o n f lic t, not only in re la t io n  to d iffe rin g  
concepts of the sa le  and use of land, but also  in  re la t io n  to de lim it­
ation  and d if fe re n tia t io n  of privately-owned and communal grazing areas,
Conflicts between p a s to ra lis ts  and s e t t l e r  farmers were also  lik e ly  to 
be exacerbated during periods of drought when ava ilab le  grazing and 
water resources were pushed to th e ir  l im its . Under such conditions 
p a s to ra lis ts  required  access to  grazing and water supplies not needed 
during periods of "normal" ra . 'n fa l l , while s e t t l e r  farmers were hard put 
to defend the already over-extended resources of th e ir  privately-owned 
p roperties, in an environmental context like  tha t in Namibia, where 
drought is  a recu rren t i f  not "normal" featu re of c lim atic  conditions, 
co n f lic t  may thus have been expected to  reach unprecedented heights.
However, the basis of c o n f lic t between pasto ra l and se tt le d  systems of 
stock -ra is ing  go beyond d ifferences in the d e f in itio n  of boundaries and 
conceptions of land ownership and usage. The underlying log ic of these 
two forms of production are inherently  incompatible and an tagon is tic , so 
that the survival of one system is  dependent on the d estru c tio n  or 
s tric tly -en fo rce d  lim ita tio n  - of the o ther, There are a t  le a st three 
reasons for th is . While pastora l systems are based on u n re s tr ic t r i  
hysical m obility , s e t t le d  farming and p riva te  property are premised on 
the demarcation of c le a rly  defined boundaries, on fencing, and on s t r i c t  
control over the movement of stock. Secondly, p riv a te  property and
s e tt le d  farming demand veld conservation s tra te g ie s  based on planned 
stocking and the s t r i c t  lim ita tio n  of stock numbers. These are diam etr­
ic a lly  opposed to pasto ra l s tra te g ie s  which emphasize the accumulation 
of stock as a compensatory mechanism against droughts and epidemics.
These two contrad ictions are in  tu rn  re la ted  to  a th ird  which revolves 
around the labour requirements of the two forms of production. I t  has 
already been noted th a t pastoralism  has a high labour p roductiv ity . 
Although p asto ra l cosssunities such as those of the Hereros and Namas 
drew on the labour of subjected groups lik e  the Camara and San, vhey 
w e  e s se n tia lly  capable of functioning from in tern a l labour resources. 
Labour inputs in to  stock rearing  were e^-tivcical in re la t io n  to s e tt le d  
o r commercial ranching. For example, livestock  was allowed to wander 
over fa ir ly  extensive areas, which of course provided another source of 
c o n f lic t with s e t t l e r  farmers b-cause untended stock would wander onto 
p riv a te  property and thus pose a th re a t to the grazing of se v .Ie r farm­
e r s . Conversely, the s tray ing  of minimally-tended stock across govern­
ment imposed boundaries and onto p riva te  property provided both tempta­
tion  and pre tex t for wholesale confiscations by colonial a u th o ritie s  and 
land owners. In co n tra s t, s e t t l e r  farmers with th e ir  need for s t r i c t e r  
stock management and th e ir  lower ecological e ffic ien c y , were heavily 
r e l ia n t  upon ex ternal labour inpu ts. This was p a r tic u la r ly  true  in 
Namibia where the size  of ranches made a large labour force necessary. 
Pastoral groups like the Merer-) were aware of the d iffe re n t labour 
requirements of indigenous and commercial farming s tra te g ie s , and, as 
Vedder t e s t i f i e s ,  held the l a t t e r  in some contempt:
Labour in the European sense is  unknown to the Herero.
According to him the white man makes unnecessary work wherebyhe only worries him self and o thers; and he despises th a t .61
Although the labour requirements of s e t t l e r  farmers provided the most
e.iduring con trad iction  between indigenous and colonized communities, 
th is  should not d e tra c t from the importance of o ther co n tra d ic tio n s , 
p a r tic u la r ly  during the ea rly  phases of coloniza tion .
Sim ilar con trad ictions ex isted  between se ttle r-fa rm ers  and hunter- 
ga the rers, but as the hunter-gatherers occupied areas periphera l to 
those su ita b le  fo r commercial ranching, co n f lic t was less  intense - 
although i t  was by no means absen t. The social organization  of hunter- 
gatherers a lso  made e ffec tiv e  and concerted res is tan ce  d i f f ic u lt  - and 
th e ir  most common form of re ta l ia t io n  to encroachment by o ther groups 
was thus stock th e f t .  Furthermore, hunter-gatherers lik e  the San and 
Damaras, had already been subjected by the dominant pasto ra l communi­
t ie s ,  so tha t the en try  of another group of stock farmers in to  the area 
did not fundamentally a l te r  ex is tin g  p attern s  of c o n f lic t. As Margo Rus­
se l has argued in re la tio n  of Botswana, "the re la tio n sh ip  between 
Kalahari Afrikaners and the Bushmen has been very s im ila r to the r e la t ­
ionship between Bantu peoples and Bushmen, not because the Boers have 
e x p lic i t ly  im itated Slacks, but because th e ir circumstances as c a t t l e -
keepers have led them in to  sim ilar so lu tions to the problems of co-
63existence with these hunters and gatherers".
The major focus of c o n f lic t during the ea rly  years of co lonial ru le  in 
Namibia was therefore with the two major pasto ra l groups, the Namas and 
the Hereros. That the g re a tes t destruc tion  of th is  c o n f lic t was wreaked 
on the Hereros is  consisten t with th e ir occupation of the best c a t tle -  
rearing  areas in the te r r i to ry  and with the p u rity  and effec tiveness of 
th e ir  pasto ra l form of production. With the exception of i n i t i a l  r e s i s t ­
ance to the establishm ent of p o l i t ic a l  contro l by the co lon ize rs.
c o n f lic t  between 1684 and 1904 coalesced around the issues of land and
c a t t le ,  and the undermining of p re-co lon ial forms of production in order
to  make room for the establishm ent of s e t t l e r  farming. As ea rly  as 1889
the German colonial rep resen ta tiv e  in Namibia, Curt von Francois, argued
th a t i t  was necessary to "crush" the Herero. He ca lled  for m ilita ry
reinforcem ents, arguing that the " larg e r the force the g re a te r the
b en e fits  re su ltin g  from the capture of the sizeab le herds of the
Herero". Sim ilar views were expressed by h is  successor, Theodor
Leutwein, who became the f i r s t  governor of Gorman South West A frica. In
1894 Leutwein complained to the Reich Chancellor th a t the Hereros were
an obstacle to co lonial development because they refused to s e l l  land to
white s e t t l e r s ,  "but are only prepared to allow them to live  there".
Furthermore the Hereros were averse to s e llin g  th e ir  c a t t l e  and instead
b u i l t  up vast herds. Because the white s e t t l e r s  did not own the land
they occupied, they did l i t t l e  to  develop i t  and in consequence the
progress of the colony was hindered.
Besides, the colony 's fu ture depends on the gradual tran sfe r of the land front the hands of the work-shy natives in to  thoseof the Europeans , , ,  In being exclusively  concerned with theenlargement of th e ir  c a t t l e  herds, the Herero are becoming 
unproductive for our trade and in d u stry .65
S im ilar arrangements were envisaged for the tra n sfe r  of livestock from
indigenous owners to the s e t t l e r s ,  so th a t the African population would
eventually  become a p ro p e rtile ss  labouring c la ss  in the serv ice of white
en te rp rize . leu tw ein 's  ambition was to transform the colony in to  "a
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c a t tle - ra is in g  country able to compete on the world market". The
colonial adm inistrator had few il lu s io n s  about what th is  would e n ta il :
<A)ny way you look a t i t ,  co lon ia l po licy  is  an inhumane thing. In the la s t  analysis i t  can, a f te r  a l l ,  re su lt  only 
in the re s tr ic t io n  of the r ig h ts  of the native population in favour of the in truders . , .  Whosoever disagrees with th is  must be b as ica lly  opposed to a l l  co lonial policy, a viewpoint
6?that is  a t  le a st lo g ica l.
The nature of German imperialism
The struggle between s e t t l e r  farmers and pastora l i s ts  was in te n s ifie d  by 
the economic m arginality  and p o l i t i c a l  in secu rity  of the l a t t e r ,  The 
German s e t t le r s  faced not only a harsh and unpredictable environment, 
but were dependent on a m etropolitan government which was not fu lly  
committed to  the co lonial p ro jec t and gave l i t t l e  in the way of finan ­
c ia l  and p o l i t ic a l  support to i t s  co lo n is ts , p a r tic u la r ly  in tha t cruc­
ia l  period th a t  led up to  the 1904-07 wars. In h is  in f lu e n tia l study of 
German South West A frica, Helmut Bley puts the emphasis on adm inistra­
tive  and legal p o lic ies  as the major causes of the 1904-07 confronta­
t ion . In p a r tic u la r , he s ing les out "the fa lla c ie s  underlying Leutwein's 
strategy" as leading "inexorably to  the Herero and Namas ris in g s  of 
1904". Whether or not one agrees w ith B ley 's emphasis, the p o lic ies  of 
colonial adm inistrators like  Leutwein are only comprehensible w ith in  the 
broader context of the sp ec if ic  nature of German imperialism. .Like any 
o ther co lonial adm inistrator, Leutwein chose from the lim ited range of 
options allowed him by the co n stra in ts  of the s i tu a tio n .
Hans-Ulrich Wehler has argued that German imperialism was e s se n tia lly  a 
response to the so cia l d is locations  and d isruptions caused in Germany by 
rap id  in d u s tr ia liz a tio n  and economic growth, and in  p a r tic u la r  by the 
depression following the economic crash of 1873. The drive for colonial 
acqu isitions was intim ately tied  to attem pts by the German government 
under Bismarck to leg itim ize i t s  au tho rity  and d iv e rt a tte n tio n  from 
in tern a l problems in a s itu a tio n  of increasing so cia l tension and 
d issen t.
The growing enthusiasm for co lonial empire can surely be
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understood as a c r is is  Ideology channelling the emotional 
tensions, the h y ste ria , and the growing fru s tra tio n  - which then, as l a te r ,  accompanied periods of economic depression 
towards a vague ex ternal goal. . . . t h e  'co lo n ia l fev er' o ften  
worked as a form of escapism from the socio-economic and 
p o l i t ic a l  problems re su ltin g  from Germany's transform ation in to  an in d u s tr ia l so c ie ty .69
Building on and re fin ing  Wehler's theory of German so c ia l imperialism, 
Woodruff Smith has id en tified  two major trends in German colonial ideo­
logy. One of these, the "em igration ist theory*', saw colonial expansion 
as a so lo tton  to  the massive emigration from Germany during the 19th 
century, and the creation  overseas of an idealized , p re -in d u s tr ia l 
peasant socie ty , "Economic colonialism " on the o ther hand envisaged no 
la rg e -sca le  (Settlement, but saw colonialism  as a means of p ro tec ting  
trade and providing the necessary food and raw m ateria ls for in d u s tr ia l­
iza tio n . During the depression of the 1870s, these co lonial ideologies 
allowed a convergence of a t le a st three major groups of in te re s ts  in 
Germany. For the leaders of industry and finance, "economic colonialism " 
provided an ideological ju s t i f ic a t io n  of demands for s ta te  assistance  
and in terven tion , p re c ip ita ted  by fa llin g  p ro f it  ra te s  brought on by the 
depression. M ercantile in te re s ts  in the tro p ics  a lso  favoured s ta te  
intervention  in order to compensate for th e ir  economic vu ln erab lity  and 
to p ro tec t them against the encroachment of B ritish  and French 
merchants. F ina lly , fo r the lower middle c la ss , threatened with a loss 
of s ta tu s  and possible p ro le ta rian iza tio n  by the depression, colonial 
em igra tion ist ideologies provided an o u tle t  for a n ti- in d u s tr ia l  and 
a n t i - l ib e r a l  sentim ents, This convergence of ideologies allowed Bismarck
to consolidate his position  by drawing together these divergent 
70in te re s ts ,  but held a number of negative im plications for the colon­
ies . In p a r tic u la r , the competing demands of "em igration ist" and "econo­
mic" ideologies had the e f fe c t o f deepening the am biguities in Germany’s
commitment to  s e tt le m e n t,
Because the ac q u isitio n  of the colonies wcs prompted by considerations 
which had more to  do with conditions in Germany i t s e l f  ra th e r  than with 
th e ir in t r in s ic  value, the commitment of the imperial s ta te  and the 
major classes in Germany to the colonies was minimal. As Wehler points 
out, Bismarck was wary of the f in an c ia l, p o l i t ic a l  and m ilita ry  l i a b i l ­
i t i e s  of colonial possessions and would have preferred  to  hand over the
colonies to syndicates of p riva te  in te re s t. However, enthusiasm for 
the co lonial p ro jec t soon waned, and Bismarck discovered th a t the 
trading companies had n e ith e r the means nor the in ten tio n  of managing 
the colonies. In s p ite  of the dominant influence of the "economic" 
ideology on the cen tra l co lonial adm inistration , em ig ra tion ist ideolog­
ies continued to exercize some appeal, p a r tic u la r ly  in re la t io n  to South 
West Africa which, a f te r  an i n i t i a l  phase as a trad ing  colony, was 
considered the most promising area fo r settlem ent.
Although attempts were made to encourage sm all-sca le farming in the
area, the German government continued to look to p rivate  c a p ita l to
develop the colony However, as surplus ca p ita l was scarce in Germany 
and German investors cautious, more German c a p ita l flowed in to  the 
B rit ish  than the German colonies, In order to  induce the flow of ca p ita l 
to Namibia, the German a u th o ritie s  freely  granted concessions for 
mining, railway construction  and land settlem ent, The granting of 
concessions did nothing to aid settlem ent, and i f  anything was detrimen­
ta l to the establishm ent of a secure white farming community in the 
te r r i to r y .  The land companies preferred  not to  s e l l  th e ir  land to 
s e t t l e r s ,  but ra th e r hoped to p ro f it  from speculation, In those cases
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Because the ac q u isitio n  of the colonies was prompted by considerations 
which had more to do with conditions in Germany i t s e l f  ra th e r than with 
th e ir  in t r in s ic  value, the commitment of the imperial s ta te  and the 
major classes in Germany to the colonies was minimal. As Wehler points 
out, Bismarck was wary of the f in an c ia l, p o l i t ic a l  and m ilita ry  l i a b i l ­
i t ie s  of co lonial possessions and would have preferred  to hand over the 
colonies to syndicates of p riva te  in te re s t. However, enthusiasm for 
the co lonial p ro jec t soon waned, and Bismarck discovered tha t the 
trading companies had neither the means nor the in ten tion  of managing 
the co lonies. In s p ite  of the dominant influence of the "economic” 
ideology on the cen tral co lonial adm inistration , e raigra tion ist ideolog­
ies continued to exercize some appeal, p a r tic u la r ly  in re la t io n  to South 
West Africa which, a f te r  an i n i t i a l  phase as a trading colony, was 
considered the most promising area for settlem ent.
Although attem pts were made to encourage SJiall-scale farming in the
area, the German government continued to look to  p rivate c a p ita l to 
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develop the colony However, as surplus c a p ita l was scarce in Germany 
and German investors cautious, more German c a p ita l flowed in to  the 
B ritish  than the German colonies. In order to induce the flow of ca p ita l 
to Namibia, the German a u th o ritie s  free ly  granted concessions for 
mining, railway construction  and land settlem ent. The granting of 
concessions did nothing to aid  settlem ent, and i f  anything was detrimen­
ta l  to the establishm ent of a secure white farming community in the 
te r r i to ry , The land companies preferred  not to s e l l  th e ir  land to 
s e t t l e r s ,  but ra th e r hoped to p ro f it  from specula tion . In those cases
where concession companies were prepared to  s e l l  land, p rices  tended to 
be beyond the reach of most prospective s e t t l e r s .  As a re su lt  s e t t le r s  
were e i th e r  compelled to buy land from the colonial governmei.S, o r to 
acquire land d ire c tly  from the African people. The l a t te r  course often  
consisted of simply occupying land on the fringes o f t r ib a l  settlem ents. 
In an attem pt to generate c a p ita l , one concession company, the Land 
Settlem ent Syndicate, proceeded to  s e l l  land to  which i t  held no legal
The incompatible aims of the eia ig ra tion ist and economic versions of
co lonial ideology therefore not only helped to fo s te r land disputes and
o ther c o n f lic ts , but contributed to the general in secu rity  and marginal-
i ty  of s e t t l e r  ag ricu ltu re  in Namibia.. Measures to  curb the abuses of
the concession companies and put s e t t l e r  a g ric u ltu re  on a more secure
basis were only implemented a f te r  the l o04-0? wars. The German
s e t t le r s  coming to Namibia during th is  phase lacked both c a p ita l and
experience, and, in common with German adm in is tra to rs , zpproached ag ric -76u ltu re  with inappropriate and even romanticized European notions. Most
of the s e t t l e r s  were e i th e r  small farmers from Bavaria or East-E lbian
Prussia, or so ld ie rs  recen tly  discharged from the Schutztruppe. The
m ajority  of both ca tegories lacked c a p ita l to  buy stock and implement 
7?the necessary improvements to th e ir  farms- One of the guiding p rinc­
ip les of German colonial po licy  was to keep exptnses as low as possib le ,
78and s ta te  aid to settlem ent during th is  ea rly  phase was lim ited.
S e tt le rs  therefore often  combined farming with trad ing , p a r tic u la r ly  in 
79order to acquire stock for th e ir farms,
The nature o f the colonial sta te
I t  has been argued th a t the in secu rity  and marginaUty of s e t t l e r  farm­
ers  in German-South West h fr ic a  car be d ire c tly  re la te d  to the sp ec if ic  
ecological and c lim atic  conditions of the te r r i to r y  and to the nature of 
imperialism. However, the attempt to resolve th is  in secu rity  by the 
crea tion  of a r ig id  and repressive ra c ia l system can only be understood 
in re la t io n  to the in terventions of the co lonial s ta te .  I t  is therefore 
necessary to explore the nature of the co lonial s ta te  and in p a r tic u la r  
the notions of sovereignty and te r r i to r ia l i t y  which guided i t .
Front the beginning of Germany's co lonial involvement in south-western
A frica, German im perial ambitions were strongly influenced by notions of
sovereignty derived from the European system of s ta te s , In s p ite  of
Bismarck's reluctance to assume d irec t re sp o n sib lity  fo r the colony from
the German Colonial Society, the A llehochste KabSnettsorde of 13 April
1885 s ta ted  that
. . . a l l  measures o f the German government aim a t  procuring the rig h ts  of sovereignty for the society  in the te r r i to r y  placed under the p ro tec tion  of the empire between the Orange and the Kunene and a t tran sfe rr in g  i t s  execution to  the sovereignty 
of the empire.80
However, German contro l over the te r r i to r y  remained tenuous throughout 
the 1880s and ea rly  1890s, and I t  was not u n ti l  Theodor Leutwein assumed 
the governorship that the fu l l  im plications of the emphasis on sover­
eignty became apparent, The h is to rian  Helmut L. >y has a ttr ib u te d  the new
d irec tio n  in colonial policy a f te r  1894 to Leutwein's "personal d isposi-
81tion to think in terms of s ta te  au tho rity" , but i t  is  c le a r th a t, 
whatever Leutwein’s personal in c lin a tio n s , the concern with s ta te  supre­
macy was shared by the imperial government, Shortly before Leutwein's 
appointment, Chancellor Von Caprivi had announced an important change in 
German colonial po)icy which signalled  a new commitient by Germany to
...w e wish to become masters of the country and to consolid­ate  our sovereignty without bloodshed. We possess South-West 
A frica once and for a l l ;  i t  is  Gerraai t e r r i to r y  and must be 
preserved as such.82
The im plications of s ta te  sovereignty ware made even more e x p lic i t  a f te r
i t  became apparent th a t German supremacy could not be a tta in ed  without
war. i . '04 the German ju r i s t  H, Hesse, for example, id en tified  the
struggle fo r control over land as the ce n tra l cause of the Herero
reb ellio n , "The p rice  of v icto ry  w ill and must be the unconditional and
absolute power of the Germans over the South West African s o il" , he83
The nature of sovereignty is  decribed by the sentence quid
e s t  In  te r r i to r ia , e t ia s  e s t  de te: •itorio, i .e .  whatsoever is in the te r r i to r y  is  absolu tely  s w je c t  to  the ru ling  s ta te  adm inistration . This to ta l  subjection  of the natives under 
the govern,,,ent of the empire has to be brought about in the course of the rearrangement of a f fa irs  in South West Africa, 
that is  by abolishing a l l  ex is tin g  p riv ile g e s ,84
The unacceptabl.ly  of Euopean notions of sovereignty to black
communities in Namibia is  v iv id ly  i l lu s t ra te d  in the d iary  of tha Nama
leader Hendrik Witbooi. At a meeting with the German commissioner. Von
Francois, for example, Witbooi strongly re je c ted  the idea of German
"pro tec tion", a euphemism for sovereignty during th is  ea rly  period:
I t  seems strange and impossible to me, and I cannot under­
stand i t .  Each ch ie fta in  ru les over h is own people independ­en tly . I t  is he who governs his land and people. I t  is  his duty to pro tec t h is  people against any danger or d isa s te r . I t  
is for th is  reason tha t we have various kingdoms and each ch ief has h is own people and land to govern. When, however, one ch ie f is subordinate to another, the former is  not 
independent.85
Witbooi went on to argue tha t Africa was "a country which belonged to 
our Red Chiefs". I f  an African ch ie f was threatened and was too weak to
neet the th re a t on h is own, then he should appeal to o ther A fricans to
help defend the te r r i to r y .  A fricans, he maintained, belonged together
and the p o l i tic a l  sub-divisions that ex isted  between them were
" t r i f l in g " .  That W itbooi's re je c tio n  of German sovereignty should take
th r form of what is  arguably the e a r l ie s t  expression of nationalism  in
Namibia, is  probably associa ted  with his missionary education and his
86g re a te r fam ilarity  with European conceptions of the s ta te . In sp ite  of 
h is c le a re r understanding of German colonial in ten tions, however, the 
p o l i tic a l  and economic organization  of the Khowesin (W itbooi's people) 
was sim ilar to  tha t o f o ther Naraa communities and was therefore 
threatened in much the same way as other indigenous communities. Among 
the immediate th rea ts  faced by the Khowesin were German attem pts to  put 
a stop to ra id ing  anc the con tro l th a t t e r r i to r ia l  boundaries afforded 
over the arms trade . Both of these threatened the p o l i tic a l  independence 
and livelihood of the m ajority of Nama communities. German m ilita ry  
ac.ti<>n against the Khauas in !894, for example, had devasta ting  e ffec ts  
on thii; Nama community. Bley argues that "not only had the ch ief been 
made U ib le  to desposition, but no su b s titu te  was found fo r th e ir  
nomadic l i f e  of raiding and hunting. Their whole tr ib a l  s tru c tu re  was 
sh a tte red .''
For communities which depended heavily  on c a t t l e  ra id ing  there­
fore, Use app lica tion  of European notions of sovereignty and t e r r i to r ­
i a l i ty  was s u ff ic ie n t  to  undermine the basis of th e ir  economic e x is t ­
ence. Tht ideas of sovereignty and te r r i to r ia l i t y  were closely  re la ted  
to one another in the minds of the colonial a u th o rit ie s . This is  i - 'u s t -  
ra te d , for example, by Leutwein’s reference to  the t e r r i to r ia l  un ity  of 
the colony when Witbooi demanded to know why he slioiud s a c r i f ic ' h is
independence to German sovereignty. The major sources of c o n f lic t  in 
the period preceding the 1904-07 wars, however, centred on the e s ta b l­
ishment of boundaries and the inherent antagonisms between s e t t l e r  and 
pasto ra l forms of production. Ecological conditions, pasto ra l s tra te g ­
ie s , and the haphazard p a tte rn  of settlem ent combined to  make the demar­
ca tion  of boundaries a d i f f ic u lt  task and a highly explosive issue . In 
p a r tic u la r  pasto ra l s tra te g ie s  of m obility  crea ted  f lu id  or i ll-d e fin e d  
boundaries. Large tra c ts  of "unoccupied" land were often  kept in reserve 
for use dt.-,ing periods of drought. German s e t t l e r s  tended to  regard such 
land as "ownerless" and therefore free fo r occupation, As Schrank points 
ou t, "a fundamental cla sh  of concepts" was involved between the notions 
of p riva te  property of the s e t t le r s  and the communal use of land by 
pastora l communities lik e  the Hereros,
C onflicts over t e r r i to r ia l  r ig h ts  were not new to Namibia. What was new, 
however, was the ex istence of a sovereign s ta te  which took upon i t s e l f  
tha r ig h t to determine and enforce boundaries between competing communi­
tie s  and to appropriate land which was not immediately occupied. Also 
a lien  was the notion of c le a rly  demarcated and immutable boundaries in 
what had previously been a highly mobile and constan tly  changing s i tu a ­
tion . Moreover, besides being a lien , the in terventions of the s ta te  
c le a rly  favoured the in te re s ts  of the white s e t t le r s  above those of 
indigenous communities. Although I  twein re s is te d  s e t t l e r  demands for 
m ilita ry  ac tion  aga inst black coniii-nltles and fo r th e ir  immediate d is ­
possession, h is  po lic ies  were guided by the assumptions th a t economic
development depended on European en te rp rize  and tha t a gradual disposs-
90ession of black communities was both inev itab le  and desirab le . 
Furthermore in the pu rsu it of s ta te  sovereignty, the crea tion  and mani­
pulation of in tern a l boundaries provided an ideal instrument fo r the
containment of black communities. This manipulation o f p o l i tic a l  space 
was premised on the s ta te  doctrines of sovereignty and te r r i to r ia l i t y ,  
and finds i t s  c le a re s t  expression in po lic ies  of divide and ru le , the 
establishm ent of boundaries between white s e t t l e r s  and pastora l commun­
i t i e s ,  the creation  of reserves, and the drawing of a r ig id  boundary 
between the police zone and the northern te r r i to r ie s .
Adding to the complexity of the boundary issue was the existence of a 
su b stan tia l s t r ip  of unused or "no-mans" land between the major Naraa and 
Herero groupings, which was largely  a product of p re-co lon ial struggles 
for dominarce between these two groupings. The German colonial author­
i t i e s  had taken advantage of the temporary vacuum created  by the Herero- 
Nama c o n f lic t to es tab lish  th e ir  adm inistrative and m ilita ry  headquart­
e rs  in th is  s t r ip .  In turn the secu rity  provided by the presence of the 
co lonial forces and the ex istence of unoccupied land, both a ttra c te d  
white s e t t le r s  and prompted the Hereros to  move th e ir  herds fu rth e r 
south. In order to secure fu rth e r land fo r settlem ent and to crea te
greater secu rity  of tenure for the s e t t l e r s ,  i t  was imperative fo r the
91colonial a u th o ritie s  to es tab lish  c le a r  and s tab le  boundaries.
The colonial adm inistration therefore entered in to  negotiations with the 
Herero ch ief Samuel Maharero, and in 1804 Leutwein and Maharero agreed 
to the demarcation of a southern boundary fo r Hereroland. However, as 
Maharero had no au tho rity  to act on behalf of a l l  Herero communities in 
Namibia, the boundary was not accepted by a l l  Herero groupings, p a r tic u ­
la r ly  by the easte rn  tr ib e s  whose land claims were most seriously  
affec ted  by the a rb itr a ry  delinea tion  of the boundary. The co lonial 
a u th o ritie s  repeatedly s^nt in troops "to drive out Herero cowherds from
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European land tha t was being despoiled1'.  In order to force the Hereros 
to respect the boundary, provision was made for the confiscation  of five 
per cent of a l l  c a t t l e  tha t crossed the boundary. Maharero was to 
receive h a lf  the p ro f its  o f the sa le  of such c a t t le .  The provision for
the confiscation  of c a t t l e  was implemented in the l a t t e r  h a lf of 1895,
and by March 1896 had p re c ip ita ted  a re b ellio n  by the Eastern Hereros 
under Kahimema and Nikodemus.
The secondary sources on th is  phase of Namibian h is to ry  tend to place 
the emphasis on p o l i tic a l  facto rs such as the riv a lry  between Samuel 
Maharero and other Hereto ch ie fs , and co lonial p o lic ies  of divide and 
ru le , and do not allow for an adequate analysis of underlying economic 
c o n f lic ts . There are, however, some suggestive po in ters . For example, 
the re v o lt of the Eastern Hereros occurred towards the end of tue 
1885/86 season, during which the southern sec to r of the te r r i to ry
experienced one of i t s  lowest recorded annual r a in f a l ls .  Although the 
secondary sources are s i le n t  on th is  po in t, i t  is  lik e ly  tha t the
drought put pressure on ex is tin g  Herero grazing areas and thus increased 
fro n tie r  v io la tio n s. Furthermore, as Bley points out, i t  was unlikely 
that the Hereros would observe the fro n tie r  without a reduction in the 
size  of th e ir  c a t t l e  herds. The s ize  of the Herero herds a lso  kept down 
the p rice  of livestock , providing yet another obstacle to s e t t l e r  farm­
ing, Both the confiscation  of Herero c a t t l e  which crossed the boundary 
and the consequent rev o lt served to reduce the numbers of Herero-owned
c a t t le ,  as the re v o lt was used as a p re tex t for lu rth e r confiscation  of 
96livestock,
That the issue of boundaries between s e tt le d  farmers and p a s to ra lis ts  
played a cru c ia l ro le  in bringing about the Herero re b e llio n  of 1904 is
strongly  suggested by the assessment of the missionary Mayer of 
Otjimbingwe:
As the main reason for the Herero re v o lt, the land question 
and the c red it nuisance have to be regarded. The consequences followed promptly. One piece of land a f te r  the o ther was lo st to the Herero nation, and i t  was f e l t  i t s  existence was being threatened. As Jong as the people could  s t iJ J  fr e e ly  move w ith  th e ir  c a tt le , no fr ic t io n  occurred. But the land  owners f i n a l l y  made use o f  th e ir  r ig h t and o ften  asked thee to  s ta y  w ith in  th e ir  boundaries. These were dvawn so narrow, however, 
th a t the natives grew a f ra id . . . .  The biggest and best portions of usable land were already in the \ands o f the 
w hites; the remaining lands we/e s c a tte re d  andpoor.97
In the build-up of tension over the fro n tie r , many of the s e t t le r s  
strongly  favoured m ilita ry  ac tion  against the Hereros. In January 1896, 
only two months before the re v o lt o f the Eastern Hereros, Leutwein 
ca lled  i  meeting of s e t t le r s  in Windhoek a f te r  farmers in the fro n tie r  
area had threatened Herero headmen with war. At th is  meeting the farmers 
made i t  c le a r th a t they favoured a "m ilita ry  so lu tion" to the fro n tie r  
problem. With the support o f ' '.e more estab lished  trad e rs , whose commer­
c ia l in te re s ts  would be threatened by a war, Leutwein was able to r a lly  
su ff ic ie n t support for the a l te rn a tiv e  s tra te g y  of n e g o tia tio n s , 
However, the following day more than h a lf  o f those who had been present
a t  the meeting withdrew th e ir  support for a peaceful so lu tion  of the 98
fro n tie r  problem. Until the outbreak of the 1904-0? wars, s e t t l e r  
in te re s ts  continued to a g ita te  for m ilita ry  ac tion  against the 
indigenous population,
Colonial society  a f te r  the 1904-07 rebellions
When war with the Hereros and o ther indigenous groupings in Namibia 
fin a lly  came in 1904, i t  erupted with such fe ro c ity  tha t an estim ated 80 
per cent of the Hereros, 50 per cent of the Namai and 30 per cent of the
Damaras perished. The 1904-0? wars not only re su lte d  in a calamitous
loss of l i f e ,  but d ra s tic a lly  reshaped colonial policy.
The demographic, social and p o l i tic a l  e ffec ts  on the trib es  who took part in the war were devastating. I t  was a c a ta s t ­
rophe, caused not only by the e f fe c ts  of the war but byGerman measures during the war and the native p o lic ies  of the post-war y ea rs . 101
Already in 1904, during the f i r s t  phase of the wars, the German colonial
a u th o ritie s  were aware of the im plications of the ra c ia l  struggle tha t
had erupted. With a l l  th a t had happened, i t  would be "very d i f f ic u lt  for
blacks and whites to co-exist unless the former are kept in a s ta te  of
forced labour, i .e .  a s ta te  of quasi-slavery", the Chief o. i Army
General S ta ff in the colony reported. "The ra c ia l struggle th a t has
erupted can be brought to an end only by destroying one side or reducing 
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i t  to  serfdom."
With the end of the war in 1907, the land .livestock of a l l  black 
groups which had p artic ip a ted  in the rebellions  was confiscated . Only 
those blacks, such as the Rehoboth B asters, the Damaras and the Berseba 
Nainas, who hed stayed our of the wars as a group, were allowed to re ta in  
th e ir  land and stock. The one exception to th is  general ru le  was the 
Bondelswarts who had negotiated a trea ty  with the Germans a t the begin­
ning of tire to rero  r is in g , snd were allowed to  re ta in  a small p a r t of 
the area tha t they had occupied before the wars. Tho p o st-reb ellio n  mea­
sures drew a c le a r legal d is tin c tio n  between 'w hites ' ."nd 'n a t iv e s '.  
'N atives' could only obtain land r ig h ts  i f  they had the permission of 
the governor. The governor's permission was also  needed to breed c a t t le  
or keep horses. During the remainder of the German period no new land 
passed into the possession of blacks, and individual exceptions to the 
ban on stock-breeding were allowed only a f te r  1912.
The regula tions fu rth e r made i t  compulsory for a l l  Africans above the
age of fourteen to carry passes. Any African without a pass would be 
refused food, lodging or any o ther ass is tan ce , and could be arres ted  by 
any white person. In addition  to th is  pass, blacks were also  required to 
carry a 'se rv ic e  book’ into which th e ir  labour con tracts were entered, 
Thuse without labour contra ts  were without any legal r ig h ts , and could 
be punished as vagrants,
Besides laving the groundwork for forced labour in the colony, the
regula aimed a t destroying the so cia l and p o l i tic a l  organiz­
a tion  ot 'cenous people. Not only were the ch ie fta insh ips  . 'he
various defeated indigenous communities abolished, but i t  was also  la id
down that not more than ten black fam ilies cculd live  together on one
p lo t. Black settlem ent would be arranged in such a way as to serve 
s e t t l e r  needs and to preclude any form of tr ib a l  regrouping. Complete 
expropriation took place in s p ite  of a vfe/cZtfte^ reso lu tion  to allow the 
Hereroj, enough land and c a t t le  to be s e l f - s u ff ic ie n t, The confiscation 
of land and c a t t le  was ju s ti f ie d  in terras of th& needs of settlem ent 
p o lic ie s , and to compensate s e t t le r s  for damages caused by the war.
At the basis of these post-war p o lic ies  were the economic in te re s ts  of 
the s e t t l e r s ,  and in p a r tic u la r  ths s e t t l e r  farmers. Although in 1911 
there were only about 1 000 farmers in a to ta l white population of 14000, 
th is  m inority held enormous p o li tic a l  sway in the te r - i to r y ,  p a r t i ­
cu la rly  in the shaping of colonial labour p o lic ie s . Bley maintains tha t 
demands for self-government "were intim ately connected with the farmers 
e f fo r ts  to achieve pre-eminence over the re s t  o f the European population"
The Tam ers' campaign for supremacy reached absurd propor­
tions as they became aware tha t they would always remain a
m inority. Their p o l i t ic a l  activism revealed i t s e l f  not only 
in th e ir  aggressive debates on the various local committees, but in a lengthy and impassioned press campaign, in renewed s trugg les fo r contro l of the Press, and in tensions w ithin th e ir own o rg an isa tio n s . . .  108
In order to b o ls te r th e ir  claimc for dominance within the colonial
community, the farmers maintained th a t , with the possib le exception of
craftsmen, they were the only productive element w ithin the s e t t l e r
population. "Shop-keepers, trad e rs , and publicans were a gruup 'l iv in g
only by trade and alcohol, not being usefu lly  productive, They merely
consumed what o thers produced’ ."
These claims received some recognition from the co lon ial a u th o ritie s . In
1908, for example, Governor Schuckmann declared in an address to the
Governor's Council th a t the
p rosperity  of the country is  dependent . . .  prim arily  on the success of our farmers, and secondly on the growth of 
m ining.110
The farmers, however, were not s a tis f ie d  with such concessions, and 
fientinuea to press th e ir  claims. The reasons for the extrem ity of the 
farmers' demands are to be sought not only in th e ir  economic m arginali.y 
and p o l i t ic a l  and m ilita ry  in secu rity , but also  in the fa ilu re  of the 
d ra s tic  measures adopted during and a f te r  the war. The high expectations 
that had been vested in the "m ilita ry  so lu tion" before the 1904-07 wars, 
fa ile d  to m ateria lize following these wars, Neither the m ilita ry  policy 
of genocide, nor the forced labour regime that followed i t ,  produced th-. 
s ta b i l i ty  for which the s e t t l e r s  had hoped, The s e t t le r s  had c learly  
envisaged the creation  of a s tab le  c la ss-s tru c tu re d  society  with the 
indigenous population as a dispossessed p ro le ta r ia t . However, the crea­
tion  of a p ro le ta r ia t  requires no>. only a dispossessed population, but 
also the generation of new s k i l l s  and values. New social and p o li tic a l  
in s titu tio n s  have to be forged in place of the d isrupted  p re -c a p ita lis t
in s ti tu tio n s  in order to incorporate, and thus s ta b i l iz e ,  the emerging 
p ro le ta r ia t . Host important, ex is tin g  economic s tru ctu re s  must be capa­
b le of absorbing and maintaining the labour tha t is  shaken loose from 
the p re -c a p ita lis t  countryside.
None of these conditions were present in the German colony a f te r  the
re b ellio n s . With the exception of the diamond mines, no strong indust­
r ia l  sec tor had emerged in Namibia. The mines were able to  absorb only a 
email proportion of the labour force, and sharp fluc tua tions in the
p rices of minerals, and in p a r tic u la r  diamonds, created the need fo r a 
112migrant ra th e r than a fixed labour force. While s e t t l e r  ag ricu ltu re  113
had the g re a tes t labour needs, i t  was, for the most p a rt, incapable 
of sustain ing  a wage labour force, p a r tic u la r ly  following the d e s tru c t­
ive impact of the war on the s e t t l e r  economy. I t  was only through 
extensive s ta te  assistance that a general bankruptcy of s e t t l e r  farmers 
was averted a f te r  the wars. Farmers faced a v a rie ty  of problems, 
including high ca p ita l costs, inadequate transport f a c i l i t i e s ,  inadeq­
uate water supplies, drought, and shortages of livestock , ' .d  and
building m ateria ls. They also  lacked appropriate farming experience. 
Many of them were former so ld ie rs  who had been offered farms a t the end
of th e ir  m ilita ry  service in the te r r i to r y .  Although s ta te  assistance
in some ways compensated for these d if f ic u lt i e s ,  i t  sometimes also 
proved counter-productive by encouraging people without the necessary 
financ ial resources to become farmers.
Building up a farm on in su ffic ie n t or borrowed cap ita l meant tha t quick success had to be sought, P atien t, p ioneer­
ing labour was not possible when c red ito rs  had to be kept a t bay. This increased s t i l l  fu rthe r the demands for e ffec tiv e  
s ta te  assistance , and bankruptcy caused resentment against the s t a t e .11?
However, the s e t t l e r s 1 dependence on the s ta te  went beyond economic
assistance . Without the backing of the p o l i tic a l  and m ilita ry  power of 
the s ta te ,  s e t t l e r  a g ric u ltu re  was incapable of maintaining i ts  labour 
fo rce . Fallowing the Herero-Nama wars, "farm-work did not provide an 
adequate livelihood fo r a workman and his family". In 1912 the demo­
grapher, Johannes Gad, conducted a survey of cen tra l Hereroland which 
contained some of the best grazing lands in the country. Gad found that 
although food ra tio n s  made up a su b stan tia l p a rt o f farm labourers' 
wages. in 75 per cent of cases the food provided fe ll  well below what 
was then regarded as a minimum c a lo r i f ic  and pro te in  intake. Farm 
labourers were thus forced to  supplement th e ir  ra tio n s  by scavenging,
hunting, c a ttle -s te a lin g , ca ttle -poisoning  and the co llec tio n  of 
119carrion .
Low wages were not purely a product of c a p i ta l is t  avarice, Namibia
during the ea rly  20th century was, in B ley 's words, a "fluctuating
so c ie ty " , with both blacks and whites constan tly  on the move in search
of new economic opportun itie s. The economic ex istence of farmers was
p ar tic u la r ly  tenuous. Many were forced to give up th e ir  farms on account
of accumulated debts, while o thers found tha t they were unable to make a
p ro f it without considerable ca p ita l investment.
The farmers in SWA were . . .  fundamentally short ofc a p ita l , They therefore had to lim it th e ir  expenditure,p a r tic u la r ly  on th e ir  labour force. They were constantly  
sho rt of cash to pay wages, and were prim arily  concerned to 
cut down th e ir  d e f ic i t  and save uv for new investments in th e ir  farms. In the second phase of building up a farm - a 
period of consolidation - additional investments wereneeded to lay the foundations of the farmers' socials ta tu s . 120
In order to avoid cash payments, farmers attempted to su b s titu te  cash 
wages with food or payment in  kind. This p ra c tice  continued well into
the mandate period , P a rtic u la r ly  during the drought and post-war recess- j
ion of the ea rly  1920s, there ere frequent complaints tha t the wages of j 0
farm labourers were paid in kind, tha t wages were fa r too low, and th a t ' '
121 'in some cases no payment was made a t  a l l .  The farm ers’ in a b il i ty  to
susta in  a wage-labour force did not lessen  the need for labour. From i •-
1904 the country experienced severe and chronic labour shortages. For '''
the mines, railways and m ilita ry  which could afford  to compete with
122 i ,wages outside the te r r i to ry , the so lu tion  was to import labour. For *
the farmers, who could not compete with wages outside the te r r i to r y ,  ; \
however, the only so lu tion  was to c a ll  fo r a g re a te r share of p o l i t ic a l  i
power and fo r the use of even more fcrce on labourers. A farm ers’
conference in 1909, for example, demanded an " increase in the police
force, more sweeping powers to use firearms against natives, (and the>
123 1 ,,-tran sfe r of po lice duties to trustworthy fa rm ers ..."  From 1907 every i
white had the r ig h t to exercize p rivate police functions over blacks, ^^  -
and corporal punishment in f l ic te d  by the police on black servants . j
increased dram atically . Moreover, farmers arrogated to themselves the ;j
r ig h t to punish th e ir labour ,rs  themselves, a p ra ctice  euphem istically I ■
ca lled  "parental chastisem ent", but which sometimes involved masters
beating th e ir servants to death. Towards the end of the German
period, the colonial a u th o ritie s  began to fear tha t the b ru ta li ty  of
white employers against th e ir  servants would give r is e  to ”a new upris- 125ing born of sheer desperation",
This increasing b ru ta li ty  was in large measure a product of the contra­
d ictions and s tra in s , in short the unworkablity, o f the labour system 
imposed a f te r  1907:
The Germans lea rn t . . .  th a t although they could d ic ta te  ex ternal circumstances they could never achieve the to ta l control over peop'e tha t they needed. The secu rity  they had
l
_ iSE . i t e u  - - —-
hoped fo r did not m ateria lise : a l l  that was l e f t  in SWA 
were to ta l i ta r ia n  tendencies imposed by the German masters, which f in a lly  poisoned a l l  human re la t io n sh ip s .126
However, not even the most bru tal repression  could ensure to ta l c o n tro l,
because in the long run the adoption of extreme measures tended to
defeat i t s  own purpose.
The Africans were . . .  always ready to escape into the bush . . .  since they might as well starve there a;, in European employ.12?
Although both s e t t le r s  and colonial au th o ritie s  were aware of the
contradictions in the labour system, they were unable to a f fe c t the
necessary changes. "We a l l  know fu ll well that i t  is  po in tle ss to accept
a native workman who is  compelled to apply to us for work", a member of
the T e r r i to r ia l  Council argued in 1908. "The employer must re c ru it  his
own workmen; he must find opportunities of talking and negotiating  with
128them so tha t they come v o lun tarily  to work."
The f u t i l i t y  of such suggestions in the context of a system which p re­
cluded the payment of liveab le wages and which was heavily  dependent on 
m ilita ry  force, must have been apparent even to th is  speaker, who went 
on to support the labour laws, and to argue that any "circumst.mce which 
promotes the independence of the natives increases th e ir  power and w ill 
have to be paid fo r with European blood," In 1907 a colonial o f f ic ­
ia l ,  Captain Kurt S tre itw o lf, was dispatched to Bechuanaland to  attempt 
to induce the Hereros who had fled there to re turn  to Namibia, I t  is 
hardly surprizing tha t S tre itw o lf 's  mission fa iled , but some of the r e ­
sponses ho received from the Hereros provide in sigh t in to  black percep­
tions of conditions in Namibia in the p o st-reb ellio n  period. For 
example, one Herero to ld  S treitw o lf tha t he feared to re tu rn  to Namibia 
because n either the Germans nor the Africans would ever forget the war:
What should he do in our land where he could perish fromfear, where he could be shot down lik e  a Klippbock, where he
could no longer have a weapon? When I asked him whether hehad fear of me or of the Governor, he said  no, that he had
fear of the e n tire  coun try .130
Towards the end of the German colonial period, attempts were made to
c reate centres for fu ture black reserves, and the ban on c a t t l e  vaising
was relaxed. However, the labour system remained in ta c t , and s e t t le r s
continued to argue tha t "any decrease in the German forces would
undoubtedly be seen by the Hereros, the H ottentots, and the Bastards as
a signal for them to un ite  and make another attempt to win back th e ir
former r ig h ts  from th e ir hated usurper,"
The destruction  of p re-co lonial in s ti tu tio n s  was not lim ited to the
economies of indigensus groupings, but extended also to  th e ir  so cia l and 
p o l i tic a l  s tru c tu re s , As the s e t t l e r  leader, Conrad Rust, pointed out, 
"the d estro rtio n  of the trib es  had l e f t  behind a so cia l vacumn th a t the 
laoour organizations had done nothing to f i l l  . . .  (Dow productiv ity  . . .  
was a product of the A frican 's  aocial s itu a tio n . Even the Nama, who were 
generally  reckoned to be economically w orthless, acted quite  d iffe re n tly  
in o ther circumstances, for instance in the Cape Colony", a s  Bley 
im plies, the fa ilu re  of a new form of social in teg ra tion  to emerge 
following the destruc tion  of the t r ib a l  system, not only precluded the 
emergence of a p ro le ta r ia t  (in  any meaningful sense of the word), but 
might also have strengthened ethnic or t r ib a l  alleg iances. In the
absence of a lte rn a tiv e  sources of social secu rity , Africans had no
a lte rn a tiv e  but to attempt covertly  to re v ert to former t r ib a l  s t ru c t­
ures and customs. In sp ite  of the repressive measures of the colonial 
au th o ritie s ,
there was a p e rs is ten t and sec re t movement among African to reassemble. This was especia lly  true of the Herero, They
l e f t  the labour camps in the south and on the coast and slowly co llec ted  in th e ir  former a re a s ,134
The former Leaders s te a l th i ly  took up th e ir  old positions of au tho rity ,
assuming new names which they frequently changed, Hereros and Namas also
turned increasingly to C h ris tia n ity  which provided a degree of social
sec u rity  as well as the only legal means of expressing s o lid a rity .
Although the s e t t le r s  and co lonial o f f ic ia ls  were aware of these
developments, they we.'u unnblu to prevent such regrouping,
The con trad ictions of the German colonial period were tnhovi'ed by the 
South African regime which took over the adm inistration of Namibia 
during World War I, and continued to  play a major ro le  in the evolution 
of co lonial p o lic ies  in the te r r i to r y  a f te r  1915. Under South African 
ru le  a lim ited re c o n stitu tio n  of the t r ib a l  system was allowed, prov is­
ion was made for the establishm ent of reserves, and blacks were allowed, 
w ithin s t r i c t l y  defined l im its , to own livestock , However, w ithin the 
context of the cr.lonial society  tha t emerged from the destruction  of the 
1903-0? wars and the aims of the new colonial a u th o ritie s , these changes 
generated contrad ictions of th e ir  own, which were to crea te  new insecur­
i t ie s  and c o n f lic ts  within the dominant colonial c la sses .
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NAMIBIA UNDER MARTIAL LAW, 1915 - 1920
The tra n s it io n  from German to  South African ru le
On July 9, 1915 the la s t  German troops defending the colony of South
West Africa surrendered to the numerically superior South African forces 
a t  Khorab, ending 30 years of German colonial ru le  and in i t ia t in g  a new 
phase in Namibian h is to ry  which was eventually  to  have vast in te rn a tio n ­
a l and in tern a l repercussions. For the next five  years the former German 
colony remained under m ilita ry  occupation and ru le  by m artial law. 
Although South A frica had long-standing and c le a rly  defined ambitions of
annexing the te r r i to r y ,  i t s  adm inistration of South West Africa was
prov isional, pending a fin a l  settlem ent a t the end o f World War I . South 
A frica 's  hopes of annexation were, however, to be f r u s l 'a te d ,  and in 
September 1919 i t  accepted a mandate for the te r r i to r y  as a compromize 
to "anexatiun pure and simple".
Provisional government under m artial law prevailed , and while 
continuity  with the previous regime was a featu re , the way was being prepared for permanent Union c o n tro l .2
AUhough South A frica 's  adm inistration of Namibia has aroused the 
world's in te re s t and scru tiny , with a few lim ited exceptions, h is to r ­
ians have devoted l i t t l e  a tten tio n  to the years of m ilita ry  occupation 
which helped to lay the foundations for permanent South African control 
o f the te r r i to ry , At the basis of th is  neglect has been a widely held 
assumption of an e sse n tia l continuity  between the German and South 
African adm inistrations of the te r r i to ry , Although th is  assumption has 
taken various forms and been Incorporated w ithin a 'v a rie ty  of d iffe re n t 
an a ly tic a l frameworks, i t s  im plications have been consisten t: Namibia
. •jfc , . I  1..
merely passed from one se t o f im peria lis t in te re s ts  to another; condi­
tions w ithin the colony remained unchanged and i t  continued to evince 
the typ ical c h a ra c te r is tic s  of im peria lis t subjection and c a p i ta l is t  
ex p lo ita tio n  : the "mode of explo ita tion" did no. "change in the s l ig h t­
e s t , and i t s  form only 5n minor aspects" ; South African ru le  in Namibia 
"emulated" that of the Germans ; i f  anything "the th eo re tic a l re s tr a in ts  
and safeguards" of the mandate system "undermined the bargaining p o s it­
ion of Namibi.in workers, and d ele te rio u sly  affec ted  th e ir  lives" because 
t t  afforded South Africa g re a te r secu rity  of tenure in Namibia ; 
African responses to  German and South African ru le  were e s se n tia lly  
s im ilar because there was "no appreciable d ifference in approach" 
between the two adm inistrations ; the repression of the Bondelswart 
re b ellio n  of 1922 demonstrated to the colonized that "under the new 
ru le rs  nothing had changed for them" ; the South African adm iiiistration 
"reproduced, i f  in s lig h tly  less  draconian form, the e sse n tia ls  of the 
German labour code."
As with most misleading p ropositions, there is  an element of tru th  in 
the assumption of continuity  in the colonial rule of Namibia, The goals 
and in te re s ts  underlying South African ru le  were indeed s im ilar to those 
of the preceding regime. South Africa also  was the d irec t beneficiary  of 
the po lic ies  of domination and expropriation of the Germans. Exploita­
tion and a highly repressive labour system were the hallmarks of South 
African ru le  in Namibia as they were of German colonial ru le , These 
s im ila r i tie s  or co n tin u itie s , however, do not exclude the p o ss ib il i ty  of 
d is s im ila r i t ie s  and d isco n tin u itie s . Only an analysis of the tran s itio n  
from one colonial regime to another can es tab lish  whether there were in 
fac t d isc o n tin u itie s  and whether the d isc o n tin u itie s  played any s ig n if i ­
cant ro le  in the development of Namibian h is to ry . The major aim of th is  
chapter is accordingly to focus on the tra n s itio n  of co lonial policy 
during the period of m artial law,
Although the most obvious aspect of th is  tran s itio n  was the change from 
German to South African ru le , i t  should be borne in mind tha t th is  
change of regime took place against a background of momentuous s h if ts  of 
power on a world sca le . The change of colonial ru le  was in e f fe c t a 
d ire c t product of World War 1, as i t  had been one of the war aims of the 
a l l i e s  to secure the German colonies. S im ilila rly , many of the import­
ant developments tha t followed the war - such as the f ru s tra tio n  of 
B ritish , French and, more sp ec if ica lly , South African ambitions to annex 
the former German colonies and the crea tion  instead of a mandate system, 
were also  tie d  in with the massive s h if ts  of power taking place on the 
in terna tiona l level.
fiichard Rathbone has concluded from a se rie s  of s tud ies on the impact of 
World War i on A frica, that the War "was very much a re a l i ty  for Africa, 
a  period of immense and s ig n if ic a n t change of which we have only ju s t 
scratched the su rface ."  He suggests that World War I helped to acce l­
e ra te  the process of p o l i tic a l  and economic change in  co lon ia l Africa, 
bringing the colonies into more cen tra lized  re la tio n sh ip s  with the 
m etropolitan powers and ra d ic a lly  a lte r in g  the "sty le"  of colonialism ,
Before 1914 A frica was for the most part a dream for the greedy specula tor. From 1918 i t  seems like ly  th a t her ro le was more ce n tra lly  re la ted , as part of the empire, to  the very heart of the m etropolitan economies.14
These general trends appear to coincide with the d iffe re n t emphases of 
German and B ritish /South  African colonial p o lic ies  in Namibia, As Knoll
points o u t, a d is tin c tiv e  feature of German colonial h is to ry  is  tha t i t  
was the la s t  European power to en ter the colonial arena and had ju s t 
begun ra tio n a liz in g  i ts  co lonial po lic ies  when the War broke out. 
B rita in  and i t s  sub-metropole, South A frica, on the o ther hand had long 
estab lished  trad itio n s  of colonial adm inistration . South A frica 's  occup­
atio n  of the former German colony and i t s  subsequent adm inistration of 
the te r r i to r y  under the mandate, also  brought Namibia into immediate 
geographical proximity with South Africa and thus served to cement the 
colony 's economic, p o li tic a l  and c u ltu ra l t ie s  with i t s  metropole.
South African in te re s ts  in colonizing Namibia
B ritish-South African in te re s t  in the area between the Orange and Kunene 
riv e rs  dates back a t  le a s t  to the 1860s. Between 1861 and 1866 the Cape 
Colony had taken possession of the rich  guano islands o ff the Naraib 
coast. Following appeals fo r B ritish  pro tec tion  from Rhenish m ission­
a rie s  in Hereroland and from the Herero ch ie f, Maharero, the Cape 
government had dispatched a specia l commissioner to the area in 1876, to 
conclude tre a tie s  with local ch ie fs . Although the commissioner, William 
Coates Palgrave, recommended B ritish  annexation of the te r r i to ry , the 
B ritish  au th o ritie s  re s tr ic te d  themselves to the annexation of the 
harbour of Walvis Bay and i t s  surrounding area, Walvis Bay was annexed 
on the assumption that "B rita in , e i th e r  d ire c tly  or through the Cape 
Colony, was e n ti t le d  to take over the adm inistration of the T errito ry  
when local conditions ju s ti f ie d  the expense. No a lte rn a tiv e  claimant was 
thought o f ."  The B ritish  were taken by su rp rise when Bismarck in 
August 1884 declared a p ro tec to ra te  over the in te r io r  a f te r  acquiring an 
a lte rn a tiv e  harbour a t Angra Pequena (renamed Luderitzbucht a f te r  the
German merchant, Adolf Luderitz, who spearheaded Germany's th ru st into 
1RSouth West A fric a .)
A .:'
The creation  of a German colony in southern Africa heightened tensions
between the im p eria lis t powers in the sub-continent. Fears that the
Germans in South West Africa might expand to jo in  up th e ir  te rr i to ry
with the Boer republics, the Portuguese in Mozambique, or even the
Germans in East Africa, prompted B rita in  to declare a pro tec to rate over19Bechuanaiand, thus keeping open the route to  the north. While the
outcome of the Anglo-Boer wars p a r tia lly  d iss ipa ted  these tensions by
bringing the Boer republics (and the Transvaal go ld fie lds) under B ritish
c on tro l, i t  succeeded also  in encouraging sympathies between the Boers
and the Germans. Many Boers, for example, volunteered fo r service in the
German colonial army during the Herero-Nama wars of 1904-07. This
a f f in i ty  between Boers and Germans created considerable anxiety for the
B ritish  and Union governments and was f in a lly  consummated in  the Maritz-
Beyers-De Wet re b ellio n  of 1914. In some c irc le s  the 1914 rebellion  was
seen as the culmination of years of in trig u e  by the Germans in South
A frica. At the very le a s t  the German presence i ' the sub-continent was
seen as a source of support for Afrikaner n a tio n a lis ts  who wanted to
sever imperial tie s  with B rita in . These fears were confirmed when
General S.G. K aritz , a prominent rebel leader who had long-standing tie s
22with the German colony, fled  to South West Africa in 1914. Thus besid­
es the immediate m ilita ry  objectives of occupying the German colony in 
order to s ilence the German radio s ta tio n s  and prevent the te rr i to ry  
from being used as a base for German submarines. the Union government 
also  aimed to prevent a possible m ilita ry  offensive from the colony by 
Afrikaner rebels in a llian c e  with the Germans.
South African in te re s ts  in the te r r i to r y  however, went fa r  beyond these 
immediate m ilita ry  and s tra te g ic  aim s, The occupation and control of the 
German colony also  held important economic and p o li tic a l  advantages. Of 
the economic considerations, the rich  diamond f ie ld s  in Namibia were the 
most important. As Lenzen convincingly demonstrates, the South African 
diamond industry had from a t  le a st the 1890s been dominated by po licies 
which aimed a t  lim iting  and con tro lling  the output of diamonds in order 
to keep th e ir p rice from dropping. However, th is  guiding p rin c ip le  of 
the diamond industry "could be applied successfu lly  only a f te r  a ce rta in  
degree of centralized  production control had been a tta in e d ", and in 
th is respect the Namibian diamond fie ld s  posed a s ig n if ican t th rea t. 
A lluvial diamonds were discovered in the German colony in 1908, and by 
1913 South West Africa was 2t per cent of the w orld's to ta l
output. Moreover, the high qu Namibian diamonds and th e ir  r e la t ­
ively low costs of production, increased s t i l l  fu rthe r the impact of the 
colony's output on the world market. South African diamond in te re s ts , 
led by De Beers, therefore exerted themselves to obtain some control 
over the production and marketing of diamonds in Namibia. Their e f fo r ts , 
however, served only to antagonize the Germans who f e l t  th e ir  national 
in te re s ts  threatened, and u n ti l  1914 prevented diamond producers in the 
two te r r i to r ie s  from reaching an agreement. Although agreement was 
f in a lly  reached in 1914, i t  could not be implemented because of the 
outbreak of war. South A frica 's  takeover of Namibia f in a lly  solved the 
problem, and in 1919 South African in te re s ts  gained control of the 
m ajority of Namibian mines with the formation of the Consolidated 
Diamond Mines (CDM).
Another seajor reason for wanting contro l over Namibia lay  in i t s  po ten t­
ia l  as a settlem ent colony for South Africa. The development of mining
and subsequent commercialization of ag ricu ltu re  in South A frica had
resu lted  in a se r ie s  of c r ise s  and so cia l d islocations in the newly
constitu ted  Union. The forces tha t had been unleashed led to massive
displacements of both black and white populations from the ru ra l areas
to the towns and to increasing po lariza tion  of classes in both ru ra l and
urban areas. The new ly-constituted Union government was coining under
increasing pressure, ;  t ic u la r ly  from i t s  white e le c to ra te . A se rie s  of
s trik e s  in  1913/14 had led to the proclamation of m artial law in January
1914. The ru ling  South African Party (SAP) had suffered heavy losses to
the Labour and N a tiona list P a rtie s  in the Transvaal provincia l elections
of 1914 and the general elec tions of 1915. The SAP government believed
i t  could strengthen i t s  p o l i tic a l  support by opening up the former
German colony to whiv.es in search of land and jobs. Even before the
Germans had surrendered, Botha wrote to Smuts about the p o ss ib lity  of
using the lures of land and jobs to n eu tra lize  d issa tis fa c tio n ,
p ar tic u la rly  amongst the Afrikaners. We sh a ll have to  make a point of i t  in the e lec tio n s  that the te r r i to ry  w ill now afford  an opening p a r tic u la r ly  for acquiring land, as well as 
openings in the police and adm in istra tion .31
In 1919 Smuts outlined  his plans for Namibia as a settlem ent colony in
the House of Assembly. South West A frica, he said, "offered great
p o te n tia l i tie s  and could accommodate a large popu lation .. . .  I t  would be
necessary to open up the country, put in water bores, e tc , ,  so as to
make the land more useful for settlem ent purposes," The geographical
s itu a tio n  of the colony made i t  seem id ea lly  su ited  for South African
expansion. In 1918 Gorges re ferred  to the boundaries between the two
countries as "merely a rb itra ry  lines drawn across the map."
Germany has made but l i t t l e  use of the land and the to ta l  number of farmers estab lished  here under her aegis barely exceeds one thousand.33
C onstraints on South African policy
A number of divergent, and sometimes incompatible, requirements and 
influences helped shape South African p o lic ies  in the te r r i to ry  during 
the m ilita ry  occupation. Notwithstanding South A frica 's  in te re s ts  in the 
German colony, i t s  legal hold over the te r r i to r y  was tenuous, The invas­
ion of German South-West Africa had been undertaken on an o f f ic ia l  
understanding with B ritain  that a l l  occupied te r r i to ry  would be put a t 
the disposal of the Imperial government for a yet indeterminate s e t t l e ­
ment a t  the end of the war, Thus, u n til a f te r  the War when the mandate 
system was framed, South A frica’s s ta tu s  as an occupying power was both 
temporary and ambiguous.
A fter the successful conclusion of the m ilita ry  campaign, South A frica
thus se t about estab lish ing  i ts  claim to the te r r i to ry . This was based
on two major arguments; That South West A frica was e s se n tia l for South
A frica 's  national secu rity  and, secondly, tha t the Germans had proved
themselves u n f it  to ru le  the colony, In order to  lay the foundations
for i t s  second claim, the South African adm inistration in SWA began
co llec tin g  evidence on the in ju stice s  and a t ro c i tie s  of G rman ru le  of
the colony, The evidence was published in an imperial "Blue Book" in 36
1918,
However, th is  stra tegy  imposed ce rta in  conditions on South A frica 's  
adm inistration of the te r r i to ry . C learly i t  was not only necessary to 
persuade the world of the inadequacies of German colonial policy, but 
a lso  to es tab lish  that South African ru le  represented an appropriate 
improvement on German ru le . Certain minimal reforms were thus necessary 
in order to secure control over the te r r i to ry . The adm inistrator re p o rt­
ed to Smuts in 1918 tha t he had ordered the d i s t r i c t  m agistrates " to  do
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persuade the world of the inadequacies of German colonial policy, but 
also to e s ta b lish  that South African ru le  represented an appropriate 
improvement on German ru le , Certain minimal reforms were thus necessary 
in order to secure control over the te rr i to ry -  The adm inistrator re p o rt­
ed to Smuts in 1916 tha t he had ordered the d i s t r i c t  m agistrates "to  do
..i6 ;A .-
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th e ir  utmost to  suppress any attempts of the ill- trea tm e n t of the 
natives pointing out tha t a clean record in th is  m atter was e sse n tia l i f
we wanted to  use the German maltreatment of the natives as a reason for
keeping th is  country,"
Besides the requirements of propoganda, there is  evidence tha t South
African o f f ic ia ls  ac tiv e ly  disapproved of German colonial p ra c tices .
While both Germans and South Africans shared common in te re s ts  in explo i­
ting the colony, the South Africans were c r i t i c a l  of the costs and
efficiency  of German p o lic ies .
Thousand of European lives have been lo s t and m illions of pounds have been wasted in th is  country through the crass s tu p id ity  in th e ir  re la tio n s  with the natives of those German who wery sent here in the e a r l ie r  days e i th e r  as so ld ie rs , o iiic ia^ i, or s e t t l e r s .38
In addition to th e ir  ideological d ifferences with German colonial
policy, South African o f f ic ia ls  also  perceived a more d ire c t  th rea t to
South African in te re s t in German p ra c tices . I t  was argued tha t in i t s
colonial wars Germany had destroyed the indigenous labour supply and was
thus forced to import labour from external sources, including South
A frica, Furthermote, a danger was perceived in "the existence ju s t
beyond the Union borders of a native population in a constant s ta te  of
d is sa tisfa c tio n  and unrest having close family t ie s  and re la tionsh ips
39with natives on the Union side of the lin e ,"
P rio r to the m ilita ry  occupation of the te r r i to r y ,  the Germans had 
themselves come to re a lize  the counter-productivity of th e ir p o lic ies , 
p a r tic u la r ly  those of Von Trotha who had conducted the exterm ination 
campaign against the Hereros. The German colonial o f f ic ia l  Paul Rohrbach 
s ta ted  that
(n)ot only with regard to the menaced destruc tion  of the most 
valvable labour-m aterial for the carrying on of our farming p u rsu its  or on grounds of humanity was the policy of General von Trotha loudly and aversely c r it ic is e d ,  but also  above a l l  
th ings, because, on account of his so-called  extermination programme, the re s to ra tio n  of peace was fu rth e r delayed and 
the war costs increased out of a l l  p r o p o r t i o n .”40
A fter Von Trotha was recalled  to Germany in 1905, the new governor, Von 
L inguist, issued a specia l proclamation addressed to  the Hereros "o ffe r­
ing them work and promising to spare the lives of a l l  who came in and 
surrendered vo lun tarily" . Shortly  before the war and invasion of the 
te r r i to r y  by South African forces, the German colonial government had 
begun lib e ra liz in g  i t s  approach to the black population in a bid to 
s ta b il iz e  i t s  labour force. Some of the harsh Native regula tions in trod ­
uced in 1907 were dispensed with or modified and plans were discussed 
to  crea te  centres for fu ture African reserves " in  order to  promote a 
physical regeneration of the Herero". In 1912 the German governor 
Seitz  in a sec re t c irc u la r to his m agistrates warned against "the bru tal 
excesses of Europeans against natives" . "A desperate feeling" was becom­
ing prevalent among the blacks of the te r r i to ry , the governor said, and 
th is  could lead to "another native ris in g " . I t  was therefore e sse n tia l 
•hat white mistreatment of blacks should be curbed. To th is  end the 
governor suggested th a t those whites who p ers is ted  in i l l - tr e a tin g  th e ir  
black servants should "no longer be supplied with native labour",
Thus when South Africa took over the adm inistration of the te r r i to r y  in
1915, the need for reform was already recognized, even w ithin the narrow 
lim its imposed by the colonial system, Change had become a pre requ isite  
for the maintenance of the system, and the change of adm inistration and 
disruptions caused by the war served fu rthe r to re inforce th is  need for 
reform. The breakdown of the r ig id  system of labour contro l during the
war had resu lted  in numerous d e se rtio n s , and the new m ilita ry  admin­
is tr a t io n  was inundated with complaints about the shortage of labour:
Natives had deserted r ig h t and le f t  from farms on which they had been located before our troops occupied the country.There was a strong d is in c lin a tio n  in many cases to re-engage 
with former m asters, and when engagements were entered into re fu sa ls  to remain were frequen t,45
While farmers blamed these developments on the adm inistration, the
la t te r  f e l t  that the breakdown of the system of labour control was a
d ire c t  re su lt o f the colonial p o lic ies  of the former regime.
The changeover also  a lte red  the re la tio n sh ip  between adm inistration and 
s e t t l e r s .  The South African adm inistrators found themselves in the 
unusual s itu a tio n  of being faced not only with a h o s tile , o r p o ten tia lly  
h o s tile , black population, but also a h o s tile  white population, In the 
other German colonies, most of the German s e t t le r s  were expelled or 
re p a tria ted , Namibia was unique among the mandated te r r i to r ie s  in 
re ta in in g  a large German community. The p o ss ib ility  of a black re b e l­
lion therefore posed a double th rea t to the m ilita ry  adm inistration, 
because the German community might take advantage of the opportunity to 
rebel against the occupying forces and reintroduce German ru le . This is  
c le a rly  i l lu s t ra te d  by the adm in is tra tion 's  quandary in 1916 when i t  
decided to send a m ilita ry  expedition against the defian t Ovambo ch ie f, 
Mandume. Fears tha t the German s e t t le r s  in the south of the te r r i to ry  
might rebel while a large contingent of South African tt ,o p s  was engaged 
in the north, prompted m ilita ry  adm inistrator E.H.L, Gorges to  telegraph 
General Jan Smuts for reinforcements from the Union.
In p art therefore m ilita ry  in secu rity  favoured a more conc ilia to ry  
approach to the black population. Far more important, however, was the
lack of id e n tific a tio n  between adm inistration and s e t t l e r s , Especially 
durinn the closing phase of German ru le , the s e t t le r s  had wielded 
coru jrab le p o l i tic a l  influence. With the change in colonial regimes, 
however, the s e t t le r s  were reduced to the s ta tu s  of enemy sub jects, and 
th is  allowed the new adm inistration g rea ter freedom to pursue a l te r n a t­
ive goals and in te re s ts . I t  was not u n ti l  a f te r  the granting of the
Mandate that the s e t t l e r s ,  and in p a r tic u la r  the farmers, were able once
50again to impose th e ir  influence on co lonial policy.
In addition  to the need for change, a number of constra in ts operated to 
produce a continuity  ra th e r than a break with the past. The objectives 
of the m ilita ry  adm inistration were s t r i c t l y  lim ited by the framework of 
the Hague Convention, in p a r tic u la r  A rtic les 43 and 48, Although the
authority  of the s ta te  passed into the hands of the occupying power of a
conquered te r r i to ry , i t  was incumbent on the occupant to maintain order 
with a minimum of change to the ex is tin g  legal and governmental s t ru c t­
ures, This s ta te  of a f fa irs  is  acknowledged by the adm inistrator in
his report of 1915/16:
Throughout the occupation .., the most scrupulous care has been exercised to adhere to the ru les of In ternational Law 
recognised in c iv ilise d  countries. The ordinary l i f e  of the people has been in terfered  with as l i t t l e  as possible. A d ra s tic  change has n ecessarily  been made in the treatment of N atives, Movements of the people have been c u rta iled  and the possession of arms and ammunition regulated. Otherwise except 
in m atters with a purely M ilitary  objec tive very l i t t l e  has been done to in te rfe re  with the population ,52
South A frica 's  tenuous hold over the te r r i to ry  was also  a fa c to r l im it­
ing change. Not only was the fu ture of the te r r i to ry  undecided, but the 
new adm inistration experienced a v arie ty  of d i f f ic u lt ie s  in the 
implementation of i t s  p o lic ies . These d i f f ic u lt ie s  were associa ted  with 
the newness and temporary nature of the adm inistration during the period
of m artial law, and included s ta f f  shortages, lack of experience and 
informal, on on local conditions, and the incompetence of local o f f ic ia ls  
and police. Under these circumstances, policy options were severely 
lim ited. Towards the end of the m ilita ry  period, the Secretary to r  the 
P ro tecto rate pointed out to the Union government th a t the adm inistration 
regarded the changes that had been introduced as inadequate- The
adm inistrator, he reported, did not consider the ex is tin g  policy as "a
proper one", but regarded i t  as "foreign to our trad itio n s"  and indefen­
s ib le  e ith e r in Parliament or the League of Nations.
(T)he Administrator is o f opinion tha t th is  system of law, 
even as modified, w hilst i t  was ju s ti f ie d  as a means for 
exercising close control over the aborigines during the existence of the wav can not longer be continued.54
Although there were c le ar differences between South African and German
p o lic ies , there were also  important a f f in i t ie s  between the two p o lic ies .
As Bley points out, German colonial law had been drawn from a v arie ty  of
d iffe re n t sources, including South African laws, In p a r tic u la r  the
Cape Colony's Masters and Servants Act had had a formative influence on
German labour policy in Namibia. Thus when South A frica assumed power
in the te r r i to ry  in l915, many of the German laws re la tin g  to blacks57were regarded as "sa tisfac to ry "  and re ta ined .
A prominent feature of German colonial ru le  was that i t  telescoped the 
colonial process into a re la tiv e ly  contracted period, achieving the 
expropriation of po lice zone blacks and the creation  of a rig id ly  
controlled labour force within l i t t l e  more than 20 years of formal 
co lonial ru le . The destruction  of black p o l i t ic a l ,  m ilita ry  and economic 
power was achieved with dramatic suddenness and f in a l i ty  as a d ire c t  
product, of m ilita ry  force applied during the suppression of the 1904-07
re b ellio n s . The major laws promulgated during and a f te r  190? matched the 
harshness of the suppression of the rebellions.
Three major enactments issued in August 1907 regulated the lives of 
blacks in German South West Africa between the Herero-Nama rebellions 
and World War I: the pass or re g is tra t io n  law, the regulations re la tin g
to the "control" of blacks, and the lass  regula ting  labour con tracts. 
Bley succinctly  sums up these laws as aiming not only a t the destruction  
of the A fricans' economic power and forcing them to  work fo r the whites, 
but also  destroying th e ir  tr ib a l  organization and making i t  impossible 
for even a loose assoc ia tion  of t r ib a l  u n its .
The pass law s tip u la te d  that a l l  blacks above the age of seven (with the 
sole exception of the Basters of Rehoboth) had to re g is te r  with the
a u th o ritie s . On re g is tra t io n  each African was handed a numbered metal 
badge, which served as a pass and had to be displayed prominently on his 
person, and a serv ice book (dienstbucfh  which was used as a second
source of id e n tif ic a tio n . I t  was an offence to give passless blacks "any 
work, support or ass is tance" , and the law enpowered any white persrii to 
a r re s t blacks without passes and hand them over to the police.
In terms of the "Order of the Governor of SWA Pertaining to Measures for 
the Control of Natives" no black could obtain rig h t or t i t l e  to fixed
property or own c a t t l e  or horses without the consent of the governor.
Although ce rta in  exceptions were made to the ban on the ownership of 
livestock a f te r  1912, permission to own land was not granted to any 
black between 1907 and 1915. The law also  forbad more than ten fam ilies 
or individuals from resid ing  on any one farm or property. This regu ia t-
60ion applied also  to mission lands.
The th ird  enactment, th a t re la tin g  to the form and conditions of labour
con trac ts, s tip u la te d  that a l l  blacks without v is ib le  means of support
should be employed. Blacks without labour contracts possessed no legal
rig h ts  and could be punished as vagrants. The Imperial Blue Book of
1918 comments as follows;
Having ensured that no native would be able to acquire 
possessions from which to  e x is t , the law goes on to  s ta te  tha t natives wandering about "without v is ib le  means of 
subsistence" are punishable as vag ran ts,62
The laws re la tin g  to the punishment and "d isc ip lin a ry  contro l" of blacks 
were contained within an enactment in 1896. This enactment was adm inist­
ered d ire c tly  by the police and under i t  black servants were punished 
for a v arie ty  of offences, including "laziness" , "negligence", 
"vagrancy", "insolence" and "disobedience". An estab lished  p ra c tice  in 
the ru ra l areas was for the employer to send his servant to the nearest 
police s ta tio n  with a note s ta tin g , for example, that the bearer "was 
cheeky to me", "refused to obey my orders", o r " is  lazy and does not
work w ell". At the police s ta tio n  the servant was flogged, the number of
ksh es  depending on the p o lic e 's  assessment of the seriousness of the
"offence", More serious offences were re ferred  to the d i s t r i c t  adm inist­
ra tiv e  o f f ic ia ls .  Sentence of death and more than six  months imprison­
ment were subject to confirmation by the Governor.
As the simplest and le a st expensive form of punishment, flogging was
used extensively during the German period. Between January 1, 1913 and
March 31, 1914 there were 2 78? sentences to lashes and 46 719 indiv id­
ual lashes administered. In 1900 the Imperial Government in Berlin 
complained tha t the number of blacks punished in Namibia was out of a l l
proportion to the population and commented on the frequent recourse to 
corporal punishment. The German government expressed concern "that 
public opinion in Germany would draw very unfavourable conclusions as to 
the success of German meihods of c iv il isa t io n " . The Imperial Blue Book 
o f 1918 suggests tha t pressure from B erlin  was probably responsible for 
the fu rth e r d ecen tra liza tion  of the German system of punishment in 
Namibia and the ta c it  acceptance of the "parental r ig h t of co rrec tion1' 
as a sem i-legal category. The doctrine of "fa th iirly  rig h t of correction"
( Vaterliche Zuchtigungsrechi) regarded the German employer as ac ting  Jn 
loco p a ren tis  to h is black servants and therefore having a "parental" 
rig h t to  adm inister punishments, including beatings, Although th is  righ t 
of "parental chastisement" was not expressly provided for in the law, i t  
was both allowed and encouraged by adm inistrative o f f ic ia ls  and recog­
nized by the local courts. Questions were only ra ised  in  those cases 
where servants were so severely beaten tha t they died or had to be 
trea ted  in h osp ita l, and even then the s itu a tio n  was ra tio n a lized . As 
Leutwein pointed out, "beating to death was not regarded as murder; but 
the natives were unable to understand such legal su b tle tie s" .
Changes in colonial policy
Taken ind iv idually , the changes introduced by the South African adminis­
tra tio n  during the period of m artial law appear both su p erfic ia l and 
in sig n if ic an t, Although the more draconian measures of the German system 
were removed or modified, even the adm inistration was prepared to 
concede towards the end of the period of m ilita ry  ru le , that the system
of forced labour was s t i l l  in ex istence, and that i t  unounted to  l i t t l e  
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more than "a modified form of slavery". The German system of re g is tra ­
tion , together with the diensbuch (serv ice book) and brass badge, were 
abolished and replaced by a pass law. However, the major provisions of
the former law, tha t every black person should ca rry  a pass and should 
be employed, remained in force. Besides ra is in g  the age of those re q u ir­
ed to carry passes from seven to fourteen and abolishing the hum iliating 
brass badge, the only meaningful change introduced was the "C ertifica te  
of Exemption from Labour" provided for .hose who could show "v is ib le  
means of support," To qualify  for th is  c e r t i f ic a te ,  which cost ten 
s h illin g s  a year, the applicant had to own a t  le a st ten head of large or 
50 head of small stock. The German law had also made provision for the 
exemption of those with "v is ib le  means of support", from the s t r i c t  
labour requirements, but the necessary c r i t e r ia  was never defined and in 
p rac tice  had l i t t l e  i f  any significance.
As under the German law, blacks were barred from obtaining any r ig h t or 
t i t l e  to fixed property without the consent of the administrator. They 
were, however, allowed to acquire and own livestock . This the deputy- 
secretary  of Native A ffairs in Windhoek reasoned would "tend to make the
native more contented and law abiding". The South African adm inistra­
tion c learly  did not envisage that the rig h t to own c a t t le  would be 
allowed to in te rfe re  with the flow of labour, ra th e r i t  saw the rig h t as 
an inducement to accept labour, as the following reference to the German 
law indicates:
The inhumanity of th is  measure, apart from i t s  in ju stice , is emphasized when one re ca lls  what a blow such a p rohib ition  must have been for the c a ttle -lo v in g  Hereros. What inducement was there to work? A native might slave for years and years but the prospect of having in his old age a few cows and 
calves of h is own, on which to subsis t when labour was no longer possible, did not e x i s t .69
The Masters and Servants Act Proclam ation No.2 of 1916) provided "for 
those defic iencies or shortcomings of the German laws which experience 
has taught are indispensable for the proper control of natives and the
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sa tis fac to ry  settlem ent of breaches of contract between masters and 
servants” . The major aims of th is  law was the system ization, form aliz­
a tion  and cen tra liza tio n  of labour re la tio n s  in the colony. The German 
system had allowed for a considerable degree of decen tra liza tion , Both 
the local police and s e t t le r s  had been given su b stan tia l powers to 
enforce the labour control system, For example, the police could 
punish black servants without reference to ju d ic ia l  au tho rity . Only the 
more serious offences were referred  to the local adm inistrative and 
ju d ic ia l o f f ic ia l ,  the bezirksanptmann. However, th is  d i s t r i c t  o ff ic e r
was not only an adm inistrative and ju d ic ia l  o f f ic ia l ,  but also  the 
72d is t r ic t  police ch ie f.
Although, u ltim ate ly , the South African a u th o ritie s  subscribed to the 
same objective of labour con tro l, they in s is te d  that th is  control should 
be more cen tralized  and that there should be a s t ic t e r  separation of 
m agisterial and police functions. In o ther words, labour control was 
seen as the prerogative of the s ta te , not of the individual employer 
backed up by the s t r t e .  There was thus during the period of m artial law, 
a growing tendency for the cen tra l au tho rity  to define and regulate 
re la tio n s  between blacks and whites, employers and employees, Between 
1916 and 1°20 the Masters and Servants Law was revised twice, in order 
to make the regulation of labour re la tio n s  more comprehensive and 
d eta iled , This law in turn was backed up with other le g is la tio n  such as 
the laws re la tin g  to "the control and treatment of natives employed on 
mines and works in the P ro tectorate" (Proclamations Nos. 3 and 5 of 
1917) and a comprehensive vagrancy law (Proclamation No. 25 of 1920),
Besides ca refu lly  defining the respective obligations of employers and
employees, the Masters and Servants laws outlawed the p rac tice  of 
"fa th e rly  correc tion" (whereby white employers had the rig h t to beat 
th e ir  servants) and put a stop to the prac tice  of flogging which magist­
ra te s  were urged to "make specia l e f fo rts"  to prevent,
I t  should be widely made known to the natives tha t masters and policemen have no power to flog, and any complaints of flogging must be ca refu lly  investigated and the offender 
prosecuted without respect of person,74
Spurred on by the need to d isc re d it the former German regime and to
con trast German ru le  with i t s  own, the South African adm inistration
ac tiv e ly  enforced tho new provisions of the law, Between September 1915
and January 1918 more than 310 cases involving ill- trea tm en t of black
servants were brought before the lower courts alone. The more serious
cases of murder and assau lt against white s e t t le r s  were given prominent
a tten tio n  in the 1918 Blue Book and elsewhere. In one case the Special
Criminal Court took the unusual step  of sentencing to death a farmer,
Frantz Ernst Bec'.er, for the cold-blooded murder of six  San (Bushmen).
The adm inistrator commuted the death sentence to l i f e  imprisonment and
commented as follows:
I t  has been a constant endeavour of th is  Administration since 
i t s  establishment to break down the trad itio n s  of German native policy and to replace i t  by a respect and fear of the law; but th is is  not the work of a day, and I fear that for some time to come a tten tio n  must be given to considerations 
which would not be allowed to weigh elsewhere or in more normal tim es.77
Before attempting to examine the sign ificance of these changes, i t  is 
necessary to ou tline  some of the d if f ic u lt ie s  that stood in the way of 
the implementation of the new laws, Many (possibly even most) black 
labourers did not report assau lts  on them for fear of th e ir  employers or 
the po lice. Besides widespread opposition to the new laws, many
farmers f e l t  tha t too much time and e f fo rt would be wasted on a t r ip  to 
the nearest police s ta tio n  to report complaints against th e ir  servants 
and so continued to re so rt to pre-War methods of "correc tion". For 
farm labourers the distances from both the courts and police obviously 
presented d if f ic u lt ie s  in laying charges against th e ir  employers. 
S im ilar d i f f ic u lt ie s  were involved in making complaints to  the police. 
There is  considerable evidence th a t the local po lice force id en tified  
strongly with the farmers and had l i t t l e  sympathy for black 
complaints. Incidents where police in the ru ra l areas defied adm inist­
ra tiv e  policy by flogging blacks are well documented. In sp ite  of 
the«e d if f ic u lt ie s  of implementing i t s  policy, the adm inistration i t s e l f  
showed reluctance to enforce i ts  laws fu lly . In 1916 the m agistrates of 
the large r towns were in structed  to d ire c t a l l  complaints under the 
Masters and Servants Law to the O fficer in Charge of Native A ffairs in 
th e ir  d i s t r i c t s ,  This o f f ic ia l  would then decide whether prosecution was 
"considered desirab le" . A few months la te r  an in stru ctio n  went our from 
the Crown Prosecutor that Masters and Servants cases "should not be 
taken up unless the employer wishes i t , "
S trains and contrad ictions in colonial policy
In sp ite  of these constra in ts and the seeming insignificance uf the 
changes made to German laws, the modified po lic ies  of the new adm inistr­
ation  caused an outcry among the s e t t l e r  community. The s e t t le r s  tended 
to see the changes in the labour system in absolute terms. For example, 
the m ilita ry  m agistrate of Karibib reported in 1917 that the
whole a tt i tu d e  of the Germans to the natives was very aptly  stated  by the Chairman (of the Farmers' Union), who sa id  that the B ritish  princ ip le  was equal righ ts for a l l ,  whereas the 
German p rincip le  was tha t the native was in a l l  things subservient to the European. I t  was urged by several members (of the Farmers' Union) th a t i t  might bo taken for granted th a t whenever a native spoke he was ly in g .84
Sim ilar a t t i tu d e s  to the change in policy were adopted by s e t t le r s  from 
the Union.
These a ttitu d e s  can only be understood against the background of the 
economic weakness of farmers in the colony. Jeffery  Paige has argued 
that because of th e ir economic weakness, dominant agrarian classes 
require the intervention  of the s ta te  to compensate for th e ir  vulnerable 
economic s itu a tio n . In Namibia the extreme vu lnerab llty  of the s e t t l e r  
c la ss  required extreme measures, In sp ite  of the re la tiv e ly  favourable 
economic conditions u n ti l  1920, many farmers appeared unable (or unw ill­
ing) to pay wages to th e ir  labourers, They consis ten tly  complained about 
the cost of black labour, and in 1916 the adm inistrator reported that 
"probably Q0 per cent of the complaints brought to our o f f ic ia ls  by 
natives are for the withholding of wages due to them". Thus what might 
appear as minor changes to an ou ts ide r, assumed far g reater sign ificance 
to the s e t t l e r  farmers.
However, in order to understand the impact of the changes on the s e t t l e r  
farmers, i t  is necessary to examine these changes a l i t t l e  more closely . 
The policy tha t emerged during the m ilita ry  period did not simply 
involve the su b stitu tio n  of one system of labour control for another. 
Rather the policy was a combination of elements of two d iffe ren t 
systems. As already argued, South African policy in Namibia during the 
m ilita ry  occupation was shaped by a varie ty  of contradictory influences 
and co n stra in ts , so that what f in a lly  emerged was a combination of both 
German and South African colonial p o lic ies . While these po lic ies  shared 
the common goal of exploiting the labour resources of the colony, they 
were not n ecessarily  compatible as they d iffe red  in the means they
employed to  secure th is  common goal, Furthermore, the s itu a tio n  was 
complicated by two additional fa c to rs . The need to d isc re d it German ru le 
and p ro jec t an image which would be acceptable to the in terna tiona l 
community was a facto r which was extraneous to the normal concerns of a 
labour-ex tractive system. I t  helped to produce, in the upper echelons of 
the adm inistration, a te n ta tiv e  libera lism  which was out of pace with 
the re s t  o f the co lonial society and which quickly evaporated a f te r the 
granting of the Mandate. A second se t of complications resu lted  from 
the lo g is t ic  d i f f ic u lt ie s  associated with creating  a new adm inistration 
under conditions of war.
Given the configuration of facto rs which were operative in the s i tu a t ­
ion, i t  is  not su rp rising  that contrad ictions and inconsistencies mani­
fested themselves in the system of labour con tro l. While i t  re ta ined  the 
general rraraework of the German forced labour system, the South African 
adm inistration removed some of the means by which labour had been 
ex tracted . Arising as i t  did out of the bru tal suppression of the 1904- 
06 reb ellio n s , the German policy of forced labour was dependent on a 
generalized and decentra lized  violence for i t s  survival- The frequency 
with which flogging was used to "discipline* the labour force has already been ment 
dispersa l of the white population, the p ra c tice  of "parental ch a s tise ­
ment" was an important means for maintaining control over the labour 
force, When the South African adm inistration prohibited the use of these 
two measures, s tra in s  occurred w ithin the system of con tro l. Instead of 
being able to "d iscip line"  th e ir labourers themselves, farmers were now 
obliged to travel to the seat of the d i s t r i c t  magistracy. This often
involved the inconvenience of trav e llin g  long distances and of being91absent from th e ir farms for a number of days. Besides the loss of time 
and o ther expenses en ta ile d , the farmers feared tha t absence from th e ir
farms would re su lt  in other labourers deserting , s tea lin g  th e ir  stock, 
or neglecting to take proper care of th e ir farms.
Within the context of the v io len t h is to ry  of the colony, the poor wages
paid to farm labourers and the compulsion used to ex tra c t labour, these
fears do not appear u n re a lis tic , In addition  to  th is ,  there was the
uncertain ty  of whether the farmer would be able to secure a conviction
against, h is servant. Some of the m agistrates were regarded as too
"len ien t" towards black servants. However, in those cases where a
conviction was secured and the labourer was sentenced to a term of
imprisonment, the farmer would be deprived of h is labourer for tha t
period, In the s itu a tio n  of chronic labour shortage, farmers were in a
vulnerable position . Black labourers appeared to be aware of th is  and
prepared to exp lo it i t .  I t  was reported from Gibeon, for example, that
in cases brought by masters against th e ir  servants I have 
found tha t the accused almost invariably refused to pay th e ir  fines, s ta tin g  tha t they preferred  to serve th e ir  time in Gaol, The prospect of a short period of imprisonment not only f a i ls  to alarm the native but ac tu ally  provides him with a 
lever wherewith to undermine the au tho rity  of his employer . . .  when threatened with legal proceedings they openly s ta te  tha t they do not fear the law of the English as they could be locked up for a while , , ,  and they would then have the s a t i s ­
faction of knowing that th e ir  masters have to herd th e ir  own stock. The unfortunate employer who is  short of labour is forced to condone a l l  kinda of offences because i f  the natives are convicted and imprisoned he loses th e ir services for a time and there in no improvement in the conduct of the servant when he r e tu r n s , . . ,  ( l)n  my opinion there is only one remedy fo r the e v il , and th is  is  the i n f l i c t io n . , ,  o f . . .  
corporal punishment . , , .  By adopting th is  method of punish­ment . , ,  the native feels th a t he has been punished and his master can make use of him almost immediately afterw ards.94
A second contrad iction  arose out of the re laxation  of re s tr ic t io n s  on 
the ownership of stock. While the ban on the ownership of large stock 
was repealed and provision made for the exemption of ce rta in  black stock
owners from the labour requirement, no c le a r policy emerged fo r the
allo ca tio n  of land to the colonized. The Gorman law which prohibited
blacks irom obtaining "any rig h t or t i t l e  to fixed property" remained in
force. The question of reserves was held in abeyance u n ti l  a f te r  the
granting of the mandate when South A frica 's  tenure over the te rr i to ry
became more secure. This inconsistency in the policy of the m ilita ry
adm inistration held a number of important im plications. As the number of
black-owned stock increased, so obviously did the need for land. In
order to meet the land shortage, black stock owners adopted a v arie ty  of
s tra te g ie s , In some cases they simply moved onto vacant Crown land or
unoccupied farms. Some of these squatter settlem ents were la te r  recogn-96
ized as temporary reserves by the adm inistration, Squatting on white 
farms also  became common during th is period, p a r tic u la r ly  as i t  provided 
a source of labour a t a time of severe labour shortage. In other cases 
government, municipal or p rivate land was hired for grazing.
These loosely s tructured  arrangements generated c o n f lic ts , many of which
only came to a head in the period tha t immediately followed the granting
of the mandate. Temporary reserves like  Orumba and Okatumba in the
Windhoek m agisterial d i s t r i c t  soon became overstocked and overcrowded.
As a re su lt co n f lic ts  arose with the white farmers who complained of 99stock th e fts  and trespassing on th e ir land.
When more permanent reserves were f in a lly  estab lished in the early  
1920s, the adm inistration decided to close the temporary reserves and 
met with strong res is tance  from th e ir occupants, The accumulation of 
stock by blacks who had been formerly prohibited from doing so, also  
threatened the in te re s ts  of s e t t l e r  farmers. S e ttle rs  complained that 
th e ir  farms were being overrun by the stock of th e ir  labourers. They
claimec’, th a t i f  they t r ie d  to lim it the number of stock kept by th e ir 
servan ts , they ran the r isk  of losing them - a serious even tuality  in a 
situ a tio n  of chronic labour shortage. The farmers also  complained that 
stock diseases were being spread by labourers who moved th e ir stock from 
farm to farm. Blacks should be forced to keep most of th e ir stock on the 
reserves, or the ban on large stock should be reintroduced.
The inconsistency, ambiguity and temporary nature of adm inistrative 
policy during the period of m artial law also  created  problems a t  the 
bureaucratic and adm inistrative leve ls , An analysis of m agistrates' 
reports in 1920 revealed some s ta r t l in g  inconsistencies in the 
implementation of adm inistrative policy a t  the local lev e l. The admin­
is tr a t io n  concluded th a t "too l i t t l e  control" was exercized over native 
adm inistration in the d i s t r i c t s ,
(M )agistrates and N.A. O fficers carry out such portions of 
the Native Memorandum ( ie . the major document which la id  down Native Policy during the m ilita ry  period) as they like : every man has h is own policy and there is  no coord ination .102
Administrative efficiency  was further hampered by the small and inexper­
ienced s ta f f s , pa- icu la r ly  of the d i s t r i c t  m agistrates, For example, 
the m agistrate of Otjiwarongo complained that although h is d i s t r i c t  
extended over nearly  20 000 square miles with 150 widely dispersed 
farms, only nine men had been provided to police the area, Of these nine 
men, five were tied  to c le r ic a l  or town d u ties , leaving only four men 
for patro l work. "In these circumstances 1 often wonder that the s itu a tio n  is  not 
worse", the m agistrate commented. From the beginning of the occupa­
tion period, the adm inistration received complaints about the closing of 
some of the police outposts tha t had been maintained by the Germans,
Following dem obilization a t  the end of the war, a number of o ther ru ra l
police posts were closed down. According to the m agistrate of Omaruru, 
th is  removed a " re stra in in g  influence” on black labour - "the knowledge 
that small forces of po lice were stationed  a t posts among the ru ra l 
population served in son-' measure to check ev il among n ativ es ."
Contradictions in the tra n s itio n a l policy of t in  m iltary period led also
to c o n f lic t between the adm inistration and the po lice. In an extensive
memorandum compiled in 1919, the adm inistrator complained to the Union
Government tha t abuses "in the treatment of the aborigines of th is
country by members of the local police force (the M ilitary  Constabulary)
are s t i l l  e x is te n t,"
Chains and the l i '^ r a l  use of the sjambok by the police w ill 
c le a rly  not secure that clean sheet which I am so anxious to 
present when the ex isting  m ilita ry  occupation of th is  country comes to an end .106
The po lice, who id en tified  with the s e t t l e r  farmers and were responsible
for enforcing colonial law, c learly  did not share these sentim ents, A
senior policeman, for example, had authorized the police under his
command to flog blacks in order to avoid overcrowding of the lock-up,
and because members of the farming community had asked him not to imprison
labourers as they could not do without then. In another case reported
by the m agistrate of Okahandja, a corporal in charge of a police ouirost
had flog$"'d blacks and had been paid by farmers for doing so.
The police d is tru s te d  the m ag istrates, "regarding them as people who 
crea te  work and trouble for them ra th e r than as th e ir  friends and 
advisers."
The complaint is  made tha t ce rta in  over zealous m agistrates go out of th e ir way to find cause of offence against the police on every t r iv ia l  complaint made by natives against 
them, The natura l re su lt being th a t not only are the police disheartened but are hampered in the execution of th e ir  duty
as they fear to imperil th e ir  position , but i t  fu rther brings about a want of that harmony between m agistrate and police which is  so esse n tia l to the good adm inistration of any 
D is tr ic t , while i t  a lso  encourages the native to think that 
the police are in the wrong and are inim ical to them thus leading to the inso len t a tti tu d e  complained of - an a ttitu d e  in marked contrast to what i t  was under German r u le .110
In the event of co n flic t between m agistrates and po lice, the police were
not without recourse. The adm inistrator pointed out in 1919 th a t where
the m agistrates complained to higher au th o ritie s  about the conduct of
the police "matters are immediately made unpleasant for them":
In almost every previous incident when a m agistrate has
reported misconduct by members of the Constabulary ..  the reply has taken the form of a personal a ttack  on them agistrate — 111
The problems experienced with the police were but one symptom of a more
general malaise tha t permeated the adm inistration. The m agistrate of
Okahandja succin tly  summed up the s itu a tio n  in 1920:
When one looks back a t the past four and a h a lf years and with what we have had to contend - dealing with an h o stile  
population, wholly in su ffic ie n t and in e ff ic ie n t s ta ff s , incompetent and almost useless po lice, a complete change of native pulicy, the disorder following on ac tive warfare, and, above a l l ,  an Administration which was necessarily  
unstable and to a ce rta in  ex ten t temporary and uncertain - i t  is  not to be wondered a t that conditions today are s t i l l  far from ideal or even sa tis fac to ry . The in structions  la id  down in the native memorandum (of 1916) . . .  were a big step 
forward in the rig h t d irec tio n . Unfortunately - and here I 
think one touches on the crux of the whole m atter - i t  has not been found possible in the absence of constant and firm supervision, with the s ta f f  and police a t our d isposal, to carry out the excellen t d irec tions  la id  down.112
I incompetence and inefficiency  among the police and adm inistrative
personnel appear to have been widespread during th is  period. In 1917 113Gorges wrote to Smuts to complain that the te rr i to ry  was being 
neglected by the South African government, I t  had struck him. Gorges 
wrote, " that responsible people in the Union are e ith e r exceedingly
in d iffe ren t about th e ir large and important t e r r i to r ia l  acq u isitio n , or 
else  they repose an extraordinary amount of fa ith  in my capacity  to 
govern th is  Colony as i t  should be governed,•' He went on to  complain 
about the quality  of police o ff ic e rs  sent to the te r r i to ry , giving 
spec ific  examples of o ff ic e rs  who had to be dismissed or d isc ip lined  for 
drunkeness, embezzlement, taking part in shady horse and c a t t l e  transac­
tio n s, or being "too fond of the lad ies" .
S ta ff m atters have been a te r r ib le  worry and I have been saddled with a lo t o f m isf its . I have received on the whole 
very l i t t l e  assistance from Union Departments and i t  has been 
a most d i f f ic u lt  m atter to  obtain re a lly  su ita b le  men from them. I am fortunate in having the services of a few re a .ly  tip -to p  men . . .  but I re g re t to say th a t the tendency on the part of some Departments has been to  try  and pass o ff th e ir bad bargains on to m e ..,. You .^U perhaps hardly c re d it i t ,  but of the eighteen m agistrates , have here, only three are 
fu ll  m agistrates in the Union, liw re s t  are nearly a l l  clerks 
in the Union, some of them only of the second grade,116
I t  is  likely  tha t the pi. ,r quality  of adm inistrative personnel in 
Namibia a t th is  time was connected with the attempts of ♦‘-e ru ling  party  
in South Africa to win favour with the white e le c to ra te  by providing 
jobs for South Africans in the te r r i to ry . Although there may have
been a few exceptions in the lower echelons of the adm inistration. South 
African policy was to replace a l l  German o ff ic ia ls  with South Africans. 
At the end oC the war, 6 274 German c it iz e n s , representing about, h a lt  of 
the colony's German population, were re p atria ted  from Namibia, Of th is 
to ta l , 3 718 (or 58 per cent) were o f f ic ia ls  or members of the m ilita ry  
and police. The remainder was made up of "undesirables" (1 223) and 
people who had requested re p a tria tio n  (1 433).
Responses of the colonized
The; adm inistrative m alaise served not only to  d ilu te  s t i l l  fu r th e r the 
already weak reforms of the new adm inistration, but also  impaired the
control the co lonial s ta te  was able to exercize over the colony and the 
colonized. In o ther words, not only was the adm inistration unable to 
implement properly the changes i t  had introduced, but i t  was also  
prevented from effec tiv e ly  executing those functions of dominance and 
control cen tra l to the co lonial en te rp rize . Within th is  context the 
black work force was able to  devize various s tra te g ie s  to r e s is t  or by­
pass the system of forced labour tha t was s t i l l  a part of the colonial 
s itu a tio n .
Although desertion  had become a w e ll-estab lished  ta c tic  even under 
German ru le , the shortage and inefficiency  of the po lice, the removal 
of police powers from the s e t t l e r s ,  and the general inefficiency  and 
lack of control of the adm inistration, made desertion  and the withhold­
ing of labour even more a t tra c tiv e  and feasib le s tra te g ie s  during the 
period of m artial law. The d isruptions and confusion caused by the 
m iltary campaign and change of adm inistrations, provided fu rth e r opport­
u n itie s  for desertion  and other forms of re s is tan ce , Following the 
Union's invasion and occupation of the te r r i to ry , dese rtions, p a r tic u l­
a r ly  from farms, reached unprecedented lev e ls , p re c ip ita tin g  a severe 
labour c r is i s .  The Imperial Blue Book of 1918 s ta te s ,  for example, that 
black labourers deserted "rig h t and le f t  from farms on which they had
been located" and that many showed a "strong d is in c lin a tio n "  to return 119to work. According to the m ilita ry  aqdm inistrator in 1916, there was 
"plenty evidence that black labourers "work for th e ir  German masters 
only under the g re a tes t pressure and tha t they were inclined to be 
inso len t to them,"
By 1918 the s itu a tio n  had not changed. The adm inistrator in h is report
(t)he demand fo r natives (s ic )  fa r exceeds the supply, and few natives can be induced volun tarily  to work for German 
farmers. . . .  121
Complaints poured in from the farming community:
The absence of any au thority  in th is  place has created condi­tions which are going to destroy the existence of our farm 
and that of o ther Farmers in the v ic in ity . Knowing that there is  nobody in th is  place to punish them the natives refuse to work. They run away and p re fer to  live  in the bush. There they get plenty of food, they make hundreds of traps to catch
the game ___ The k a ffirs  fee l no co n stra in t to work, theys i t  id le , 1 know where they are hiding but 1 have not the 
power to force them back. The natives are informed of th is  and therefore they dare to run away, one a f te r  the other . . . .  The k a f f irs  of th is  country needless to say only work as long as they fear the Police, when Waterberg gets a small Garrison 
the conditions I think w ill re a lly  improve, only then normal conditions w ill s e t t l e .122
Although not adequately documented, the stra tegy  of liv ing  o ff the veld
by hunting and foraging appears to have been widespread. S e ttle r
in te re s t groups complained frequently about the increase in the number
of dogs owned by blacks. By 1917 the adm inistration had adopted i ts
f i r s t  dog tax and ac tive measures were taken to destroy dogs owned by 124blacks, Another way of circumventing the repressive labour system was 
by accumulating enough stock to  qualify  for an exemption c e r t i f ic a te .  
The m agistrate of Otjiwarongo reported in 1920 that the Hereros were 
"stra in ing  every nerve to acquire large and small stock, in order tha t 
he may again become independent and relieved of the necessity  of work­
ing ," He maintained tha t between 1914 and 1920 black-owned small stock 
had increased from "no more than a few hundred" to more than 4 000 in 
h is d i s t r i c t .  In the minds of both the s e t t le r s  and the au th o ritie s ,
the dramatic increase in black-owned stock was closely  linked to
126increasing stock th e fts  during th is  period- Although the availab le 
evidence makes i t  d i f f ic u lt  to confirm or re fu te  th is  link , i t  would
J L l
appear tha t losses of small stock in p a r tic u la r  were very heavy. I t  was
even alleged tha t because of stock th e ft, small stock farming was no
127longer viable in the te rr i to ry .
However, for the m ajority of blacks in Namibia the s tra te g ie s  outlined 
above were not immediately ava ilab le , At the low wages paid during th is  
period, i t  would have been impossible for most blacks to obtain s u ff ic ­
ien t stock to qualify  for exemption from forced labour, S tra teg ies such 
as stock th e ft , desertion  and liv ing  in the veld held th e ir  own costs 
and d i f f ic u lt ie s .  Even for those blacks who were able to acquire exempt­
ion c e r t i f ic a te s ,  problems s t i l l  arose as to where they could keep th e ir
stock as there was l i t t l e  land availab le to black stock-owners during 
th is  period. In the s itu a tio n , the m ajority of blacks f e l l  back on the 
widespread stra tegy  adopted in other p arts of Africa against forced 
labour, poor wages and o ther conditions of colonial repression . In the 
words of the s e t t le r s  and colonial a u th o ritie s , they became " inso len t", 
"lazy", " in e ff ic ien t"  "unre liab le" and negligent".
By 1920 complaints of th is  so rt had reached a climax and permeated every
level of s e t t l e r  society , The adm inistration showed some awareness of
the re la tionsh ip  between the inefficiency  of black labour and the
repressive labour policy of the s ta te . The magistate of Otjiwarongo, for
example, re ferred  to "a passive resistance  movement, a t  present confined
to doing the work as badly as possible", and the Secretary for the
P rotectorate pointed out that "large numbers" of blacks
work only because the law compels them to do so, and in 
consequence they do th e ir  work with very l i t t l e  grace and
with only so much e f fo rt  as circumstances demand. This is  thereason for the general complaints about the inefficiency  of labour in th is  coun try ,.,130
Another unanticipated consequence of the change in colonial adm inistra­
tions during World War I was the generation of u n re a lis tic , but firmly 
held, expectations of reform among the black population. The defeat ot 
the German colonial power during the war helped fo ste r the b e lie f  that 
th e ir lands would be returned to them. As la te  as 1946, a Herero witness 
told Michael Scott:
What we don 't understand is  tha t when two nations have Leen a t  war, such as B ritain  or Germany or I ta ly , and when one or other of those nations is  defeated the lands belonging to that nation are not taken away from them. That nation remains 
a nation, and th e ir  lands belong to them. The African people although they have always been on the side of the B ritish  people and th e ir a l l i e s ,  yet have th e ir lands taken away from them and are trea ted  as though they had been conquered,131
Because they wished to convey the impression tha t the South African 
adm inistration was welcomed to the te r r i to ry  by the indigenous inhab it­
an ts, o f f ic ia l  sources played down black ag ita tio n  over the land issue. 
However, in h is preface to the Imperial Blue Book of 1918, adm inistrator 
Gorges s ta ted  that
the native in th e ir simple way of thinking unable tounderstand why a f te r  having conquered the Germans here, we did not u tte r ly  despoil them of th e ir property, have also 
since the Occupation provided a considerable amount of d i f f i ­cu lty  for the A dm inistration,132
Expectations lik e  these appear to have been widespread among police zone 133blacks during the m ilita ry  period. I t  is  probable that these b e lie fs
were encourage by adm inistrative po lic ies  during th is  period. Although
the changes introduces were only minor concessions, war propganda, the
prosecution of German employers and the tensions tha t ex isted  between
s e t t l e r s ,  po lice  and adm inistrators, undoubtedly made an impact, as did
134the recognition of squatter-occupied land as 'temporary reserves". 
These expectations were, however, to be rudely shattered  in the period
tha t immediately followed the m ilita ry  adm inistration , and played a 
s ig n if ican t ro le  in the concerted res is tance  to colonial ru le  between 
1920 and 1925.
Strong s e t t l e r  opposition to the po lic ies  of the adm inistration was 
evident throughout the m ilita ry  period, but reached almost h y steric a l 
proportions in 1920. During that year the Deputy Commissioner of Police 
conducted an extensive tour through the police zone. On completion of 
h is tour, he reported that "a universal complaint" had been made to  him 
"by every section of the white population a t every place I v is ite d , 
without exception, and th a t is the a tti tu d e  of the Native as regards 
work, his inso len t demeanour, laz iness, u n re lia b il i ty  and thieving prop­
e n s it ie s ."  The adm inistration approached the m agistrates for comments 
and suggestions. In almost every case the m agistrates reported s im ilar 
complaints to those outlined by the Deputy Commissioner and suggested 
t ig h te r control of the black labour force. Farmers had made rep resen t­
ations to both the South African prime m inister and the adm inistra­
to r. For most of the farmers and some of the m agistrates, the obvious 
solution to the problem was to reintroduce flogging. In sp ite  of i t s  
ideological objections to th is  aspect of German policy, the adm inistra­
tion  shared th is  opinion, but f e l t  that i t  could not afford to a lien a te  
in ternational opinion. In a le t t e r  to the m agistrate of Gibeon, the 
Secretary of the P ro tectorate conceded th a t although the "decreased 
e fficiency" of black labour was "due to the p rohib ition  of corporal 
punishment . . .  the in f l ic t io n  of corporal punishment for offences
against the Masters and Servants Laws is  not within the range of 139p ra c tic a l p o l i tic s ,"
The intense resentment tha t the p o lic ies  of the new adm inistration
aroused in the s e t t le r s  may be explained on an economic, m ilita ry  and
ideological lev e l. I t  is  c le ar that an economically vulnerable community
which is  dependent on s ta te  intervention  to provide i t  with a cheap and
docile  labour force, w ill be threatened economically i f  the s ta te
appears unwilling or incapable of providing such a labour force.
However, there were other dimensions to the fears of the s e t t l e r s .  I t  is
to be expected that tea r of rebellions and re p risa ls  would be a feature
of a community as steeped in violence and b ru ta li ty  as the s e t t l e r
community in Namibia. An investigation  of the German adm inistration 's
f i l e s  had shown that from a t le a st 1910 the colonial au th o ritie s  "were
in a constant s ta te  of nervous apprehension" over the p o ss ib ility  of a
black r is in g . During the m ilita ry  campaign of 1915 white s e t t le r s  had
been moved from the outlying d i s t r i c t s  to the more densely populated
areas along the railway lines because of fears of re p ris a ls . These
fears were proved a t le a st p a r tia lly  r e a l i s t i c  by the Baster rebellion
and other more lim ited incidents of looting and violence d irec ted142against the s e t t l e r  community during the war. Following the occupa­
tion of the te rr i to ry  by South African forces, the German s e t t le r s  had 
been compelled to surrender th e ir arms, and th is  had had the e f fe c t of 
in tensify ing  th e ir fears,
For some months a f te r  the close of the campaign applications were received from Germans in large numbers for the re turn  to them of the arms they had surrendered, in order to afford 
them some protection from the natives. After Novemoe, la s t alarming rumours were se t in c irc u la tio n  by the Germans of an impending r is in g  of the natives, during which no European l i f e  would be safe. They reached every corner of the P ro tec t­
o ra te and thoroughly alarmed the ru ra l population.143
On an ideological lev e l, the defian t a tt i tu d e  (or, in colonial parlance,
"insolence") of the colonized represented a d irec t th rea t to the system
of oppression, Eugene Genovese has argued tha t
(a ) i l  forms of c la ss  oppression have induced srne kind of 
s e rv il i ty  and feelings of in fe r io r i ty  in  the oppressed; f a i l ­ure to induce these means fa ilu re  to survive as a system of oppression ,144
That colonial policy in Namibia during th is  period had a t le a st p a r t ia l ­
ly fa ile d  to inculcate the required s e r v il i ty  and deference in the 
colonized was for the s e t t le r s  (and even some of the adm inistrators) a 
c le ar ind ication  th a t the colonial s ta te  was not adequate to i t s  task.
I t  was against th is  background of s e t t l e r  fears and a g ita tio n  against 
the po licies of the m ilita ry  adm inistration, that South A frica was 
granted the mandate to ru le  Namibia. Developments during the five  years 
of m ilita ry  rule played a prominant ro le  in  shaping the responses of 
both blacks and whites in  the period tha t followed. Although flogging 
was not o f f ic ia l ly  reintroduced during th is  early  mandate period, many 
of the demands made by the s e t t le r s  during the m ilita ry  period fo r 
tig h te r control of the labour force, branding laws, a heavier dog tax 
e tc . ,  were introduced during the f i r s t  five years of the mandate. The 
ten ta tiv e  libera lism  of the m ilita ry  adm inistration disappeared and 
s e t t l e r  in te re s ts  once more reigned supreme. The rebellion  and 
defiance tha t characterized the f i r s t  few years of the mandate was also  
rooted in the m ilita ry  period, not only because the expectations tha t 
had been nurtured during th is  period were fru s tra ted , but a lso  because, 
for a b rie f  period, the colonial s ta te  had revealed i t s  weakness.
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THE MANDATE AND THE CONSOLIDATION OP THE SETTLER STATE
The years 1920-1925 represent a watershed in Namibian h is to ry , not only 
in terms of the new d irec tio n  assumed by the co lonial s ta te ,  but also in 
the build-up of res is tance  to colonial ru le  in  the te r r i to r y .  The 
foundations of South African policy in  Namibia were la id  during th is  
period, and were in turn  to condition indigenous responses to foreign 
domination. The p o lic ies  tha t took shape out of the un certa in ties  and 
am biguities of the m ilita ry  period were a product cf forces both within 
and ou tside the German colony. On a global sca le , the creation  of the
League of Nations and the granting of a mandate to South A frica to  ru le
Namibia as a part of i t s  own te rr i to ry , provided g reater secu rity  for 
both colonial o f f ic ia ls  and s e t t le r s .  The secu rity  of tenure that came 
with the mandate meant tha t the colonial adm inistration need no longer 
•?ander to in ternational opinion by presenting a lib e ra l image to the
world. Colonial po lic ies  could now follow colonial in te re s ts , and the
benevolent paternalism  of the Gorges adm instration could be stripped 
away to reveal the grim r e a l i t ie s  and requirements of the s e t t l e r  
econom). With the end of the wa>1 and in tern a tio n a l recognition of South 
A frica 's  rig h t to Namibia, the German s e t t le r s  could be welcomed back 
into the fold as fellow whites and colonial m asters. There was no longer 
a need, as there had been in the e a r l ie r  period, to  depic t them as
bru tal and vicious in th e ir  treatment of blacks. The ranks of the colon-3ia l society  were closing,
However, changes in  the d irec tio n  of colonial p o lic ies  in  Namibia were 
not only a response to  the new in terna tiona l s ta tu s  of the te r r i to ry ,
but also re flec te d  the developing p o li tic a l  c r is is  in South Africa, I t  
was argued in the previous chapter that one of the major reasons for the 
Union wanting control over Namibia was to ease pressures in South Africa 
by providing land and jobs for whites in the former German colony. Rapid 
in d u s tr ia liza tio n  and the commercialization of ag ricu ltu re  had brought 
with them landlessness, unemployment, accelerating  urbanization, p ro le t­
arian iza tio n  and social degradation for large segments of the black and 
white populations. I t  was e s se n tia lly  the marginalized whites, the 'poor 
white problem ', which caused the g rea tes t concern, and came to  pose the
g reater th rea t to the South African s ta te ,
With the onset of the world recession in 1920, the p o li tic a l  c r is is  
deepened, culminating in the 1922 Rand rebellion  and the erosion of the 
p ) l i t ic a l  base of the ru ling  south African Party (SAP). The p o li tic a l  
c r is is  in South Africa and the granting of the mandate therefore len t 
fu rthe r urgency to co lonial p ro jec ts , and p a r tic u la r ly  settlem ent 
p o lic ie s , in Namibia, while removing the major inh ib itions to the ar ive 
exp lo itation  of the colony. These changes in turn increased p ressu r,s  on 
the indigenous population, accounting for increasing resistance to the
colonial s ta te  in  the ea rly  1920s. Although there had been widespread
defiance of colonial au thority  during the m ilita ry  period, th is  had not 
cry s ta lliz ed  into a confrontation with the colonial s ta te . There are 
several possible reasons why a general r is in g  had not taken place during 
the 1915-20 period. Central to  these were the nature of indigenous 
communities in Namibia and the conc ilia to ry  po lic ies  adopted by the 
colonial s ta te  during th is  period.
German colonial po lic ies  had shattered  the social in teg rity  of Indigen­
ous communities in the police zone and, although the colonial s ta te  was 
p a r tic u la r ly  vulnerable during the m ilita ry  period, the colonized had 
n either the organization nor the m ilita ry  resources with which to ch a ll­
enge the colonial au th o ritie s , The consolidation of black communities 
was therefore e sse n tia l before any attempt could be made to r is e  against 
colonial domination, However, the tenuousness of s ta te  power during th is 
period meant not only that the s ta te  was more vulnerable, but a lso  that 
i t  was unable to keep e f fec tiv e  control over the black population who 
were able to exp lo it the weaknesses and loopholes in the repressive 
labour system and thus to  consolidate th e ir economic positions by way of 
the accumulation of stock and the occupation of open or government land.
Economic changes and the re riignaen t of colonial po lic ies  
In sp ite  of the d isruption  caused to the economy by the m ilita ry  
campaign, the years during and immediately a f te r  the war provided an 
ideal opportunity for economic consolidation. Following the South 
African occupation of the te r r i to ry , the m ilita ry  adm inistration devoted 
considerable a tten tio n  to re s to rin g  farming, commerce and industry in 
the te r r i to ry . Mining was resumed although on a sm aller scale than 
previously and farming flourished owing to the ready markets for farm 
produce during and immediately a f te r  the war. Not only did the presence 
o f the Union garrison  provide a market w ithin the te r r i to ry , but there 
were also excellen t markets for slaughter stock both in South Africa and 
overseas, The abnormal prices realized  for stock resu lted  in turn  in 
high values being placed on land. P artly  because of the high values of 
land and the uncertain future of the te r r i to ry , few s e t t le r s  entered the 
country during th is  period. The smallness of the s e t t l e r  population in 
turn ensured both that, the level of ag ric u ltu ra l production would remain
low, thus maintaining the high pr: es, and tha t there would be more open 
land availab le for blacks to occupy e ith e r  leg a lly  of il le g a lly . Here 
again conditions conspired to  am eliorate the conditions of blacks and to 
promise fu rthe r improvements in the future,
However, within two years of the war the economic boom came to an end,
and by 1932 the te r r i to ry , along with the o ther p arts of the world, had
entered the depths of the post-war recession. The disbandment of the 
m ilita ry  garrison  a f te r  the war meant tha t an important local market for 
farm produce was lo s t. The end of the war I sad also  seen the reorganiz­
ation of ag ricu ltu re  on a world scale and the consequent contraction of 
markets for slaughter stock and other produce both in South Africa and 
overseas. At the same time a severe drought overtook the te r r i to ry . The 
s itu a tio n  dete rio rated  fu rthe r with the reversa l of the inflow of
ca p ita l from Germany to the te r r i to ry  and with the speculation in paper
10marks which resu lted  in numerous bankruptcies during the ea rly  1920s.
In th is  decade the adm inistration also  began pursuing an ac tive s e t t l e ­
ment policy. Between 1920 and 1922, 730 s e t t le r s ,  mostly from the Union,nwere to occupy 583 holdings, comprizing 4 884 626 hectares, and to 
provide fu rthe r competition for an already shrinking market, liie drought 
was followed by heavy floods and an in festa tio n  of locusts in 1923, In 
sp ite  of the damages caused by both floods and locusts, farming in 
Namibia recovered temporarily, Moreover a severe drought in the Union 
created a good market for fa t stock and large numbers of c a t t le  were 
exported, However, many farmers anxious to take advantage of the 
improvement in the market, disposed of th e ir best breeding stock u n ti l  
the adm inistration introduced le g is la tio n  to prevent a fu ther reduction
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of breeding stock. Whatever hopes were ra ised  by tho 1923 ra ins were 
dashed in 1924 when another drought occurred and locusts once again 
attacked crops and grazing. The te r r i to r y  suffered severe stock losses 
which in some d is tr ic t s  amounted to 30 per cent of to ta l holdings.
In 1921 the adm inistrator summed up the position  of the r  ling industry 
as "d isastrous". The slump in  the market for diamonds and other 
minerals produced in the te r r i to ry , re su lted  in a d ra s tic  drop in 
production. Diamond exports which had risen  from £834 314 in 1917 to 
£1 060 087 in 1918. £2 204 326 in 1919 and £1 599 849 in 1920, dropped 
steeply  to £492 513 in 1921, one quarter of the previous y ea r 's  figure, 
There was only a s lig h t improvement in 1922 with recovery following in 
1923. Thereafter diamond production continued on a fa ir ly  steady keel 
u n ti l  1931 when i t  again dropped steep ly . The production of other 
major minerals showed a s im ilar decline during th is  period. The s i tu a ­
tion was p a r tic u la r ly  serious for the adm inistration which re lie d  
heavily on the diamond industry for i t s  revenue.
As the country began entering the recession, many farmers who had over­
stocked or overcapitalized  th e ir farming operations during the prosper­
ous war years, found th a t they were only able to  s e l l  stock a t  low 
prices, i f  a t  a l l .  However, an over-optim istic report o f the Farmers' 
Produce Commission during the early  years of the mandate had resu lted  in 
extensive investments in in fra s tru c tu ra l development. This together 
with the adm in istration 's  heavy re liance on an unstable mining industry 
had the e f fe c t of committing the s ta te  to a long-termed settlem ent 
policy,
The ea rly  mandate years also  saw a p a r tia l  rapprochement between the
adm inistration and the German s e t t l e r  community, Furthermore, the s e t t l ­
ement policy of the adm inistration began changing the composition of the 
white population in favour of the South African component. The new 
adm inistration of the mandated te r r i to r y  c learly  saw i ts  major aim as 
bringing the adm inistrative and le g is la tiv e  s truc tu res  of Namibia in 
line  with those in South A frica. In his report for 1920, the 
adm inistrator s ta ted  that
(u)nderlying the whole of the measures introduced has been the p rin c ip le  la id  down by the Treaty of V e rsa illes , under 
which the T errito ry  is  to be governed as "an in teg ra l part of the Union of South A frica" .19
With the establishment of the mandate, a more sympathetic policy was
adopted to the s e t t l e r  community. Early in 1921 an Advisory Council was
appoints" to represent s e t t l e r  in te re s ts . The Council consisted of six
ntemebers selec ted  by the adm inistrator, and represented "farming,
commercial, mining, wage-earning and native in te re s ts " . Government
o ff ic ia ls  were not e lig ib le  for appointment except in the case of the
20
member appointed to represent 'n a tiv e  in te re s ts " . There are strong 
indications that the Advisory Council helped influence adm inistrative 
po lic ies  in re la tio n  to the indigenous population. In 1921, for example, 
the adm inistrator s ta ted  tha t he had sought the advice of the Council on 
a number of issues including native reserves, the pass laws, the Masters 
and servants proclamation, the branding of small and large stock, and 
the dog tax . As we sh a ll see, a l l  these issues were to have an impor­
tan t bearing on black pro test and resistance during th is  period, By
1922 the Advisory Council was expanded to nine members, with four 
representing farming in te re s ts , two commercial in te re s ts  and one each 
for mining, white labour and native adm inistration. The adm inistr­
a t io n 's  a tt i tu d e  to the s e t t l e r  community was c learly  il lu s tra te d  by the
adm inistrator when he addressed a conference of d i s t r i c t  m agistrates in
1920. The m agistrates, said  the adm inistrator, were "the ch ief agents of
the adm inistration":
They were there to d ire c t and cheer the would-be s e t t l e r ,  and to  a s s is t  and p ro tec t him once he had anchored himself; i t  was equally th e ir  duty to protect the native as to punish 
idleness and vagrancy, and to  see tha t a l l  availab le labour ►.us u ti liz e d  - they were, in fa c t, the goldden bridge betueen the fa.m er snd (be n a tive  labourer. 24
Soon a f te r  the granting of the kr,ndate a T s a r s '  Produce Commission 
was appointed to investigate the export marker problems of farmer;, in 
the te r r i to r y .  The Commission which consisted of white farmers and 
businessmen, gave a highly optim istic  report o f the country 's  agricui • 
tu ra l p o ten tia l, claiming tha t i t  could carry between two and three 
m illion head of c a t t le  in addition to a large number of small stock. 
According to D.W. B allo t, i t  was largely as a re su lt  o f th is  report that 
the adm inistration committed i t s e l f  to extensive in fra tru c tu ra l develop­
ments and speeded up i t s  land settlem ent programme, with l i t t l e  or no 
regard for black in te re s ts . B a llo t's  comments on the adm inistration 's  
policy, which was to prove economically d isastrous even for the s e t t l e r  
community, are an accurate re f le c tio n  of the adm in istration 's  approach 
to tv, n -estion  of land d is tr ib u tio n  a t th is  time:
adm inistrator who neglected s e tt l in g  and developing the waste places  of the country in the face of so favourable a report on the T e rrito ry 's  p o te n t ia l i t i e s . . .  might possibly 
have been regarded as crim inally  negligent of the country 's in te re s ts .27
At the same time as land was being made av a ila b 's  for white s e t t le r s ,  
the adm inistration was in the process of creating  the long-awaited 
reserves for blacks. Already in 1921 the adm inistrator reported in 
re la tio n  to black reserves tha t "at th is  la te  stage there are d i f f ic u lt ­
ies in the way of procuring su ff ic ie n t or su itab le  ground on account of
vested r ig h ts  having to be considered." Yet in 1924 in a sim ilar
report, the adm inistrator s ta ted  that there were "hundreds of good 
29farms" s t i l l  awaiting s e t t l e r s .  C learly d iffe re n t standards governed 
the a v a ila b ili ty  of land for blacks and whites in the te r r i to ry .
Land settlem ent policy
During the m ilita ry  period from 1915 to 1920, no le g is la tio n  ex isted  
under which land settlem ent could be ca rried  out. Although the admin­
is tr a t io n  generally discouraged settlem ent during th is  period, a 
number of stock farmers crossed into Namibia from South Africa and were 
issued with grazing or occupation licences in ths southern p arts of the 
te r r i to ry . In 1920, however, the land settlem ent laws in force in the 
Union were applied to the te r r i to ry  and a Land Board was estab lished  to 
fa c i l i t a te  settlem ent. In i t i a l ly  the ju r isd ic tio n  of settlem ent in 
the colony fe ll  under the Union government, but with the withdrawal of 
m artial law in 1920, th is  was transferred  to the SWA adm inistration. The 
f i r s t  s e t t le r s  under the new scheme were granted farms in the Warmbad 
and Keetmanshoop d i s t r i c t s  towards the end of 1920 - a fac t which, as
we sh a ll see, was not unconnected to the outbreak of rebellion  in th is  
area in 1922. From the s ta r t  generous assistance  was given to the 
s e t t le r s  and early  in 1921 a Land Bank, s im ilar to that in the Union, 
was estab lished .
Without even taking in to  consideration black land needs, the decision to 
launch a large-sca le settlem ent programme in the la te r  h a lf of 1920 was 
a t  best ill- tim ed . The f i r s t  signs of the post-war recession began to 
manifest themselves in about September 1920 when business began dropping
o ff and the p rice of stock fe l l ,  By 1921 the combined e ffec ts  of 
recession and drought were already taking th e ir  t o l l  of both new 
s e t t le r s  and estab lished  white farmers. Rather than back down on i ts  
settlem ent programme, the adm inistration continued to dispose of land in 
vast q u an titie s , Between 1920 and 1933 662 farms comprizing 5 650 087 
hectares were provided for 831 s e t t le r s .  The largest a llocations were 
made in  1921, 245 farms comprizing Z 125 154 hectares. After 1921 the 
number of farms allocated  declined to 169 (1 163 600 hectares) in 1922 
and 79 (765 461 hectares) in 1923. With the height of the drought in 
1923, fewer farms were a llocated  because of the d if f ic u lt ie s  of finding 
water supplies. The demand for farms a lso  declined because of the 
e ffec ts  of the recession on prospective s e t t le r s  from the Union.
Instead of re s tr ic t in g  the inflow of s e t t l e r s ,  the adm inistration adopt­
ed a short-sigh ted  and f in a lly  d isastrous po’ 'c y  of providing extensive 
aid  to the strickened white farming community, At the end of 1921 impor­
tan t amendments were made to the land settlem ent leg is la tio n  to provide 
more favourable conditions for s e t t l e r s .  Provisions were made for the 
remission of rent owed to the Land Board. The already generous provis­
ions for loans (£500 for the purchase of stock and farming implements, 
£400 for permanent improvements. and the costs of boring operations 
which were added to the purchase price ) were su b stan tia lly  improved. 
The minimum cap ita l requirements for s e t t le r s  was lowered from £500 to 
£250 and a new provision was introduced to cover the transport costs of 
not only the s e t t l e r  and h is family, but also  h is fu rn itu re , farming 
implements and breeding stock,
Unusually generous conditions for s e t t le r s  characterized the adm inistr­
a t io n 's  policy u n ti l  1935, when the collapse of the farming industry
which followed in the wake of the 1929 to 1933 depression, could be
ignored no longer even by the myopic a u th o ritie s . From 1935 farms were
a llo tte d  for a probational period of one year, without financ ial a s s is t
ance or improvements, and s e t t l e r s '  tenure of th e ir  fares depended on
the success they were able to make of th e ir  farming operations. These
measures prevented s e t t le r s  from over-cap ita liz ing  th e ir  operations and
liv ing  beyond th e ir means. According to an o f f ic ia l  assessment made in 
391939, the new policy was proving a success.
P rior to  these changes, however, the Land Settlement Commission was to 
report in 1935 that the misguided settlem ent policy was largely respons­
ib le  fo r the precarious position  in which the m ajority of farmers found 
themselves. The Commission also  drew a tten tio n  to such d if f ic u lt ie s  as 
droughts, inadequate water supplies, stock d iseases, predators, tran s­
port costs, low prices, and the lack of markets. The main th rust of the 
re p o rt, however, focused on the hasty and in e ff ic ie n t implementation of 
the settlem ent policy and the " lib e ra l loan policy" followed by the 
adm inistration:
In the opinion of the Commission the lib e ra l policy as regards advances is  likewise one of the great causes why many of the s e t t le r s  are today economically unsound eg. advances fo r dwelling houses, fences, camps, k raa ls , re servo irs , dipping tanks e t c .41
Advances were granted without proper supervision or con tro l. Loans for
dwelling houses were not merely offered to  the s e t t l e r s ,  "but were also
p ra c tic a lly  forced on him, even before he was able to frame h is plans as
to the general development of the farm and before he had gathered
su ff ic ie n t knowledge of the economic value of the farm."
The native reserves policy 
I f  th«i settlem ent policy pursued '.,y the adm inistration was detrim ental 
to s e t t l e r  ag ric u ltu re , i t  was doubly d isastrous for the indigenous 
population. The vigorous settlem ent policy not only meant tha t very 
l i t t l e  land was provided for blacks, but also  th a t the adm inistration, 
.in a bid to save the a i l in g  white farming community, adopted rad ical 
measures to force blacks onto the labour market. Colonial land and 
labour po lic ies  under both German and South African ru le  were of course 
closely  interconnected, with the demand for labour as tU  primary 
determinant.
For Gysbert Hofmeyr, the man who headed the adm inistration between 1926
and 1926, there was no doubt that the "native question" was "synonomous"
with both the "labour question" and the "l&nd question". The "labour
question", however, took precedence. Towards the end of 1920 Hofmeyr
appointed a small commission to investigate the supply of labour in the
te rr i to y . The following year both the membership and terms of the
commission were expanded and i t  was charged with making recommendations44
for "the allotment of su itab le areas for permanent native reserves", 
i t  was th is  commission which la id  the basis for the reserves policy 
adoptee oy the adm inistration.
The policy which began to take shape during the ea rly  mandate period was 
rooted in conditions that had prevailed during the tran s itio n a l m ilita ry  
period. At the very basis of these conditions was a fundamental contra­
dic tion  between e a r l ie r  German po licies and those of the m ilitai1) admin­
is tr a t io n  during the war, German native and labour po lic ies  not only 
depended on a highly repressive and decentra lized  system of regula tion , 
but also  on expropriation of the land of the m ajority of blackis in the
police zone. The existence of a landless work force completely dependent 
on employment in the s e t t l e r  economy was re inforced by the re s tr ic t io n s  
placed on the possession of livestock by blacks. With the removal of the 
ban on large stock, the creation  of a system of labour exemption for 
black stock owners, and the loosening of other labour controls during 
the m ilita ry  occupation, the numbers of black-owned stock increased 
rap id ly . With the increase of black-owned stock, the need fo r land, 
pai 'c u la r ly  among those groups which had been dispossessed, also 
increased.
No d e f in ite  reserves policy was formulated during the m ilita ry  period. 
Those black areas which were recognized by German tre a tie s  were preserv­
ed, and a lim ited number of government farms were se t aside as temporary 
reserves for Hereros and Naraas. For the most part, however, i t  appears 
that black stock owners were able to obtain grazing through th e ir  own 
e f fo r ts . In a number of cases open Crown land was simply occupied. For 
example, Hoachanas, an area ju s t  outside Rehoboth, which before the war 
had been a mission s ta tio n  and police camp, was occupied by Mamas during 
the invasion. In other cases government, municipal or p riva te  land wa; 
hired for grazing, Squatting on white farms also  became common p a r tic u l­
ar ly  as i t  ensured a supply of labou, 'indcr conditions of chronic sho rt­
age. Many black stock owners also  coved in to  the Rehoboth reserve as 
squatters, o r hired grazing land from the R asters. In fac t the Rehoboth 
community became so dependent on black payments for grazing or squatting
rig h ts  tha t I t  suffered a serious economic set-back when blacks were
4 9moved to the reserves a f te r  the Rehoboth rebellion .
The establishment of temporary reserves held i t s  own problems. Besides
the common s e t t l e r  complaint th a t p o ten tia l black labourers were being
"id le" in the reserves, the creation  of small and overcrowded reserves
near white farms, re su lted  in co n flic t between black and white stock
owners. For example, the Orumba and Okatumba reserves estab lished  for
Hereros in the Windhoek d i s t r i c t  in 1916, a ttra c te d  large numbers of
c a t t le  owners and were soon overcrowded. In 1917 the superintendent of
locations reported that stock was coming into the reserves a t  a ra te  of
about 400 head a week. He estim ated tha t Orumba which was 9 500 hectares
in ex ten t, could accommodate no more than 500 c a t t le  and 6 000 small
stock, while Okatumba (4 500 hectares) would hold about 400 c a t t le  and
2 000 small stock. By May 1918 the two reserves were already carrying
I 900 c a t t le  and between 2 000 and 3 000 small stock. An o ff ic ia l
count in August 1918 revealed tha t there were more than 2 000 c a t t le  and
5 000 small stock on the two reserves. With the overstocking of these
reserves, f r ic t io n  with neighbouring farmers became inev itab le . As a
superintendent of reserves reported in May 1918:
. . .  i t  is  impossible where there are over th irteen  hundredhead of c a t t le  together, as is  the case on Orumba, a farm ofapproximately 9 500 hectares, to prevent a few head of c a ttle  
from straying >n to  the adjoining farms ...5 3
The three-cornered co n flic t between occupants of the Orumba reserve,
neighbouring white farmers and the adm inistration reached a head in
1919, when the officer-in -charge of Native A ffairs for Windhoek, Captain
0, Bowker, burned down a l l  the huts in a ce rta in  part o f the reserve
because c a t t le  ha'-1 nto neighbouring white farms. In September
1919 a depu tau  • ros from Orumba went to Windhoek to  see the
Secretary fo r South Africa to complain about Bowker's harsh action 
and the overcrowding of the reserves. Thereafter co n flic t centring on
Orumba and other temporary reserves grew. These reserves became less and 
less able to support the stock of th e ir  occupants. Neighbouring white 
farmers continued to  complain about stock th e fts  and trespassing  of 
reserve c a t tle ,  The acting-m agistrate of Windhoek reported in 1922 that 
"there is  considerable risk  of violence creaking out between the farming 
and native community of tha t lo ca lity  ( ie . Orumba) :n the near future 
unless some immediate steps are taken by the Administration to re lieve 
the congestion in the reserve ."
Even before th is , however, the adm inistration had decided to  abandon 
Orumba and the other temporary reserves. In 1916 the Native A ffairs 
Department was investigating  the p o ss ib ility  of estab lish ing  more exten­
sive and consolidated reserves in order to prevent co n flic t between 
blacks and white s e t t le r s  and to f a c i l i t a te  con tro l. The Report on 
Native A ffairs for 191? stated  that "(f)rom more than one point of view 
the retension of Okatumba and Orumba, which are situ a ted  in the heart of 
the populated area and surrounded by European farmers, is  undesir­
ab le ."  I t  is c le a r th a t as ea rly  as 1916 the adm inistration has 
decided to ' • I. 'n the best farm land for the s e t t le r s ,  In tha t year 
Captain Bowker of the Native A ffairs Department had taken a group of 
headmen on a tour of an area proposed as a fu ture reserve. The response 
o f the headmen to the proposed reserve was anything but favourable:
They are however net favourably impressed with the country, shrewdly observing tha t a l l  the land in that part of the country su itab le for farming is  occupied by the white m an.... I t  may be mentioned in th is  connection that the 
p o ss ib ility  of a settlem ent has given r is e  in the native mind to a dream of again occupying th e ir  old haunts, which are, as is well known, west of Windhoek northwards.,.60
Black land demands, p a rtic u la rly  in the post-war period, also  played an 
important ro le  in shaping the reserves policy, The occupation of the
te r r i to ry  by South African forces ra ised  expectations among blacks that 
a t le a st some of the land taken from them by the Germans weald be 
returned. Early in 1916, for example, the m agistrate of Grootfontein 
reported tha t Hereros who were previously resident j n the northern p arts 
of the te r r i to ry  were moving southwards and "from facts already on 
record i t  is c le a r tha t these people hope, eventually , to be permitted 
to occupy a t  le a st a portion of the country from which they were expell­
ed by the German Government." Expectations of th is  so rt were not 
exclusive to the Hereros. The largely Nama community a t  Hoachanas were 
reported in  1916 as subscribing to  '.he b e lie f  tha t »he "English came to 
give us back our land ard re -es tab lish  us as a nation ,"
Expectations of being granted * .e  raised again a t  the end of war 
and when the Mandate was es tab lished . On belli occasions these expect­
ations were rudely disappointed. In August 1919 Captain Bowker announced 
the end of the war to the residents of Orumba. The war, he said , s ignal­
led an important change in the laws and government of the country. 
Rather than mention land claim s, the Native A ffairs o ff ic e r  upbraided 
the residents for not standing up and taking o ff th e ir  hats when an 
o ff ic e r  of the admini. 'ra tio n  approached:
Now on the f i r s t  -Ay of the new government th is  is  the f i r s t  lessoi. I w ill h. v j you learn, When your o ff ic e r  leaves his 
house to open hv’ i-ffice, you w ill r is e  and g reet him,65
By the ea rly  192'"' -i .oi s ta tio n s  were giving way to fru s tra tio n  and 
resentment. In the u,s<vxt of mounting resistance , the adm inistration 
was forced to pay a t  Ic .'s t some a tten tio n  to black land demands, The 
provision of reserves, i t  was f e l t ,  would help to  defuse the s itu a tio n  
in bringing about more "se ttle d  conditions, contentment". The Bondel-
swart rebellion  of 1922 had c le a rly  demonstrated to the adminslrii.ion 
tha t even a seemingly iso la ted  and ea s ily  repressed revo lt could have 
major diplomatic repercussions. I t  is  therefore s ig n if ican t that in his 
report for 1922 the adm inistrator maintained that the delim ita tion  and 
occupation of reserves had "done much to  a llay  the undoubted unrest 
which existed among the N atives."
Perhaps the cen tra l motivation of the adm inistration in estab lish ing  
reserves, however, revolved around the question of contro l, On one 
leve l, th is  involved removing the contradictions tha t had emerged in 
colonial po licies during the m ilita ry  period. Remnants of German policy 
which clashed with South African policy had to be removed and the 
country brought into line with adm inistrative p ractice in the Union. On 
another, more p ra c tica l leve l, however, were a varie ty  of considerations 
re la tin g  to adm inistrative convenience and t k ' fa c i l i ta t io n  of control. 
On th is  level larger, more consolidated reservxs were preferred to 
sm aller, fragmented reserves, while any form of 'overnraent-controlted 
reserve was preferable to squatter communities on white farms, or in the 
Rehoboth Gsbiet. Because the adm inistration was manned largely by 
re c ru its  from the Union c iv i l  serv ice, these p ra c tic a l considerations 
tended to merge with the more abstrac t requirements of consistency with 
Union p o lic ies .
Some of the contradictions tha t faced the adm inistration of the mandated 
te r r i to ry  were inherited  from the German adm inistration, The Germans had 
not dispossessed a l l  blacks in the police zone. C ertain reserves such as 
the Rehoboth Gebiet, the Okambahe reserve for Damaras, and reserves of 
the Bondelswarts and Bersoba Namas were maintained and were recognized 
by German t re a t ie s ,  The abo lition  of these reserves would have been
unacceptable to the League of Nations and would have resu lted  in p ro tr­
acted resistance  in the te r r i to ry . Yet the continued existence of these 
reserves was inconsisten t with the complete dispossession of the Hereros 
and the m ajority of the Namas. This i^ o n s is ten c y  was exacerbated by the 
decision of the m ilita ry  adm inistration to re lax  the re s tr ic t io n s  on the 
ownership of stock by blacks. The newly aquired stock had c le a rly  to be 
accommodated somewhere. The creation  of small temporary reserves there­
fore ra ised  more problems than i t  solved. Furthermore, thti existence of 
a substan tial landless population accelerated urbanization and encourag­
ed squatting.
The adm inistration was opposed to both tendencies, mainly because i t
made control more d i f f ic u lt .  The adm inistrator s ta ted  in 1922 that i t
was "undesirable to allow surplus natives (s/c)  of various races to
crowd into municipal locations and sim ilar places, where, even under the
best control . . .  they generally d e te rio ra te  physically  and morally
besides ermbarrassing the white population in regard to the use of
commonages and w ater," "Everything possible", the adm inistrator
said , should be done to encourage both blacks and whites "to  go back to 69the land". Already in 1917 i t  had been pointed out that i f  blacks were 
allowed to keep stock in the reserves, they would be less like ly  to 
migrate to the towns and perhaps more amenable to farm labour. For 
the adm inistration, urbanized blacks provided a marked contrast to those 
in the reserves, particu la ry  those in the iso la ted  northern part of the 
te r r i to ry , For a number of reasons which w ill be examined la te r , labour­
ers from these northern areas were both cheaper and ea sie r to control.
Contradictions between the settlem ent and reserves po lic ies
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Thus, a t  the beginning of the 1920s there were a varie ty  of ready 
reasons for embarking on an extensive reserves policy in the police 
zone. However, the establishment of reserves conflic ted  with the admin­
i s tr a t io n 's  vigorous settlem ent programme. Even more important, a rever­
sal o f the process of p ro le ta rian iza tio n  se t in motion by the German 
adm inistration would negate the adm in istration 's  attempts to ex trac t a 
su ff ic ie n t supply of labour under conditions of chronic shortage. The 
dilemma was summed up by adm inistrator in 1921:
The m ajority of the population is  s t i l l  liv ing  in accordance 
with native custom in the Ovamboland, Okavango and Kakoaveld areas, and although the progress of c iv il iz a tio n  and the country 's economic requirements do not permit of a reversion to or extension of the tr ib a l  system, these people as a rule are more amenable to au thority  and require less supervision 
than those who, a f te r  years of contact with Europeans, have lo s t much tha t was good in th e ir  old code and acquired some of the vices connected with c iv iliz e d  ce n tres .72
In South Africa the major th rust of native policy was to frame le g is la t ­
ive and adm inistrative devices to draw labour out of the reserves. 
German colonial po licies had attempted the p ro le ta rian iza tio n  of a 
m ajority of the population in the police zone by means of m ilita ry  
force, The existence of a large landless population, however, posed 
problems of control for the South African adm inistration in the t e r r i t ­
ory. The policy that emerged during the ea rly  1920s was therefore an 
attempt to s tee r a course between the two apparently contradictory 
demands of es tab lish ing  reserves (in  order to  fa c i l i t a te  contro l, 
reverse, o r a*, lea st contro l, black urbanization, and standardize admin­
is tr a t iv e  procedures) and a t the same hime ensure an adequate supply ot 
labour. As the Native A ffairs o f f ic ia l  Captain Bowker pointed out. in 
1916, the two goals were not necessarily  incompatible:
. . .  i t  may prove more economical to  consider the p o ss ib ility  of estab lish ing  one large settlem ent fo r a l l  the P ro tectorate Natives in an area such as the Kaokoveld, where the natives would be en tire ly  segregated from the European
farming community, and from which, through economic p ress­ure, they would be forced to seek employment, the labour market thus not being seriously  affected; on the contrary, i t  
is  f e l t ,  that such a course would ac t as a stimu’ ,s to labour, for the natives would be under closer control and the payment of such taxes as may be levied could be e ffec tu ally  enforced and such money would have to be earned.74
In broad ou tline  therefore the policy of the ea rly  mandate adm inistr­
ation  made provision for the creation  of reserves to accommodate the 
residents of the temporary reserves, squatters on both white farms and 
in t!,j Rehoboth Gebiet, and the "surplus" populations of the urban 
areas. The amount of land allocated  was, however, s t r i c t l y  controlled. 
Furthermore, land was a llocated  largely in those areas of the country 
which were less su ita b le  for farming. A varie ty  of economic pressures
such as grazing fees, dog taxes and the s t r i c t  control of "informal
sector" economic a c t iv i t ie s ,  were imposed to f a c i l i t a te  the efflux  of
migrant labour. These measures were incorporated in to  an over-arching 
system of le g is la tiv e  and adm inistrative controls which applied to a l l  
blacks in the country.
The findings of the Native Reserves Commission in 1922 la id  the basis 
for th is  policy. I ts  major recommendations were tha t ( i )  the country 
should be more c learly  segregated into black and white settlem ent areas; 
( i i )  squatting on white farms should be prevented; ( i i i )  there should be 
more e f f ic ie n t  control of the reserves; (iv ) reserves which were recog­
nized by German tre a tie s  should be maintained, but 'the temporary
reserves estab lished  during the m ilita ry  period should be closed; <v) 
new reserves (which did not d is tu rb  "vested rig h ts" ) should be e s ta b l­
ished; and (v i) fu rthe r land should be earmarked for the future extens­
ion of these reserves. An "extensive area" to the east o f the Gobabis 
and terberg d is tr i c t s  and bordering on Bechuanaland was recommended.
This area f e l l  in the Sandveld or Kalahari region which although a t t ra c ­
tiv e  in appearance, lacks surface water and has grazing with low protein 
and phospherous contents. The low phospherous content of grazing was 
p a r tic u la r /  serious because i t  caused gaJJaasiekte  or "sandveld 
disease". The adm inistrator reported in 1918 that where cases of 
gaJJamsiekte had occurred, white farmers had been advised to move th e ir
c a t t l e  elsewhere. Although the South African Native Land Act (no. 2778
of 1913) was not made a law of the te r r i to r y  u n ti l  1928, the general 
p rincip les of th is  Act were applied de fa c to  to the te r r i to ry  a t lea st 
from the beginning of the mandate period. In 1921, fo r example, the 
Prime M inister's  Office informed the Secretary for South West Africa 
th a t in the absence of leg is la tio n  lik e  the 1913 Land Act in the 
te rr i to ry :
The Acting Prime M inister is of the opinion that the South- 
West Africa Administration should divide the country roughly into what w ill u ltim ate ly  become native areas and European areas respectively , then to apply the same policy as in the 
Union.79
During the m ilita ry  occupation blacks were prevented from acquiring 
legal t i t l e  to land (without permission of the government) by Section 
One of the Ordinance of the Imperial Governor dated 18 August 1907 which 
remained in force for the duration of the South African occupation. 
However, in terms of proclamation 21 of 1919 a l l  laws which were in 
co n flic t with the tenets of Roman Dutch law as applicable in the Cape 
Province, were repealed. In the view of the Attorney-General o f SWA in
1926, the 1907 ordinance was also  repealed and there was not "anything 
in the law of th is  T errito ry  which makes i l le g a l  the acquisition  of the 
ownership of land by a n a tiv e ."  As la te  as 1948 there s t i l l  appeared 
to be some doubt as to the ap p lica b ility  of the Imperial Ordinance in
the minds of both the Registar of Deeds and the Attorney-General. 
Such legal n ic e tie s , however, did not appear to influence the early  
Mandate adm inistration in i t s  s t r i c t  applica tion  of t e r r i to r ia l  
segregation in Namibia.
Segregation allowed the adm inistration to keep rigorous control over
both the alloca tion  of land and the communities that were es tab lish  on
i t .  With the exception of the 998 101 hectares that made up the
reserves recognized by the German t re a t ie s ,  the only land tha t could be 
occupied by blacks was tha t a llocated  by the adm inistration. This not 
only allowed the adm instration to determine the amount and location of 
land occupied •• blacks, but also  to  charge grazing fees for th is  land. 
In th is  wa ■ farmlands could be reserved for white s e t t le r s  and
economic pi. .s could be put on the reserves to supply the required
labour, furthermore, the granting of land could, as the adm inistrator 
pointed out in his 1922 report, be made conditional on "good
behaviour".
In terms of the 1921 recommendations of the Native Reserves Commission, 
655 650 hectares would be allocated  for the proposed reserves and a 
fu rthe r 636 881 hectares "earmarked for reserves in case of future 
extension, or of u n su ita b ility  of the proposed reserves," Together with 
the reserves that had been created during the German period, the to ta l 
a llocation  of land for Africans, as envisaged by the Commission, amount­
ed to  ? 237 874 hectares. This was only s ligh ted  more than the
2 125 154 hectares tha t had been allocated  to 311 s e t t le r s  in 1921
In s p ite  of the meagreness of the proposed areas , the opening of the 
reserves was delayed by drought and inadequate water supplies. By the 
end of 1903, 634 000 hectares had been a llocated , The insignificance of 
th is  area can be gauged from a comparison with the more than 1,9 m illion 
hectares allocated  for s e t t le r s  in 1922 and 1923 a t the height of the 
drought. A further 349 782 hectares were added to  the reserves in 1924 
and about 754 360 in 1925, With the proclamation of Otjimbingwe 
(77 495 hectares) a f te r  1925, the programme of the Reserves Commission 
was completed. In 1925 the various reserves in the te r r i to ry  accomm­
odated a to ta l  population of 11 740 people, as well 49 250 large stock 
and 22? 834 small stock. Information re lc tin g  to  the size  of the 
reserves estab lished  during the f i r s t  five years of the Mandate is given 
in tab le 3.1 below, while comparative figures re la tin g  to settlem ent 
between 1920 and 1925 are presented in tab le 3.2.
TABLE 3.1: RESERVES ESTABLISHED DURING EARLY MANDATE PERIOD
Reserves recognized by German tre a tie s  998 101 haReserves estab lished  in 1922/23 634 000 haLand a llocated  in 1924 349 782 ha
Land a llocated  in 1925 754 360 haOtjimbingwe (proclaimed a f te r  1925) 77 498 ha
TOTAL 2 813 741 ha
Total population of a l l  reserves, 1925: 11 740
Stock on a l l  reserves, 1925:
Large stock 49 250Small stock 227 834
TABLE 3.2: WHITE SETTLEMENT DURING THE EARLY MANDATE PERIOD
No. of No. of Area inholdings s e t t le r s  Hectares.
1920 169 203 1,595,873
1921 ................................ 2-15 311 2,125,1541922 ................................ 169 216 1,163,6001923 ................................ 79 101 765,4611924 ................................ 123 157 1,0*7,3221925 ........................................... 95 118 783,961
880 1,106 7,481,371
Because of the d iffe rin g  quality  of land a llocated , a d ire c t comparison 
of the quan tities  of land se t aside for white settlem ent and b’ .'ck
reserves is  d i f f ic u lt .  However, the fact tha t about 28 times more land
per person was a llocated  to s e t t le r s  during the f i r s t  five years of the 
mandate than was allowed for a l l  blacks in the police zone during the 
same period, provides a rough but c le a r  indication of adm inistrative 
p r io r i t ie s .
The implementation of the reserves policy, based de fa c to  on the 1913 
Native Land Act, excluded the p riva te  tran sfer of land to blacks and 
ensured th a t the adm inistration re ta ined  complete control over the 
alloca tion  of land. Both the quantity  and quality  of land occupied by 
blacks could be controlled to ensure tha t there would be no obstacle 
from that quarter to the adm inistration 's  vigorous settlem ent policy and 
to guarantee a continuous flow of labour tc mines, farmers and other
white en terp rizes, In sp ite  of the small quan tities  of land se t asides
for reserves, other measures were also used to ensure the continued 
supply of labour. A system of grazing fees was introduced ea rly  during 
the m ilitary  period. In 1917, for example, £3 782 was co llec ted  in 
grazing fees. Although there is  no breakdown of the re la tiv e  sums con tr­
ibuted by blacks and w hites, i t  is  clear tha t the large r part must have
come from blacks who held 1 475 of the 1 733 grazing licences and lease :90effec tiv e  during that period,
With the establishment of reserves during the ea rly  Mandate period,
grazing fees were extended to a l l  reserves with the exception of those
granted under German trea ty . Stock was taxed on a slid in g  scale with
the obvious in ten tion  of lim iting  the number of stock kept on the
reserves. Thus large stock was taxed on the basis of 2d. per head per
mensem for one to  25 head, and 3d. for herds of 26 or more. S im ilar/ the
grazing fees for small stock was l/4d . fo r herds of 100 or less and
91l/2d . for those above 100, The s tra te g ic  aims of grazing fees are
clear from the report of the Natives Reserve Commission of 1928. The
major aim of the Commission was to devize measures to ensure the steady
flow of labour form the reserves. I t  recommended s t r ic te r  control over
both the occupants of reserves and th e ir  livestock . In order to ensure
control over black stock and increase the labour supply, the Commission
recommended a new scale of grazing fees, which in effec t doubled the
fees of reserve residents below the age of 55 (in  o ther words, a l l
po ten tial labourers), and placed fu rthe r economic pressures qn owners of
large herds. The Commission concluded i ts  comments on the new grazing
fees scales with the following statement:
Owing to  the urgency of the labour problem and the fac t that there are too many natives in the reserves, we cannot too strongly recommend the above.92
In the reserves recognized by German tre a tie s , grazing taxes were not 
imposed. However, a dog tax, also  based on a slid in g  sca le , was levied 
under Proclamation No 16 of 1921. P a rticu la r ly  in the early  1920s 
the dog tax proved an effec tiv e  instrument for forcing labourers from 
these reserves onto the labour market and was an important contributory 
cause of the Bondelswart ris in g  in 1922.
As noted e a r l ie r ,  the reserves policy implemented during the f i r s t  five 
years of the Mandate was incorporated into a general framework of le g is ­
la tio n  contro lling  the employment, movement and economic a c t iv i t ie s  of 
blacks in the police zone. A se rie s  of laws aimed a t tightening the
controls introduced during the m ilita ry  period, was passed between 1920 94and 1922, The Vagrancy Law (Proclamation 25 of 1920) made i t
punishable offence for a person to "wander abroad" without "v is ib le
lawful means or in su ffic ie n t lawful means of support." This law also 
made provision for the removal of squatters from Crown and mission land 
or land se t aside fo r native locations. Further measures to control 
both squatting and the movement of blacks were introduced under the 
Native Administration Proclamation (No. 11 of 1922), This law not only 
aimed a t contro lling  the movement of blacks within the te r r i to ry , but 
also  movements of blacks entering or leaving the te rr i to ry . In a l l  
such cases permits dependent on the "d iscre tion" of the adm inistration, 
were required. As we shall see below, these measures provided an impor­
tan t means of contro lling  the various black organizations established 
during th is period. The Native Administration Proclamation also  made I t  
' lleg al for blacks to squat on p rivate property unless they were employ­
ed by the owners or leasees of the property or had obtained the per­
mission of the adm inistration. The number of fam ilies employed on farms 
and other properties were also lim ited to ten.
In 1921 the branding of a l l  c a t t le  was made compulsory (Proclamation No. 
36). Although th is  law applied to both blacks and whites, i t  required
that branding irons allocated  to blacks be kept by local adm inistration
o ff ic ia ls  and that the branding of black-owned c a ttle  be conducted under 
the supervision of the local au th o ritie s . Other measures such as the
curfew regula tion  (Proclamation 33 of 1922) and regula tions for the 
management and control of locations (Government Notice 45 of April 1921) 
aimed a t the control of blacks in the urban areas. Following the imple­
mentation of the reserves policy, the adm inistration aimed to reduce (or 
a t le a st control) the number of blacks in the urban areas because urban 
townships proved more d i f f ic u lt  to control and in su la te from outside 
influences. I t  would appear tha t the adm inistration was a t  le a st p artly  
successful in th is  aim in tha t the black populations of Windhoek and 
Okahandja decreased between 1921 and 1925, Rural or reserve-based 
populations were ea s ie r to control for a number of reasons, Indigenous 
(" tra d itio n a l" ) in s titu tio n s  and tr ib a l  a u th o ritie s  were re la tiv e ly  easy 
to manipulate and re c ru it as agents of the colonial adm inistration. 
Because agrarian communities are tied  to  the land, they have fewer 
a lte rn a tiv es  when economic pressures are brought to bear on them. 
Furthermore, ru ra l communities can be more ea sily  iso la ted  from external 
p o li tic a l  influences than urban communities. Lastly, i f  ru ra l commun­
i t ie s  are organized according to trib es  and ethnic groups, they can 
provide an important ba rrie r to n a tio n a lis t or populist organizations 
and the unity of the oppressed.
Conclusion
To sum up, the f i r s t  five years of the mandate saw an important s h if t  in 
colonial p o lic ies , away from the lim ited reformism of the m ilitary  
period and towards a more rigorous system of con tro l. In part th is  
s h if t  was a re su lt of the adm inistration 's need to ra tio n a liz e  i t s  
p o lic ies , both by bringing them more in line with those in  the Union and 
by resolving the contradictions that had arisen  from the blending of 
South African and German colonial po lic ies  during the m ilita ry  period.
What is  most s trik in g  about the development of colonial po licies during 
the f i r s t  five years of the mandate was the degree to which the in te r ­
es ts  of s e t t l e r  farmers shaped both colonial po lic ies  and an ti colonial 
res is tance  in the police zone. The dominant tendency in the recent 
historiography of Namibia has been to see colonial po licies of th is 
period evolving in response to the requirements of B ritish  ca p ita l 
represented by the large mining operations in the te r r i to ry . There is  a 
good case for arguing that the settlem ent policy so vigorously pursued 
by the adm instration was a by-product of in d u s tr ia liza tio n  in the Union 
and the attempts of the Union government to a lle v ia te  the d islocations 
th is  had caused among the white population. However, to go on to argue 
tha t the colonial po lic ies  which aro^ in response to  s e t t l e r  in te re s ts  
a lso  served the in te re s ts  of B ritish  or South African c a p ita l, is  to 
b lur the d is tin c tio n  between the causes and e ffec ts  of the settlem ent 
policy, While in d u s tr ia liza tio n  and the commercialization of ag ric u l­
ture in South Africa may be seen as influencing the po lic ies  tha t evolv­
ed in Namibia, i t  is  nevertheless important to draw a c le ar d is tin c tio n  
between the requirements of white s e t t l e r  farmers in Namibia and those 
of in d u str ia l and commercial ca p ita l in South Africa,
The Namibian mines played a very small part in determining the evolution 
of native and labour po licies in the police zone as they drew the great 
majority of th e ir labour from beyond the boundaries of th is  zone. In 
order to minimize competition for labour between d iffe ren t sectors of 
the economy, the adm inistration had segmer.ied the black labour force, 
reserving Ovambo and other migrant labour for the mines, and police zone
I t  has already been established that s e t t l e r  ag ricu ltu re  in Namibia,
p ar tic u la rly  during the f i r s t  five  years of the mandate, was extremely 96vulnerable, Besides the d i f f ic u lt ie s  experienced in re la tio n  to 
shortages of ca p ita l, distances from markets, and the fluc tua ting  prices 
of a g ric u ltu ra l produce, white farmers were p ar tic u la rly  vulnerable to 
the severe ecological conditions that characterize th is  ra in -d e fic ie n t
area. The major im plication of the economic vu lnerablity  of the 
s e t t l e r  farmers was th a t they were able to pay only the lowest wages, 
and in times of drought or recession many farmers paid th e ir  labourers
in kind, or even fa ile d  to make any form of payment.
The s itu a tio n  of the mining industry, p a rtic u la rly  the diamond mines,
provides a s ig n if ican t con trast. Because of th e ir  stronger economic
positions the mines were able to pay more competitive wages - although
they did so only under pressure. For example, from the s ta r t  of South 
African ru le in Namibia, ovambo migrant workers showed a d is tin c t
preference for mine labour above farm labour, a t le a st in part because 
o f the higher wages paid by the mines. The mines also  showed a greater 
readiness to improve liv ing  conditions in th e ir compounds when th e ir
labour force was threatened or they were subjected to pressure by the 
adm inistration, % ile  the overall wage s tru c tu re  in Namibia was lower 
than that in South A frica, and the Namibian mines c le a rly  took advantage 
o f th is , they could afford in times of labour shortages to re c ru it 
labour from the Union and other p arts of southern A frica. This option 
was not open to farmers. S tructura l differences between farming and 
mining also  affected the ways in which these two sectors responded to 
financial c r ise s , For the mines the most common s trategy  in times of 
financial s tre s s  (for example, a sharp drop in the demand and prices of 
diamonds and o ther minerals), was to stop or lim it production, thus
icu tting  down on production and labour costs, This is  one of the reasons
why the mines preferred a migrant labour force, Farmers on the other
hand could not cut down on th e ir labour force without risk ing  heavy 1
stock losses. Their responses to financ ial c r ise s  prec ip ita ted  by
drought or a drop in the p rice of farm produce, was to reduce wages or
to su b stitu te  wages with payment in kind,
The extreme economic vulnerablity  of s e t t l e r  farmers in Namibia thus 
made them heavily dependent on extra-economic coercion, on the p o li tic a l  
and the m ilita ry  power of the s ta te . At various stages in the h istory  of 
Namibia the intervention of the s ta te  has been c ru cia l.
While an element of compulsion is  ch a rac te ris tic  of a l l  systems of 
labour ex traction , a clear d is tin c tio n  may be made between those systems 
which re ly  on p o li tic a l  power to ex tract labour and those which are ^
prim arily dependent on the labour market. I t  is  e sse n tia lly  on tht. basis 
of th is  d is tin c tio n  that Barrington Moore's id en tifica tio n  of "labour 
repressive systems" hinges, Extra-economic coercion is  also  seen as a 
major distinguishing feature of feudalism in the debate over the t ra n s i ­
tion of Europe to capitalism .
The work of Stanley Greenberg also  traces the o rig ins of ra c ia l domin­
a tion  to the esse n tia lly  coercive nature of p re -c a p ita lis t  agrarian 
re la tio n s  between dominant and subordinate classes:
Coercive methods of organizing ag ric u ltu ra l production and a 
labour force and la te r  maintaining them in the face of expanding markets were as much a part of colonial h is to ry  as Livingstone's expedition to the Zambezi and Magellan's circumnavigation of the world,99
In a more fo rm alistic  manner, Jeffery  Paige spells  out these issues in
cle a r and unambiguous te ra s . Dominant landed classes are dependent on
the s ta te  both for the control of land and the repression and disenfran-
chizement of those classes which provide th e ir  labour force:
Since free  markets do not favour the landed upper class and more e f f ic ie n t  forms of production threaten i t s  existence as a c la ss , i t  must adopt a r ig id  opposition to completely free 
markets. The continued existence of the landed upper class in the a g ric u ltu ra l export economy depends, therefore , on p o l i t ­ica l re s tr ic t io n s  on the working of the markets in land, labour and c a p i ta l . . . .  The economic weakness of the landed upper class forces i t  to re ly  on p o li tic a l  means to a tta in  economic o b jec tiv e s .100
In the precarious physical environment of Namibia, the dependence of 
s e t t l e r  farmers on the p o l i tic a l ,  and a t times m ilita ry , intervention of 
the s ta te  for th e ir survival was in ten sified . In sp ite  of large in je c t­
ions of financial aid  from the s ta te , s e t t l e r  ag ricu ltu re  maintained 
only a tenuous hold in Namibia, and although p ro f its  increased a f te r  
1Q35, the v ic iss itu d es  of clim ate continued to play havoc with the 
economic security  of farmers, In the fin a l analysis, the forms and 
s tra te g ie s  of ag ric u ltu ra l production adopted by s e t t l e r  farmers was 
inappropriate to the environment and could only survive by exacting an 
increasingly heavier to l l  from the indigenous population. In a recent 
study of ag ricu lture in Namibia, Richard Koorsom exposes the heart of 
the matter:
One of the most fundamental contradictions in a semi-arid 
environment is  the ecological r ig id ity  of re la tiv e  small- scale p rivate en terprize farming in an environment which requires f lex ib le  methods and very extensive u n its  of pasture management. The div isions of the hardveld into a mosaic of fixed separate ranches deprived stockfarming of the m obility over wide areas which in pre-colonial times was a crucial means of coping with an unre liab le r a in f a l l . 101
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THE BOtiDBLSWART REBELLION
Perhaps the c learest manifestation of the acute tensions underlying the 
re la tionsh ip  between s e t t l e r  farmers and the indigenous people was the 
Bondelswarts re b ellio n  of 1922. That th is  rebellion  was led by the 
Bondelswarts ra the r than some other group is  the product of a converg­
ence of circumstances and events, some of which can be traced back to 
the German and pre-colonial periods.
The BondelswarU under German ru le
The Bondelswarts, a Nama grouping had established i t s e l f  in the extreme 
south of Namibia between thei Orange and the Fish Rivers. Even before the 
colonization of the area, they had maintained a strong tra d itio n  of 
p o li tic a l  and m ilita ry  independence. Unlike most other Nama groups, 
they had never fa llen  under the suzerainty of the Red Nation, and had 
generally remained aloof from Nama disputes and the larger Herero-Nama 
co n flic t. However, th e ir  position in the extreme south had placed them 
in the path of the Oorlam migrations from the Cape and fa c il ita te d  th e ir 
absorption of the trading and m ilita ry  trad itio n s  of these groups. 
Moreover, the Bondelswarts had estab lished  d ire c t contact with the Cape 
Government from which they had secured supplies of arms and ammunition.
I t  is  probably s ig n if ican t that th e ir r is in g  against German colonial 
ru le in 1903 helped se t in motion the great rebellions of the Hereros 
and Naraas between 1904 and 1907. Like the 1922 rebellion , the 1903 
revo lt was tied  up with the encroachment of s e tt le rs  on Bondelswarts 
te rr i to ry  and the heavy-handed intervention of the local po lice, The
Bondelswarts were able to in f l i c t  heavy losses on the German forces, but 
the war was cut short when the Herevo rebellion  broke out In January 
1904 and the Bondelswarts captain, Johannes C hristian , accepted the 
o ffe r of peace from the German colonial governor, Leutwein, However,
the peace agreement was not recognized by a l l  Bondelswarts, and by
July 1904 under the leadership of men like  Jacob Morenga, Abraham Morris 
and Jacobus C hristian, the Bondelswarts once again engaged the German 
forces, a f te r  which the rebellion  endured u n ti l  October 1906.
The 1903-06 rebellion  held a number of important im plications for the
revo lt which took place sixteen years la te r . The eventual suppression
of the e a r l ie r  rebellion  had prec ip ita ted  the f l ig h t  of a number of 
Bondelswarts, including Marengo, Morris and Jacobus C hristian , across 
the Orange River into the Cape Colony, Although Marengo was k ille d  by 
L ritish  forces, many of the Bondelswarts remained in the northern Cape. 
Their return to Namibia from about 1919 helped to create the conditions 
for the 1922 confrontation with the new colonial power. In terms of the 
peace trea ty  signed in December 1906 the Bondelswarts were confined to a 
reserve of 175 000 hectares, as compared with the 40 000 kra they had 
occupied previously. This loss of land undoubtedly contributed to the 
economic decline of the Bondelswarts community, which was reaching
serious proportions by the outbreak of the 1922 rebellion . Even more 
important, however, was the fac t tha t the Bondelswarts, unlike other 
groups which had rebelled between 1903 and 1907, had managed to  re ta in
some te r r i to ry . That the Bondelswarts retained a t e r r i to r ia l  base not
only contributed to the anxiety of neighbouring s e t t le r s ,  thus increas­
ing the tension that led up to the 1922 reb ellio n , but provided the
esse n tia l social cohesion for the Bondelswarts to be able to  launch
fa ilu re  of a more general re v o lt against colonial ru le  during the early  
mandate period may be a ttrib u ted  to the lack of cohesion or fragment­
ation  of the largely landless and sca tte red  black communities during
th is  phase of Namibian h isto ry .
I t  is  also  possible th a t the form which the 1903-06 rebellion  took
played a ro le  in the rebellion  of 1922. That the Bondelswarts had
achieved s ig n if ican t successes against the German forces and th a t th e ir  
revo lt had helped to spark o ff a more widespread reb ellio n , may have 
helped to persuade the Bondelswarts to  p i t  th e ir  small and poorly equip­
ped force against the formidable m ilita ry  power of th e ir  colonial 
adversary in 1922, F inally , the m ilita ry  successes enjoyed by the
Bondelswarts in 1903 - 06 appear to have played a part in the decision
of the German colonial au th o rities  to move a substan tial part o f the
Bondelswarts community to the north of the te rr i to ry  shortly  before the
invasion by the South African forces.
The Bondelswarts la te r  estimated that they had lo st more than 15 000 
head of small stock and 120 c a ttle  during the move. This was another 
important cause of the severe impoverishment of the Bondelswarts during 
the f i r s t  years of South African ru le . In September 1915, shortly  
a f te r  the Bondelswarts had been re p atria ted  to th e ir  reserve In the 
south, the Keetmanshoop Native A ffairs Department reported acute food 
shortages and starva tion  in the reserve, The Bondelswarts who had been 
re se ttle d  to the north of the te rr i to ry  were provided with about 400 
c a t t le  by the Germans, as a uource of food for the displaced coemmity. 
Following the South African occupation, these c a t t le  were sold and i t  
was agreed that the proceeds would go towards buying c a ttle  fo r the
Bondelswarts once they had returned to th e ir  reserve. However, a year 
elapsed before compensation was paid, The delay was largely a re su lt of 
the bureaucratic confusion and ineptitude that characterized the f i r s t  
few years of South African ru le , although the in te re s ts  of farmers may 
also  have played a ro le . At one stage of the proceedings the adm inistr­
a tion  was undecided whether to pay compensation in stock or cash, 
Although the Bondelswarts had sp ec if ica lly  requested c a t tle ,  the admin­
is tra tio n  f e l t  tha t cash might provide more incentive for the Bondel­
swarts to o ffe r  th e ir labour to farmers in the area. When compensation 
was fin a lly  paid, i t  was in the form of goats, and deductions were made 
for the ra tions supplied in the interim.
Relations with white farmers
C onflict between the Bondelswarts and white farmers was evident from the 
beginning of South African ru le . In 1915, fo r example, the Native 
A ffairs Department reported that although the Bondelswarts were "anxious 
to obtain employment . . .  several absolutely se t th e ir faces against 
accepting work with farmers. On being asked for reasons I was to ld  in 
almost every instance, that the farmers were used to dispense Justice 
without reference to anyone," There could be l i t t l e  doubt, the Depart­
ment argued, that the "great shortage of farm labour" was a natural 
reaction to the " ill-trea tm en t meted out to farm labourers in the past, 
by German and Dutch farmers a lik e  ", In sp ite  of th is  the Department 
was using "every e f fo r t  and persuasion" to induce the local black popul­
a tion  to accept labour, In the same year the o ff ic e r in charge of 
Native A ffairs reported that several incidents had been brought to  his
where farmers engage boys a t 15/- per month, and when paying themo ff, they give them the equivalent in stock. The equivalent of a
goat usually being 15/- . . .  I need not point out that 15/- is  much in excess of the value of an ordinary breeding goat, which is  worth 
from 5/- to 10/- according to s iz e .9
Nor had the s itu a tio n  changed for the b e tte r  in 1930, when the M ilitary
M agistrate of Warmbad blamed dete rio ra ting  re la tionsh ips between whites
and blacks in the area on the "poor wages, improper treatment (and) poor
food" to  which farm labourers were subjected. The farmer, he said,
looks upon the Hottentot as a kind of animal, not a human being and his f i r s t  impression is  tha t a Hottentot because he is  a Hottentot should have a hiding once a day. 10
in 1931 the Native Reserves Commission had recommended a minimum wage of 
15/- a month with food for black men, and 10/- a month for black women. 
I t  is  not known whether these recommendations were ever implemented, but 
they had ce rta in ly  not been implemented by the time the Bondelswarts 
rebellion  erupted in 1922. According to a d ra ft report of the Native 
A ffairs Commission charged with investigating  the Bondelswarts r e b e ll­
ion. average wages paid in the d i s tr i c t  inhabited by the Bondelswarts 
were between 10/- and 15/- a month with food, This, said  the Commiss­
ion, was "not a liv ing  wage", and i t  was doubted whether even these 
meagre wagt' were paid during the drought and depression that preceded 
the 1932 rebellion ,
Although an o f f ic ia l  settlem ent policy was only inaugurated a f te r  1920, 
numbers of s e t t le r s  entered the te rr i to ry  from the Union between 1915 
and 1920. Because of i t s  proximity to the South African border, the 
m agisterial d i s t r i c t  o f Warmbad became an important area for the s e t t l e ­
ment of farmers from the Union during th is  period. For example, in 191? 
the adm inistrator had referred  to the "importance" of Warmbad as a 
border d i s t r i c t  which was "a ttrac tin g  a steady flow of s e tt le rs "  from
the Union. Many of the s e t t le r s  a ttra c ted  to the P ro tectorate by lew 
in te re s t loans were farmers possessing l i t t l e  ca p ita l or stock, and 
contemptuously known as "bokboere" (goat farmers) by the more es tab lish ­
ed s e t t le r s ,  In his e*. :dence before the Commission, the Secretary for 
the P ro tectorate conceded that many of these farmers were unable to  pay 
adequate wages. In 1919 the m ilita ry  magistr?-,e of Wambad came to  the 
conclusion " th a t the m ajority of farmers (and p a r tic u la rly  the new 
comers) . . .  are not worthy of being supplied with serv an ts ,n
The defeat of the German colonial forces and the occupation of the 
te r r i to ry  by South Africa had ra ised  hopes among the Bondelswarts that 
th e ir  former tr ib a l  1-nds would be returned to them. These expect­
ations were not to ta l ly  groundless: the Bondelswarts leader, Abraham
Morris, had acted as a scout for the South African forces during the SWA 
campaign and many of the Bondelswarts had been moved to the north
because the Germans expected them to jo in  up with the South African
forces. However, th e ir lands were not returned to them and instead they 
found themselves in competition with s e t t le r s  who occupied land which 
had previously belonged to them,
The Bondelswarts watched th e ir tr ib a l  lands irrevocably being 
divided up and se tt le d  by whites on an unprecedented sca le . An- as the pressure on the land grew, so did the pressure on the borders of the Bondelswart re se rv e .17
In 1917, the Bondelswarts complained that government stock was being 
grazed on th e ir reserve, but as there was no vacant Crown land in the 
v ic in ity  i t  was decided to continue using the reserve. White farmers
also  made use of ce rta in  p arts of the reserve to graze th e ir  stock, in 
sp ite  of the opposition of the Bondelswarts and,, on a t  lea st one occas­
ion, contrary to the instructions of the local m agistrate. Consequent
pressure on the land produced border disputes. In 1918 some of the 
Bondelswarts who had estab lished  themselves on Crown land adjoining the 
reserve were subjected to "gentle" pressures to move back into the 
reserve. This re su lted  in a dispute with the adm inistration over where 
the reserve boundary was located.
C onflict between the s e t t le r s  and the indigenous population was of 
course in ten sified  by environmental and economic conditions. Below 
average ra ins f e ll  in southern Namibia between 1918 and 1922, culminat­
ing in a very severe or "th ird  degree" drought in the 1921/22 season 
which immediately preceded the outbreak of the rebellion . This s i tu a ­
tion was of course worsened by the post-World War I recession of the 
ea rly  1920s. As pointed out above, complaints about low wages were 
common from the beginning of South African ru le . These, however, inten­
s if ie d  during the drought and depression of the ea rly  1920s. The admin­
is tr a to r .  for example, reported that in 1922 because of the depression, 
"many farmers not of the re a lly  poor c la ss , unfortunately find themselv­
es unable to pay wages in cash and some are unable to feed th e ir  employ­
ees properly". Although the adm inistration was opposed to  the payment 
of wages in kind, the adm inistrator said he saw no immediate "option but 
to countenance the payment of wages in kind where the native does not 
ob jec t,"
Although the largely marginal s e t t l e r  farmers were even less able than 
usual to pay adequate wages during the early  1920s, pressures to force 
blacks in to  the farm labour market increased su b stan tia lly  during the 
same period. Iron ica lly , the most important of these pressures involved 
cash payments (of taxer e tc .)  a t a time when many farmers were unable or
unwilling to pay cash wages.
The dog tax and other s ta te  measures
For the Bondelswarts the most severe pressure to  which they were
subjected was the dog tax. Because th e ir  reserve was recognized by 
German trea ty , the Bondelswarts were not expected to pay grazing fees. 
However, through some strange tw ist of colonial logic, they were
subjected to the regulations in regard to exemption c e r t i f ic a te s .  These 
c e r t if ic a te s  which exempted bearers from seeking employment, could be 
bought by those who possessed su ff ic ie n t numbers of stock. T 'e Berseba 
Nama community which had not rebelled against German ru le , was not
obliged to buy exemption c e r t i f i ' \ ; t - s . The adm inistration, however, 
argued that the Bondelswarts had " fo rfe ited  th e ir o rig inal trea ty  righ ts 
through rebellion , and accepted German Law as the Law of th e ir 
country". This d iffe  in t ia l  treatment provided another source of 
discontent on the part of the Bondelswarts,
Dogs played a cen tral ro le  in the economy of the Bondelswarts. They 
were essen tia l for the protection from and destruction  of vermin, p a r t i ­
cu larly  jackals. Dogs were also used in hunting which provided an 
important means of supplementing the income of the already marginalized 
community. According to the Catholic missionary a t Gabis the local 
Bondelswart community had in 1922 attempted to do without dogs, but
th e ir  flocks had almost immediately been attacked by jackals. The 
missionary maintained that "a f te r a while there would be no flocks le f t  
a t a l l  without the dogs. "
A dog tax was f i r s t  introduced by the German au th o ritie s , but had only26been enforced in the urban areas. In 1917, in response to  complaints
tha t blacks were "roaming about rural areas with a number of dogs . . .  to 
supply them with food", a tax of 5/- per dog was extended to the ru ra l 
areas. I n i t ia l ly  only whites were allowed one dog free of tax, but th is  
exemption was extended to blacks in 1919. However, in 1920 the new 
adm inistrator, Gysbert Hofmeyr, toured the country and found tha t blacks 
and a "ce rta in  class of European squatters" were s t i l l  making extensive 
use of dogs to hunt game, instead of earning a liv ing  by what Hofmeyr 
ca lled  "honest labour". Farmers, p ar tic u la rly  those in the south, put 
pressure on Hofmeyr to increase the dog tax so tha t blacks would be 
forced to seek work.
The new tax, which was imposed by Proclamation No. 16 of 1921, provided 
for payment of £1 for the f i r s t  dog, £2.10 for two dogs, £4.10 for three 
dogs, £7 for four dogs and £10 for five dogs. Even without taking into 
consideration the low wages paid in Namibia and the non-payment of wages 
or payment in kind, the tax was absurdly high. As the missionary 
Krolikowski pointed out, the Bondelswarts were aware tha t in the Union 
the dog tax was 2 sh illin g s  and six  pence. In those casus where the 
tax was not paid, the police were empowered to seize and destroy dogs. 
Prosecution of Bondelswarts for non-payment of the tax commenced in 
September 1921, and by January 1922 the Warmbad m agistrate had trie d  140 
cases. The average sentence was a fine of £2 or 14 days imprisonment.
Although Hofmeyr la te r  denied that the tax had been imposed to force 
blacks to seek work, and claimed that i t s  purpose was to  p ro tec t game, 
evidence suggests otherwise. In h is submission to the Native Affairs 
Commission, a local farmer said that white farmers had to ld  Hofmeyr that 
i f  "the Hottentots were not made to pay th is  tax, they (the farmers)
would not be in a position  to  get labourers. The main idea was to  get 
the Hottentots to come out and work." This was supported by the
magistrate of Warmbad, who said  that the tax was imposed a f te r  the
farmers made representations to the adm inistrator about the dogs owned 
by the Hamas, Even the evidence of the Secretary of the P ro tectorate, 
Major Herbst, contradicted the adm inistrator's  claims. Herbst said that 
the farmers had been " i r r i ta te d "  by the way in  which blacks used dogs
for hunting. " If  they could liv e  by hunting they would not work."
According to Herbst, the tax had been made p a rtic u la rly  heavy in order 
"to do away with the dogs".
In April 1921 the Bondelswarts had petitioned  the adm inistrator, saying 36that the dog tax was beyond th e ir  means. The adm inistrator was also
petitioned  by the Catholic missionary at. Gabis, who argued th a t the tax
was threatening the survival of the already impoverished Bondelswarts:
(T)o demand of such paupers as most of our natives are, a tax of £1 or else  to go without dogs means to condemn them to starvation  that the jackals may l iv e .3?
Although the tax was reduced by 50 per cent ju s t  before the outbreak of
the rebellion  in 1922, i t  was too la te  to avert the confrontation
that had been developing between the Bondelswarts and the s ta te . The
Bondelswarts were forced into re v o lt by the dog tax , C hristian  Marcus,
said a f te r  the rebellion :
When we paid the dog tax the people prepared for war. They said they would ra the r make war because they were suffering too much.35
A number of o ther, more subtle pressures also  operated on the various 
black agrarian communities in Namibia, The Branding of C attle  Proclam­
ation  of 1921 was strongly re s is te d  in many black communities. The 
Proclamation made the branding of stock compulsory and applied to both
blacks and whites. However, while whites were allowed to keep th e ir
branding irons, blacks were not, even though they also  paid 30/- for
them. In the case of black stock owners, branding irons were retained
40by government o f f ic ia ls  who also  supervized branding. The branding 
regulations therefore not only en ta iled  an added cash demand on the 
Bondelswarts and other black communities, but also  another source of 
hum iliation. in February 1922 the Bondelswarts had petitioned  the 
adm inistrator to give them permission to keep th e ir  branding irons. By 
using a branding iron tha t was retained by the superintendent of the 
reserve, the Bondelswarts f e l t  tha t they were transferring  ownership of 
th e ir stock to the s ta te . Further resentment was caused by the regu la t­
ions re la tin g  to the compulsory dipping of small stock and the s t r i c t  
quarantine measures. The quarantine regulations prevented the Bondel­
swarts from se llin g  th e ir  stock on the most p ro fita b le  markets. The 
dipping regulations demanded regular dipping which in some cases ac tu a l­
ly k ille d  the stock. The missionary a t Gabis complained in 1921 that a 
number of Bondelswarts had been imprisoned because, although they had 
dipped th e ir stock, they had not succeeded in eradicating the disease. 
The ag ric u ltu ra l inspector had said that i f  the stock had been dipped 
frequently enough, they would have been cured of the d isease. However, 
a number of goats had died a f te r  being dipped by the inspector.
Besides the attempt to lim it hunting by the imposition of a dog tax, the 
Bondelswarts and other pastora l communities had to contend with s t r i c t ly  
enforced game laws. Most of the pastora l communities in Namibia a t th is  
time were trying to build up th e ir  flocks and herds, and thus hunting 
provided an important source of meat. For the Bondelswarts, however, 
the re s tr ic t io n s  on hunting imposed by the game laws, also  ra ised  other 
problems. At the height of the drought in the early  1920s, vast herds
of springbok invaded the Bondelswart reserve, not only competing with 
stock for scarce grazing and water supplies, but also spreading scab and 
other diseases among the livestock. As the missionary a t Gabis put i t ,  
the conservation of game might be good, but i t  was absurd tha t "the 
o rig in al owners of the land should ra th e r die of hunger than to reduce 
th is  p lague,. . . "
These laws and regulations operated w ithin the context of the more
general repressive le g is la tio n  outlined in the preceding chapter, The
law s t i l l  required a l l  blacks who did not possess ten c a t t le  or 50 head
of small stock to o ffe r themselves on the labour market - no matter
how inadequate the wages farmers were able or prepared to pay. Influx
in to  the towns where be tte r paid jobs might have been availab le, was
s t i l l  s t r i c t ly  controlled, and the vagrancy law was s t i l l  in force.
According to Wellington, the vagrancy law provided a "useful means of
supplying farmers with labourers", because offenders could be sentenced46
to a term of work for the adm inistration or a p rivate person. Another 
part of th is  broader canvas is  provided by the traders who kept Bondel- 
swarts in debt by allowing unlimited c red it a t exhorbitant in te re s t 
ra te s , who paid low prices for goods sold to them, or who refused to pay
cash for stock, but instead paid in "good-fors" redeemable a t  th e ir
By the beginning of the 1920s the combined assau lt of leg is la tio n , 
drought and depression had reduced the Bondelswarts to a desperate 
poverty. In 1920 the Catholic missionary in the Bondelswart reserve 
reported that the s itu a tio n  of the Bondelswarts had become "next to 
unbearable", Even the Chief Native Commissioner who v is ite d  the
reserve in 1921 was forced to concede that the circumstances of the
49Bondelswarts were worse than those of "roost natives elsewhere,"
1 saw some poverty-stricken looking women and children liv ing  in 
wretched huts in the neighbourhood. These people s ta te  tha t in former years they had been able to earn by washing and other labour su ff ic ie n t to liv e  fa ir ly  comfortably, but owing to smallness of wages and ra tions now obtainable in the d i s t r i c t ,  high prices charged by the traders for even the smallest clothing requirements and loss of most of th e ir  stock as a re su lt of the wai, they were in d is tr e s s .50
M ilitary th rea ts and p o li tic a l  constra in ts
A labour ex traction  system of the type that operated in Namibia during 
the early  mandate period, is  not only dependent on the s ta te  to dislodge 
a labour force from the countryside, but also  requires the assistance of 
the s ta te  to counteract any p o li tic a l  o r m ilita ry  organization (or even 
individual defiance) on the part o f the labour force or po ten tial labour 
force. P o litic a l organization and rebellion  of course not only posed a 
th rea t to the labour system (and thus the labour supply), but obviously 
also a more d irec t th rea t to the lives and property of the se t t le rs .
From the beginning of South African rule u n ti l  the actual eruption of 
the 1922 rebellion , p e rs is ten t reports of threatened risings had become 
a common feature in the white farming areas adjacent to the Bondelswarts 
reserve. The ch a ra c te r is tic  response of the adm inistration was to 
dismiss such reports as a ploy by the German s e t t le r s ,  who had been 
disarmed following the change of adm inistration, to obtain arms and 
ammunition, or as an attempt to d isc re d it the new adm inistration. This 
a ttitu d e  did nothing to a llay  the sense of alarm that spread through the 
white community in the ru ra l areas, and tended also to  make the admin­
is tra tio n  less responsive to the very real grievances of indigenous 
communities such as tha t of the Bondelswarts.
There were strong, although not altogether conclusive, indications that 
a t lea st a section of the Bondelswarts were planning a rebellion  towards 
the end of 1916 a t the time when the adm inistration was preparing to 
take m ilita ry  action against the Ukuanyaeia in Ovamboland, The Warmbad 
m agistrate was su ff ic ie n tly  convinced of the p o ss ib ility  of a r is in g  to 
ca ll fo r police reinforcements, and a force of about 100 men was d isp a t­
ched from Keetmanshoop to the area. I t  is  clear from correspondence 
captured by the au th o rities  that the Bondelswarts planned to take some 
urgent, but unspecified ac tion . "The time is short", the Bondelswarts 
leader Adam Pienaar wrote to Hendrik Sneeuwe of Kalkfontein. "The time 
agreed between Jacobus C hristian and ae is  short, On the 15th December 
we shall meet again a t Ramans D r if t."  Adam P ienaar's plans went awry, 
however, because a crucial le t t e r  addressed to Jacobus C hristian was not 
delivered on time, and because the suspicion of the au th o rities  had been 
aroused.
Nevertheless by mid-December a number of Bondelswarts had begun assembl­
ing in Warmbad in compliance with P ienaar's  request. The presence «'f 
armed men was reported in the area, and an attempt was made to blow up a 
telegraph line  between Kalkfontein and Warmbad, although i t  was never 
c learly  estab lished  that the saboteurs were Bondelswarts, When Adam 
Pienaar was ordered to report to the m agistrate in Warmbad, he and some 
followers fled to the mountains and allegedly threatened war against the 
adm inistration, A few days la te r  Pienaar entered Warmbad and was 
a rrested . The au th o ritie s , however, were unable to obtain su ff ic ie n t 
evidence against him and his closest supporters to secure th e ir  convict­
ion for fomenting a rebellion . Whether or not Pienaar intended to 
lead a rebellion  remains an open question, but there is  no doubt that
the s e t t l e r s , and some o f f ic ia l s , regarded the Bondelswarts as a po ten t­
ia l m ilita ry  th rea t.
Under such circumstance the police would c learly  play a major ro le  in 
the suppression of any defiance or organization on the part of subord­
inate groups, The Native A ffairs Commission which investigated the 1922 
Bondelswart rebellion  s tressed  the d e te rio ra ting  re la tionsh ip  between 
the Bondelswarts and the police as a major reason for the rebellion . 
Even during the m ilita ry  period when the s ta te  had tr ie d  to  moderate the 
repressive ro le  of the police, the locally  based police force had cont­
inued to play the ro le  expected of them by the s e t t le r s .  This had in 
some cases resu lted  in co n flic t between magistrates (and other local 
level o f f ic ia ls )  and the police force. One of the most p e rs is ten t 
complaints of the s e t t l e r  community - p ar tic u la rly  towards the end of 
the m ilitary  period when s e t t l e r  p ro test reached a crescendo - was that
blacks were "cheeky" or "inso len t", This complaint was almost always
. 56accompanied by appeals for more active intervention by the police.
The past rebellions and m ilita ry  successes of the Bondelswarts were a 
potent source of anxiety for the s e t t le r s ,  Following the 1903-06 
rebellion , the German colonial au th o rities  had been strongly c r itic iz e d  
by the s e t t le r s  for being too lenient with the Bondelswarts. As the 
Bondelswarts had been able to maintain a t e r r i to r ia l  base in sp ite  of 
th e ir  rebellion  against the German colonial a u th o ritie s , they were able 
to re ta in  a ce rta in  degree of communal id en tity  and p o li tic a l  organiz­
ation . S e ttle rs  and s ta te  thus sought to lim it and control the p o l i t ­
ica l organization of the Bondelswarts. These e f fo rts  largely took the 
form of preventing the Bondelswarts from obtaining effec tiv e  leadership.
From the beginning of South African ru le , the Bondelswarts wanted the 
appointment of Jacobus C hristian, a Bondelswarts leader who had fled to 
the Cape in 1906, as th e ir ca p ta ir. I n i t ia l ly  the s ta te  re s is ted  a i l
moves to secure the appointment of a captain. The position of the admin­
is tr a t io n  was clearly  s ta ted  by the m agistrate of Warmbad in 1917:
1 cannot in my opinion too strongly advise the Administration not to appoint a Captain or Chief over the Bondels as that would immed­
ia te ly  combine the nation which could then give endless tro u b le .59
However, in 1918 the adm inistration modified i ts  s trategy  by allowing
the appointment of a captain, although i t  continued to oppose the
appointment of C hristian to th is  post. Thus, under the supervision of
the adm inistration, Willem C hristian , a man described by the local
m agistrate as "a harmless id io t who was incapable of influencing his
people in any way or even showing any in te re s t in  them", became the
captain of the Bondelswarts in 1918.
When Willem C hristian died in December 1918 following the influenza 
epidemic, the Bondelswarts again asked for the appointment of Jacobus 
C hristian . This was re s is ted  by the adm inistration, and early  in 1919 
Hendrik Schneeuwe became captain. The Bondelswarts, however, objected 
to Schneeuwe's enthusiasm in helping to round up labour for local 
farmers and accused him of embezzling tr ib a l  funds, An enquiry into the 
Bondelswarts a llegations against Schneeuwe was held in March 1920 and ',e 
was subsequently asked to resign. The adm inistration again re s is ted  
demands for the appointment of Jacobus C hristian, and Timotheus Beukes 
assumed the captaincy. In 1921 Beukes was commended by the Warmbad 
m agistrate for being "of great assistance" in persuading the Bondel­
swarts to pay the dog tax and in helping the m agistrate in  "obtaining 
information". i t  appears that Beukes was jenerally  regarded by the
Bondeiswarts as a stooge and labour-gatherer, and was described by the 
Chief Native Commissioners as having "no desire or p a rtic u la r ab ility "  
to lead the Bondeiswarts,
In sp ite  of these o f f ic ia l ly  recognized headmen, the m ajority of Bondei­
swarts continued to regard Jacobus C hristian as th e ir  "hereditary and 
al foreman and spokesman." The Secretary for the P rotectorate 
said la te r  tha t "the adm inistration 's man drew the money and the other 
man (Jacobus C hristian) wielded the influence." C hristian had re tu rn ­
ed to the Protectorate with a group of about 50 followers in July 1919. 
The return of the Bondelswart leader had resu lted  in a panic-strickened 
response from the s e t t l e r  community and a consequent confrontation with 
the police, C hristian was subsequently charged with i l le g a l  entry into 
the Protectorate , possession of firearms without permits, and bringing 
stock into the te rr ito ry  without a permit.
Following C hristian’s return to Namibia, various other Bondeiswarts 
periodically  crossed the Orange River into Namibia, heightening the 
level of tension in the d i s t r i c t  and helping to se t o ff rumours of 
unrest. These tensions climaxed with the re turn  of Abraham Morris, 
the lieutenant of the g u e rr i l la  leader Jacob Morenga and the most 
prominent liv ing  m ilitary  leader of tbs Bondeiswarts.
The tensions aroused by the re turn  of Morris can only be understood 
against the background of developments preceding h is re turn , For both 
the s e tt le rs  a id the adm inistration, Morris represented the past m ili t ­
ary prowess of the Bondeiswarts and thus a c r i t i c a l  th rea t to the 
tenuous labour arrangement with blacks in the area. The Bondeiswarts,
on the other hand, required e ffec tiv e  leadership i f  they were to
respond to the in to le rab le pressures to which they were being subjected, 
Before the return of Morris, the Bondelswarts had shown some d is s a t is ­
faction with the leadership of Jacobus Christian, who had been unable 
to affec t any improvement in th e ir condition, For the Bondelswarts 
therefore Morris represented th e ir la s t hope of unified and effec tive 
action against th e ir  predicament. The combination of these circum­
stances made a confrontation near inevitab le.
Shortly a f te r  Morris and his party arrived a t  Haib in May 1922, he was
v is ite d  by the police who demanded h is  permits for entering the colony, 
and for introducing weapons and stock into the country. As Morris was 
unable to produce the required permits, the police attempted to a rres t 
him, but were prevented from doing so by the Bondelswarts. I t  was la te r  
claimed that the policeman who attempted to a r re s t Morris had threatened 
the Bondelswarts with war. The negotiations which followed were char­
acterized  by a deep m istrust on the part of the Bondelswarts, a rig id  
and uncompromizing position on the part of the adm inistration, and 
blatan t ineptitude on the part of the local o ff ic ia ls  and policemen who 
conducted the negotiations on behalf of the au th o ritie s . When these 
negotiations reached a deadlock, the two p artie s  to  the co n flic t began 
to prepare themselves for war.
The rebellion  in context
The suppression of the Bondelswarti rebellion  raised a barrage of c r i t ­
icism and r id icu le  not only abroad, but in the Union »ud the te rr i to ry  
i t s e l f ,  Hofmeyr, the adm instrator, haf' iken personal command of the 
South African forces in the campaign against the Bondelswarts and was 
accompanied down south by the Secretary for South West Africa and six ty
re c ru its  from the c iv i l  services in Windhoek. On 26 May, a day 
before even the f i r s t  armed clash had taken place, two a irc ra f t  were 
flown in from P reto ria . Three days la te r  Guruchas, the mountain refuge 
of the Bondelswarts, was bombed by the a irc ra f t  and shelled by mountain 
guns. The bombing was continued on the following day, although by th is 
time Morris and the main body of figh ting  men had broken thr-'.-cn the 
cordon around Guruchas. Morris was k ille d  in the figh ting  thai -d,
and the remaining Bondelswarts surrendered on 7 June. ;co
Bondelswarts were k il le d  in a campaign which lasted  less  than
The ferocity  and single-mindedness of the m ilita ry  campaign against vhr$
Bondelswarts shocked even the local s e t t l e r  press. An ed ito ria l  in the
Windhoek A dvertiser  maintained tha t "the mind revo lts a t the thuic-h1., ,•>/
a bloody campaign against a body of ill-arm ed savages. The iioMflr
course would have been one of patien t perserverance ra the r than fevoc- 73ious punishment." Although the newspaper was c learly  using the 
Bondelswarts campaign as a stick  with which to beat the adm inistration 
in order to further the cause of s e t t l e r  self-government, the strange
conduct of the adm inistration during the rebellion  remains to  be
explained. This is  p a rtic u la rly  so as the en tire  Bondelswart community 
was made 'ip of fewer than a thousand people < including women and
children) f whom no more than 200 were armed.
In the campaign against the Ukuenyama in 1917, the adm inistration had 
been content to wait several months for favourable weather before moving 
againat an enemy which was far more numerous and b e tte r  armed than the 
Bondelswarts. The Ukuanyama were of course iso la ted  in the fa r north of
the country, far away from white settlem ents. However, although the 
Bondelswarts did raid neighbouring iarias in order to obtain s v p l ie s  of 
arms and foodstuffs, they did not a ttack  local s e t t le rs  - nor is  there 
any evidence tha t they planned to do so.
In accord with that segment of s e t t l e r  society represented by the 
Windhoek Advertiser, F re is lich  a ttr ib u te s  tUa puzzling aspects of the 
campaign to the personal fa ilin g s  of Hofmeyr - his vanity , ambition and 
fear of c r itic ism . Although there were signs of panic ( in i t ia l ly ,  
d iff ic u lty  was experienced in ra ising  a force for the campaign) and even 
c leare r indications of bungling due to Hofaeyr’s lack of m ilitary  exper­
ience. F re is lic h 's  explanation is  not a complete, nor a convincing one. 
I t  seems improbable that Hofmeyr would have been retained as n in is tr -  
ato r of the te rr i to ry  u n ti l  1926, i f  his personal fa ilin g s  had keen so 
g laringly  obvious, p a rtic u la rly  as the suppression of the Bondelswarts 
rebellion  ra ised  an unprecendented in ternational furore.
Hofmeyr's own account of the campaign suggests that the adm inistration 
was t'ken  by surprise , and that there was an element of panic in i ts  
responses, The adm inistrator maintained that rumours of native unre-'t 
had been r i f e  in the te rr i to ry  for several years, and had "caused panic 
and not infrequently the periodical abandonment of farms". In i t ia l ly  the 
adm inistration had dismissed these reports as the product of "scare- 
mongering persons", but as the reports of unrest and rebellion  continued 
to accumulate the adm inistration began to  experience doubts. Shortly 
before the outbreak of the rebellion , Hofmeyr had received reports of 
"considerable unrest" among black communities, p artic u la rly  in the Keet- 
manshoop and Gibeon d i s t r i c t s ,  There were also indications that some of 
the black communities in the south were "'tn league with the Bondel-
swarts" and would co-operate with them in the event of war. Hofmeyr 
said that "nearly every responsible person believed tha t a general 
r is in g  was pending", although he maintained that u n ti l  the outbreak of 
the rebellion  neither he nor the Secretary for SWA believed a general 
r is in g  might occur. He f e l t ,  however, that immediate action was necess­
ary to reassure the public. I t  was only a f te r  his a r riv a l in the south 
tha t he received information tha t convinced him "of the p o ss ib ility  i f  
not probablity, of the whole country going ablaze and the h istory  of 
German times being repeated unless a peaceful settlem ent was quickly 
announced . . . o r  a decisive blow was quickly s truck ."
Hofmeyr's account appears consisten t with the evidence availab le on the 
rebellion  and i ts  context. There is  considerable evidence in the 
adm inistration’s f i le s  on "native unrest", ti,a t the au th o rities  ex e rt­
ed themselves to  suppress rumours of rebellion  and tha t local o ff ic ia ls  
were frequently cautioned against spreading alarm. Only a few months 
before the outbreak of the Bondelswart rebellion , the m agistrate of 
Kectmanshoop, which borders on the d i s t r i c t  of Warmbad, had bee’i re p ri­
manded for suggesting tha t there was serious unrest in his d i s t r i c t .  
Although the sudden re a liza tio n  tha t the te rr i to ry  might a f te r  a l l  be 
faced with a general rebellion , may have caused the adm inistrator to 
exaggerate the dangers involved, there is  evidence that major elements 
of the black population did consider the p o ss ib ility  of a general 
rebellion  - even i f  they lacked the means to match the m ilita ry  resourc­
es of the colonial s ta te . The relevant evidence w ill be discussed in 
chapters six  and .seven.
If the adm inistration had believed in the p o ss ib ility  of a general
rebellion , th is  would explain why Hofaeyr considered i t  imperative to 
s tr ik e  "a decisive below"; why i t  was also thought necessary to bomb the 
Bondelswarts into submission; and why the Union government was prepared 
to sanction the use of a irc ra f t  so ?oon a f te r  the outcry caused by th e ir 
employment during the Rand rebellion . I t  a lso  makes more comprehensible 
Hofmeyr's premature announcement a f te r  the bombing of Guruchas, that the 
rebellion  had beer, crushed, although Morris and a large body of rebels 
were s t i l l  a t  large. I t  appears that even the Union government 
believed that the revolt might spread to the Northern Cape, because, 
a f te r  the suppression of the rebellion , an armed patro l under Lieut- 
enant-Colonel Trew had been sent through the R ichtersve'd in the north­
ern Cape "as a show of force and to show the inhabitants tha t the area
was not as impregnable as i t  was commonly regarded." In the pro tec t­
o ra te Hofmeyr took h is own precautions by asking the head of the m i l i t ­
ary un it in SWA "to  watch events most carefu lly  in the cen tral and
northern parts of the te rr i to ry  and to hold himself . . .  in readiness to 
organize and proceed to any point of danger, should the exigency
The context of a threatened general rebellion  is  also consistent with
the conduct of the Bondelswarts during th e ir ris in g . Lewis is puzzled
by the fact that a small and poorly armed community like  the Bondel­
swarts could consider rebellion  when the re su lt would inevitably be 
d isastrous for them. A possible solution to th is  problem is  that the 
Bondelswarts did - as Hofmeyr suggested - expect support from other
black groups in the te rr i to ry . In 1903 the Bondelswarts had helped to
spark o ff the great Herero rebellion , and in 1916 when the colonial 
au th o rities  were preparing for war against the Ukuanyama, the p o ssib il­
ity  of a rebellion  appears to have been considered by them. I t  was
cle a r, however, tha t the Bondelswarts had not an ticipa ted  that th e ir 
rebellion  would be brought to such a sw ift end by the destructive impact 
of a irc ra f t  and modern a r t i l l e r y ,  As experienced g u e rr i l la  fig h ters, 
they had in the past been able to hold out for long periods in the 
mountainous country to the south of th e ir  reserve. With the in trod­
uction of a i rc ra f t ,  however, the p o ss ib il i t ie s  of g u e rr il la  warfare were 
su b stan tia lly  reduced,
The bloody suppression of the Bom ’ warts rebellion  brought home to 
most black Namibians th e ir vulneri ,ty in the face of the enormous 
m ilitary  power wielded by the colonial s ta te . Although resistance 
against the colonial s ta te  continued for a number of years a f te r  the 
rebellion , i t  is  clear that the bru tal suppression of the Bondelswarts 
helped to condition some of the forms resistance took a f te r  June 1922. 
In p a rtic u la r, i t  throws some lig h t on the m illenarian tendencies of the 
Garveyist movement in the period immediately following the rebellion .
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Chapter five
THE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS' UNION IN NAMIBIA
In sp ite  ■ of the massive dispossession that had taken place during the 
German colonial period, the r 3rwhelming majority of the black popula­
tion remained rooted in the ru ra l areas where i t  served the labour needs 
of s e t t l e r  ag ricu ltu re, or attempted against heavy odds to eke out an 
independent existence from stock farming, supplemented by hunting and 
foraging, Industria l a c tiv ity  during th is  period was dominated by the 
mines, in p a rtic u la r the diamond mines, which re lie d  almost exclusively 
on migrant labour drawn from neighbouring te r r i to r ie s  or from the 
reserves beyond the police zone. I t  was thus in the ru ra l areas that 
the major struggle of the ea rly  1920s took place.
Resistance was not, however, re s tr ic te d  to the countryside. By the 
1920s a small permanent work force had se ttle d  in the major towns to 
provide labour for smaller industria l concerns, such as the fib.i and 
meat procerslng fac to ries , the lower echelons of the adm inistration and 
police, and the commercial sec tor. This urban work force formed a d i s t ­
inctive stratum of the Namibian social formation, d iffe ren tia te d  from 
ru ra l labourers by i t s  higher wages, i t s  g reater command of industria l 
ant. commercial s k i l ls ,  and i ts  social composition. Foreign sk ille d  and 
sem i-skilled labourers, drawn predominantly from South Africa and the 
West African ccsst ma-ie up an important component of the urban work 
force, and played a key ro le  in introducing new forr-s of p o li tic a l  
organization into Nam'bia.
At th is  phase of Namibian h isto ry , Luderitz was the major in d u str ia l 
enclave in Namibia. Besides being the centre of the diamond industry, i t  
had a small but flourish ing  fishing industry and a harbour of some 
significance. I t  was in Luderitz that the f i r s t  branches of the 
Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU) and the Universal iegro 
Improvement Association (UfHA) were launched. Both of these organiza­
tions closely re flec ted  the d is tin c tiv e  composition and in te re s ts  of the 
urban work force. The ICU, In p a r tic u la r, remained iso la ted  from and 
peripheral to the majority of black Namibians in the ru ra l areas and 
labour compounds. This iso la tion , together with i ts  o rig ins and leader­
ship, tied  i t  firmly to i t s  mother organization in South Africa.
Formation of the ICU branch in Luderitz
There are s'w* import*!'! connections between the formation of a branch 
of the ICU in Luderitz in December 1920 and the launching of the mother 
organization by Clements Kadalie in Cape Town nearly two vears e a r l ie r . 
Although when the ICU was estab lished  in Cape Town, the South African 
economy was s t i l l  on the upswing and both in d u str ia l output and employ­
ment opportunities were on the increase, considerable discontent e x is t­
ed among black labourers because of low wages, and in fla tio n  which had 
sent the price of basic foodstuffs soaring. The early  a c tiv it ie s  of 
the ICU in Luderitz were "chiefly  confined to wages and the cost of 
liv ing", as a local o f f ic ia l  of the Native A ffairs Department pointed 
out in a le t te r  to the adm inistration in Winchoek.
The native generally does not re a lise  that liv ing  everywhere has gone up. All he knows is  that he has to pay perhaps 100% 
more for food and clothing than he did before the war, that though he may have received a 25% advance in wages he is  more often hungry than before, and that i t  is probably the fau lt of the white man, and some attempt w ill have to be made to standardize native wages generally or to ensure th at they are raised to a ra te  which corresponds to the cost of liv ing  and thus demonstrate to the native that Unions are not essen tia l
to  his welfare.
However, besides ce rta in  s im ila r itie s  in economic conditions, there were 
also important links between Cape Town and Luderitz that c learly  fa c i l ­
ita ted  the early  establishment of a branch of the ICU in the Namibian 
town. From 1904 when the German colonial wars against the Hereros and 
the Nanas disrupted the labour supply in Namibia, large numbers of 
African migrant workers had made th e ir way from the Cape to the German 
colony. These Cape labourers were used in the war e f fo rts  against the 
Namas and Hereros as well as for the buildings of raiiw>vs from the 
ports of Swakopmund and Luderitz. Although tn is  V*o*' of i.,tyjur from 
the Cape ta iled  o ff a f te r  1912, migrant labour from South Africa contin­
ued to be used in South West A frica, p a rtic u la rly  on the mines and for 
sk ille d  jobs on the harbours and railways. While some re cru itin g  was 
done in the Eastern Cape, Cape Town was the most important co llec tion  
point for re c ru ite rs  from German South West Africa. That Kadalie's ICU 
in i t ia l ly  drew most of i t s  support from the docks and railways in Cape 
Town probably .Iso  played a sig n if ican t role in es tab lish ing  links 
between Luderitz and Cape Town.
The nature of these links with South Africa played a v i ta l  ro le  not only 
in determining the composition of the ICU in Luderitz, but also i ts  
subsequent deve' ' ,  " t .  The Luderitz branch was launched la te  in 1920
shortly  a f te r  the a r riv a l of a Cape Coloured ca lled  P ie terse in the 
Namibian town. In Luderitz P ie terse , who was believed to be a member of 
the Cape executive of the ICU, established contact with two West 
Indians, John de Clue and a local storekeeper ca lled  Hannibal, and 
together they launched the organization. I t  is  possible th a . P ie terse 
was sent to Luderitz as an emissary of the Cape ICU, as the administra­
tion suspected, because shortly  a f te r  the formation of the Luderitz
branch he le f t  for Grootfontein in the north of the te rr i to ry  to take up 
employment with a storekeeper there,
Also prominent in the establishment of the Luderitz branch was James La 
Guraa who was la te r  to become ass is tan t general secretary of the ICU and 
one of Kadalie’s most important lieu tenants, u n ti l  h is expulsion in 
1926. La Guma who was born In Bloemfontein in 1894, had gone to German 
South West Africa in 1910 a f te r  being apprenticed as a lea ther worker in
Cape Town. In 1918 he led a diamond miners' s trik e  in Luderitz, La
Guma became the f i r s t  secretary  of the Luderitz branch with a salary of 
£5 a month. At the inv ita tion  of Kadalie, La Guma returned to  the Cape
in 1921 to become secretary of the Port Elizabeth branch, His
successor, William Adrianse, was also a South African and was described 
by the Native Commissioner fo r South West Africa as "a respect lb le 
looking Cape Coloured person."
I t  would appear that from the s ta r t  the Luderitz branch of the ICU was 
dominated by South Africans, partic u la rly  from the Cape, This was to 
have important implications for the organization. Like the West
Africans wno dominated the Universal Negro Improvement Association, 
black South Africans in Namibia formed an expa tria te  community d is tin c t 
from the local population. From the German colonial period - when 
chronic labour shortages had forced re cru iters  to o ffer re la tiv e ly
higher pay to labourers recru ited  outside the te rr i to ry  - the wages
offered to South African labourers were markedly higher than those paid 
to the local black population. P referen tia l treatment was also 
accorded to expa tria te  blacks, p artic u la rly  Cape Coloureds. In terms of 
an adm inistrative c irc u lar sent out to municipal a u th o ritie s  in  1922, i t
was pointed out tha t the "Cape Coloured persons and people of that 
class" did not f a l l  under the pass laws, the curfew regulations, and the 
municipal by-laws which required blacks to keep o ff sidewalks of ce rtain  
Namibian towns.
With the exception of the prohib ition  against th e ir  obtaining liquor, these people are e n title d  to be placed on an equal footing with Europeans in so far as the law is concerned.13
The c irc u la r also  advised that "wherever possible separate areas should
be reserved for coloured persons a t some distance from the ordinary
locations". In general a " lib e ra l and progressive a ttitu d e"  was
advised in regard to a l l  blacks in urban areas.
Although the relaxation  of the harsher laws appeared to  be aimed specif­
ica lly  a t Coloured people, there were considerable ambiguities in the 
s ta tus of Africans from the Cape. In o f f ic ia l  documents of th is  time, 
the favoured term, "Cape Boys", appears to have been used sometimes to 
re fe r  to Coloureds, sometimes Cape Africans and soraetiro both. For 
example, the Secretary for South West Africa pointed out in a le t te r  to 
the head of Native A ffairs in Luderitz that curfew regulations did not 
apply to "coloured persons, v iz: Cape boys and such people".
In i t ia l ly  the adm inistration regarded the ICU as an organization repre­
senting the Caps Coloured community and early  documents even re fe r to 
the ICU as the "Industrial Coloured Workers Union". That these percep­
tions of d iffe re n tia l  sta tus were shared by the leaders of the ICU and
UNIA is  made ex p lic it in a report by the Native Commissioner for South
West Africa on a meeting with the ICU and the UNIA leaders in March
I t  was noticed that although th is  deputation seemed concerned about the welfare of v is ito rs  - presumably natives as a rule- they said they thougnt th e ir class should not have to livein proximity to raw n a tiv e s ,16
The d is tin c tiv e  class basis of the ICU in Namibia manifested i t s e l f  on a 
number of le v e l., in the kind of organization i t  became, in i t s  a c t iv i t ­
ie s , and in the a ttitu d e s  adopted towards the ICU by both the adm inistr­
ation and local blacks. The constitu tion  adopted by the Luderitz branch, 
for example, was "imported" d irec tly  from South Africa, apparently 
without any consideration for the conditions that existed in the t e r r i t ­
ory. Members were required to pay an entrance fee of 1/6 and a contrib­
ution of 6d a week. A further charge of 1/- was made for a copy of the 
"rules" ( ic . the co n stitu tio n ) . Given the wage structu re and compos­
itio n  of the labour force in Namibia, these fees must have put the 
organization well beyond the financial reach of a l l  but a small and, for 
the most p art, expatriate  e l i t e .  The constitu tion  also imposed fa ir ly  
complex debating procedures which were c le a rly  pre jud ic ia l to uneducated 
members. The constitu tion  and structu re of the ICU, Luderitz, seemed 
almost designed to prevent effec tiv e  action by members on the labour 
front. For example, the constitu tion  la id  down that "No s tr ik e  shall be 
declared before a b a llo t has been taken a t a meeting summoned for that 
purpose and must be carried by a two-thirds majority of those 
present."  Disputes had further to be referred  to the Executive 
Committee in writing, Throughout i t s  b r ie f  existence the Luderitz 
branch showed a heavy re liance on headquarters in Cape Town - a weakness 
which was successfully exploited by the adm inistration.
A ctiv ities of the ICU, Luderitz
In i t s  a c tiv it ie s  the ICU branch never got much beyond i t s  not 
altogether successful attempts to maintain the organization, and the 
occasional a r tic u la tio n  of grievances of the e l i t e  urban groups, Early 
discussions were confined to wages and conditions in Luderitz. These
early  attempts a t organization did not seem to d isturb  the au th o rities  
unduely. The major anxiety of the adm inistration was that the movement 
might spread to the contract labourers working on the mines near 
Luderitz. Both P ie terse and De Clue were warned by the au th o rities  in 
Luderitz to confine th e ir a c tiv it ie s  to the "educated c lasses". The two 
men had promised to do th is , but had enrolled a number of non-contract 
Ovambos. The f i r s t  rea l cause for concern came in October 1921 when De 
Clue attended a conference of the ICU in Port Elizabeth, As an o ff ic ia l  
representa tive of the Luderitz branch, De Clue addressed the conference 
about the position of black labour in Namibia, wages, the treatment of 
blacks on tra in s , and police b ru ta lity . He called for the abo lition  of 
the "seven-day pass system" and for the establishment of proper hospital 
f a c i l i t i e s  for blacks. After debating the report, the conference decided 
to send a three-man delegation to Namibia to investigate the situa tion  
and interview the local au th o rities .
A fter receiving reports of the Port Elizabeth conference, the
au th o rities  decided to take ac tion . Shortly a f te r  his return to
Luderitz, De Clue was interviewed by the d i s tr i c t  m agistrate and asked
for a statement to substan tiate  the allegations he had made in Port
Elizabeth. After xlrecking the statement with the police who, quite
predicably, denied a l l  knowledge of policemen i l l- tr e a tin g  black
prisoners, the m agistrate dismissed De Clue's statement:
From what I know of th is  coloured person there is  l i t t l e  doubt that he did make sweeping statements and from his own 
admission before me took no action to ascerta in  any facts before preceding to the conference.23
Within a few months of De Clue's return from Port Elizabeth various
pressures were brought to bear on members of the ICU in Luderitz, and
urgent pleas were made to Kadalie In Cape Town to provide assistance, 
"We are surrounded here with a l l  manners of troubles ju s t  now and the 
clouds look ra the r dark on our side, in short the au th o rities  are press­
ing us on a l l  sides and I am not prepared to say what the consequences 
w ill be, however i f  ever we required assistance now is the time and i t  
would have been a grand chance to figh t the storm i f  our leaders from 
headquarters could nave been here to a s s is t  us in our grievances which 
are too much to w rite down . . . "  the secretary  of the ICU branch, 
Adrianse wrote to Kadalie.
In another le t te r  Adrianse stated  that
since Mr De Clue has returned from the Port Elizabeth confer­
ence, the Local au th o rities  have never l e f t  him in peace and the re su lt is  th a t his private in te re s ts  are suffering through i t ,  as you are perhaps aware he is  carrying on a l i t t l e  business as a General Dealer in the Location. This priv ilege i t  appears that the local a u th o ritie s  are bent on taking away from him.25
This s itu a tio n  had compelled De Clue to spend money on legal assistance.
De Clue had also been told that he would have to obtain permission from
the Town Council in order to reside in the location. On applying for
permission, he "was informed through the Local Supt. that according to
instructions received that no permission w ill be granted to him
However they always remind him of Port Elizabeth conference." Adrianse
complained also of the introduction of a new curf ■- regulation, heavy
s i te  taxes for location houses, the high price of water, decreasing
wages and unemployment. The native population of Luderitz, he said, had
"decided not to carry  any pass neither to pay tax a t the ra te  fixed by
the local au th o ritie s ,"
They are w illing to pay tax but taking the present high cost of living into consideration, compared with the sca rcity  of work i t  means nothing else  but " p o litic a l slavery ."26
These i d other le t te rs  were sent to the adm inistrator of South West 
Africa by Kadalie to support the ICU's request for permission to send a 
delegation to the te rr i to ry  to as s is t  the two branches of the ICU e s ta ­
blished in Luderitz and Keetmanshoop. The adm inistrator promptly 
grasped a t  th is opportunity to delay giving an answer to the request, 
He maintained that the grievances outlined in the l e t t e r  were of such a 
serious nature tha t he would like to have them investigated before 
considering the '*CU's request. The Native Commissioner, C.N. Manning, 
was therefore dispatched to Luderitz to inquire into the grievances.
The delegation from the ICU which included the president of the 
Universal Negro Improvement Association, F itz  Herbert Headley, adopted a 
concilia tory  approach to Manning. The various grievances enumerated L- 
the le t te rs  supplied to the adm inistration by Kadalie were discussed. 
Manning sk ilfu lly  iso la ted  those grievances which d irec tly  affected the 
in te re sts  of the ICU e l i t e  from those which affected the wider black 
population. Trading righ ts of blacks in the Luderitz location were 
trea ted  with sympathy. Manning says in his report that " i t  was under­
stood that on instructions from '"ndhoek de Clue's (trading! licence had 
been resto red ."  Not long a f te r  Manning's v i s i t ,  m unicipalities were 
instructed to adopt a more lenient a ttitu d e  to "native and coloured" 
traders, "provided applicants (for trading licences) were f i t  and proper 
persons". Manning also pointed out to the delegation that s i te  taxes 
and water charges were s t i l l  under consideration by the adm inistration 
and that adm inistrative o f f ic ia l ' i tz  were making enquiries with
a view to estab lish ing  fa ir  r . .
Other issues such as the pass laws, ra ids by the police and the a rres t
and harrassment of the unemployed, were trea ted  with less sympathy and 
w illingness to compromize. The delegation was informed, however, that 
"the new Pass Law would only affec t Luderitz in as far as trav e llin g  is 
concerned," Manning came to the general conclusion that "whilst most 
of the complaints are fr iv ilo u s  or exaggerated to support politic?.} 
asp ira tions and in some rases quite unfounded", there was "room for 
improvement" in such matters as (a) trading r ig h ts  for Coloured people 
and (b) san itary  arrangements on tra in s  which "were not only very primi­
tive  but most like ly  to humiliate respectable coloured persons and 
natives having to conform to them," Manning also  recommended th a t "Kroo 
Boys (West Africans) and such foreign coloured people , , .  be encouraged 
to leave th is  Territo ry  whenever possible, and in cases of proved crimes 
against them, they should be deported."
During the course of his interview with the ICU delegation, Manning had 
asked there "in what way they thought a mission from the Union could 
improve m atters." The delegation had replie'* tha t there "was no p art­
icu lar grievance which ; t  could enquire into, but a mission could 
expedite 'o rganization ' f i  >  'eral betterment," C learly th is  a t t i t ­
ude reinforced the adm inistration 's doubt about le ttin g  an ICU delega­
tion  into the country. No a t'im pt was made to  communicate with the ICU 
in Cape Town, however, u n til August, when Kadalie wrote to the administ­
ra to r to inform him that the organization was "anxiously waiting for the 
re su lts  of the investigations and also for the desired permit for our 
mission to the T errito ry". The application for a permit wa? turned 
down with the observation tha t "the adm inistrator regrets tha t he does 
not think i t  advisable, in view of the present disturbed condition of 
the country". However, while in Cape Town in September the admin­
i s tr a to r  reversed th is  decision and granted a pern it to J.G. Gumbs,
acting President-General of the ICU, to v i s i t  the organizations' 34branches in the te rr i to ry , This change of heart probably had more to 
do with conditions in the Union than in the P ro tectorate. The Smuts 
Government had obtained only a narrow m ajority in the 1920 e lection  and 
was therefore eager to maintain the support of the black and coloured 
e le c to ra te . I t  was probably for sim ilar reasons that the South African 
Minister of the In te r io r had in 1921 reversed a decision which declared 
Kadaiie a prohibited immigrant into South Africa.
Gumbs' movements in the te rr i to ry  were carefu lly  monitored by th i Admin­
is tr a t io n , and i t  appears that he re s tr ic te d  himself to the in ternal 
a f fa irs  of the ICU branches a t  Luderitz and ’<»*'" >op in compliance 
with the conditions la id  down by the adrair-ist.- .  ,. However, i t  is
perhaps indicative both of conditions in Nas-ibia a t th is time and of the
gap between ICU leaders and the indigenous population that Gumbs' v is i t  
became associated with a general rising  of blacks in the te rr i to ry , The 
Luderit -olice reported that from the information they had gathered
i t  appears tha t a t lea st an impression ex is t among a certain  section of natives - South West Africa trib es  - both here and a t Keetmanshoop, that Gumbs' mission was of a war-like 
purpose and for the recru iting  of men for a so-called 
"Regiment" required for servic.r by Gumbs in a general rising  against the white man. I am formed also  th a t a t Keetmans­hoop the Natives talk  of a r i  ,'i., which is  to take place in January next. Certain natives .w e  even confused th is  rumour with the object of Gumbs’ v i v t  and such expressions as 
"stand together" have apparer-»-- been m isin terpreted .36
Another attempt to secure a per-f1 ;uv Kadaiie to v i s i t  Luderitz was 
made in June 1923 following urgoru appeals by Be Clue, who was then 
president of the Luderitz branch for assistance from headquarters. De 
Clue had reported to Kadaiie that the a f fa irs  of the organization were
"in  a very bad s ta te "  because members of the executive fa iled  to comply
with regulations. In p a rtic u la r the new branch secretary  was neglecting
h is duties and had repeatedly fa iled  to attend meetings, De Clue also 38
suspected him of embezzling ICU funds. The administration was c le a r­
ly opposed to the proposed v i s i t  by Kadalie, I t  had already adopted a 
clear policy of attempting to s p l i t  and weaken black organizations in 
the te rr i to ry , and the news that the Luderitz branch of the ICU was 
in trouble must have been welcomed by the adm inistration. However, 
probably because of the sensitive issue of the black e lec to ra te  in the 
Union, the adm inistrator wrote to the prime-ministar asking his advice 
in re la tio n  to K adalie's application for a permit. With character­
i s t i c  s k i l l ,  Smuts endorsed the reluctance of the adm inistrator to 
issue a permit to Kadalie without taking any personal re sponsib ility  for 
the decision, Kadalie was therefore informed by the adm inistration 
tha t there was "no need" for him to go personally to Luderitz as the 
suspected misappropriation of  funds had been reported to public 
prosecutor "who will make a l l  the investigations necessary and w,11 give 
any assistance in his power." Kadalie protested against the 
"unreasonable a ttitu d e"  of the adm inistration but without re su lts .
Further unsuccessful attempts were made in 1924 to secure permission for
an ICU representative to v i s i t  the te rr i to ry , and the executive of the
ICU resolved, in accordance with a conference resolution, to take up the
matter with the Union government, An ICU delegation consisting of
Kadalie, La Guraa, S.M, Masabalala and "Professor" James Thaele saw
M inister of Mines ant, Industries F .s, Malan in  March 1924 to discuss
labour conditions in both the Union and South West Africa, Nothing45concrete appears to have come from th is  meeting, As Wickens points 
out, the Pact Government of Mertzog was from the s ta r t  pre-occupied with
vhe "poor whites" and white workers and was therefore less likely  to 
be responsive to the d i f f ic u lt ie s  of black labourers, p a rtic u la rly  those 
in South West Africa,
Although documentation of th is  period of the ICU in Namibia is  a t best
sketchy, i t  would appear tha t the Luderitz branch did not survive the
o r g a n iz a t io n s d i f f ic u l t i e s  I t  experienced in 1923/24, As for the
Keetmanshoop branch, there is  no evidence tha t i t  existed in anything
but name. According to a reso lu tion  adopted on South West Africa a t
thi- Port Elizabeth conference in 1924, the ICU had four branches in the
P rotectorate. This is  highly unlikely, unless of course the ICU was
counting UNIA branches in South West Africa among i ts  own. Even Kadalie
who was not above exaggeration, admits to only two branches of the ICU 
48in South West Africa in his autobiography, However, Kadalie does 
maintain that the congress held in Kimberly in December 1927 was attend­
ed by large numbers of delegates from a l l  over the Union and South West
A frica." There is , moreover, evidence that In 1926 the ICU made
attempts to re c ru it members among the contract workers in Walvis Bay. 
An ICU re c ru ite r from South Africa had apparently been holding "nightly 
meetings" in the Walvis Bay compound. The man who is  iden tified  only as 
"Timothy" was assist,ed by a secretary called Napthali and had been 
co llec ting  funds for the ICU. According to the compound manager, 
"although the financial support given to Timothy was not very grea t, he 
never lacked a good audience to lis te n  to his outpourings against the 
White Man." Both Timothy and Napthali were repatria ted  back to South 
Africa on the grounds of being "undesirables", although Napthali managed 
to find his way back to Walvis Bay and obtain employment a t the radio
A ttitudes of the adm inistration to  the ICU
From u»e beginning of the establishment of the ICU in South West Africa, 
the adm inistration 's main concern was tha t the organization would spread 
frora the "educated" expatriate  e l i t e  to the local population - p a r tic u l­
arly  the Ovambo migrant workers who made up a s ig n if ican t part of the 
Namibian labour force. The founders of the organization in Luderitz 
were therefore warned to confine th e ir a c tiv it ie s  to  the "educated 
class" of blacks. The very f i r s t  communications informing the admin­
is tr a t io n  in Windhoek of the formation of an ICU branch in Luderitz 
expressed anxiety about the recruitment of non-contract Ovambos in the 
town and the effec t the ICU might have on mine labourers. The o ff ic e r 
in charge of Native Affairs in Luderitz pointed out tha t he was "fu lly  
a live to (the) danger (of the) movement spreading to mine labourers" and 
said that he had already taken steps to prevent th is  by stopping Ovambo 
passes between the adjacent diamond fie ld s  and the town of Luderitz. 
The police had also been asked to supply additional p a tro ls , presumably 
to prevent contacts between the town and the labourers on the diamond 
fie ld s . The magistrate of Luderitz advised that:
anyone who attempts to influence the Ovambos in th is  d ire c t­ion should in my opinion be deported as a menace to the good order of the te r r i to r y .55
Some anxiety was also  expressed over the p o ss ib ility  of farm labourers
baing recru ited  by the ICU:
The native Unions are epparently countenanced in the Union and they may be of assistance to the natives but what may
give r is e  to trouble in th is te rr ito ry  is the enrolment of the uneducated class of natives such as Hottentots andOvambos, and this i t  w ill be d i f f ic u lt  to prevent as t'.ieleaders are natura lly  out for subscriptions from a l l  andsundry t.o provide sa la r ie s  for themselves.56
As i f  the precautions already taken were not enough, the Secretary for
South West Africa instructed the Natives Affairs Department of Luderitz
tha t on "no account should native strangers be allowed on the Diamond
In a le t te r  to the South African prime m inister about the ICU and 
Kadalie’s application for a permit in 1923, the adm inistrator observed 
that he had recently  authorized the Consolidated Diamond Mines to 
re c ru it a ce rta in  number of black labourers in the Union, However, he 
and the CDM representative had concurred tha t i t  would be "highly 
u ndesirab le ... that the Union and our natives should come into contact 
with each other, and i t  was decided that the local natives employed a t 
Kolmanskop should be transferred  and the Union natives placed there ."
These measures to iso la te  the ICU from the major labour force in the 
te rr i to ry  had important im plications for the organization. They meant 
that the Luderitz branch would be re s tr ic te d  to the small, largely 
sk ille d , and re la tiv e ly  privileged residents in the Luderitz location, 
The iso la tion  of Luderitz from other urban, or even ru ral settlem ents - 
the Namib Desert e ffec tive ly  cut the town o ff from i ts  hinterland - 
further served the cause of the adm inistration in th is  regard. All th is 
contributed towards making the membership of the Luderitz branch a small 
and d is tin c tiv e  grouping dominated by expatriates with in te re s ts  of 
th e ir own. This would in turn mean that they would incur the suspicion 
of the local black population and be more vulnerable to the 
manipulations of the administration.
Some of the ways in which the administration was able to manipulate the 
ICU leadership have already been discussed. Because of the class-base of 
the leadership of the ICU in Luderitz they could easily  be brought under
pressure, for example, by threatening th e ir  business in te re s ts . Furthe­
rmore, ce rtain  concessions could be granted to th is  small group without 
affec ting  the "native" and labour po licies applied more generally in the 
te rr i to ry , This se lec tiv e  treatment would in turn widen the gap between 
ICU leaders and th e ir  prospective base, and arouse the suspicion and 
d i s tn s t  of the indigenous population. The expatriate  composition of 
the ICU branch also increased i t s  dependence on i t s  headquarters in 
Cape Town, and the adm inistrate:n was not slow to explo it th is  depend­
ence. Soon a f te r the es tab lish r nt of the Luderitz branch, adm inistra­
tiv e  o ff ic ia ls  suggested the introduction of a permit system for black 
and coloured people attempting to en ter South West Africa. I t  was also 
suggested that trave lling  passes within the te rr i to ry  should be more 
t ig h tly  controlled. The introduction of the permit system meant that 
the ICU branches in the Protectorate could be effec tiv e ly  iso la ted  from 
th e ir  headquarters in Cape Town - a situ a tio n  which fin a lly  proved fa ta l 
to the Luderitz branch. I t  may be possible on th is  score to c r it ic iz e  
Kadalie for moving La Guma • perhaps the most effec tiv e  organizer assoc­
iated  with the Luderitz branch - from South Wb t  Africa to the Cape. 
R estrictions on m obility within the country also enormous obstacles 
in the way of the black organizations' attempts to extend th e ir a c t iv i t ­
ies into other parts of the country, or to coordinate the a c tiv it ie s  of 
th e ir branches.
The South West African National Congress
The measures described above did not exhaust the adm inistration 's a b i l ­
ity  to put obstacles in the way of the organizations established in 
Luderitz and other parts of the te rr i to ry . A major ta c tic  adopted by 
the adm inistration was to encourage s p l its  in these organizations. Here 
i t  was clearly  aided by the suspicion that had been aroused among local
blacks about the foreign origins and the privileged sta tus  of expatriate  
blacks in both the ICU and the UNIA, The clearest example of this 
strategy  was re la ted  to  the formation of the South West African National 
Congress (SWANC) in Luderitz in the la t t e r  ha lf of 1922.
The major ca talyst for the establishment of the SWANC in Luderitz was
S.M. Bennett Ncwana, a ra the r strange figure who f l i t s  in and out black 
p o litic s  in the Cape and South West Africa. Ncwana was an ea rly  and 
fa ir ly  prominent member of the ICU, who moved periodically  between the 
ICU and i t s  riv a l the ICWU. After defecting from the JCWU, Ncwana joined 
the ICU for a short period before deserting th is  organization in 1921 
and launching a b i t te r  attack on i t  in his newspaper, The Black Man. 
Later he again joined the >' helped found the African Land S e tt le ­
ment Scheme with the ob„ a s s is t  the Government by inducing
natives liv ing  in towns to s e t t le  on the land." At other times Ncwana 
also acted as general organizer of the Cape Native V oter's Organization 
which mobilized black voters for the South African Party, and accord­
ing to Kadalie helped w rite the e lection  li te ra tu re  for the N ationalist 
candidate Professor Schoeman who stood against Margaret Ballinger in 
the 1949 election .
Ncwana must have had contacts in Luderitz from an early  period. In May
1921, the Native A ffairs Department in Luderitz reported that Ncwana's 
newspaper, The Black Man, was regularly  send to Luderitz and that the 
ed ito r of the newspaper had been expected to pay a v i s i t  to  the town two 
months before. Ncwana did eventually pay a v is i t  to South West 
Africa in the la t te r  ha lf of 1922, a t roughly the ssme time that the ICU 
was having trouble persuading the adm inistration to grant i t  a permit
to send a delegation to the te rr i to ry . How Ncwana managed to get into 
the te rr ito ry  is not known, but according to a report in the Windhoek 
A d v e r tis e r '^  had been discovered to be without a p e n i t  and was given 
fourteen • days grace to leave the country. Why Ncwana was given 
fourteen days grace ra ther than been arrested  or sent back to Cape Town 
immediately may well be connected to the a ttitu d e  the adm inistration 
adopted to the organization he was attempting to launch in South West
The Natives A ffairs Department in Ludevitz was f i r s t  informed of the 
inauguration of the South West African National Congress in September
1922, The ass is tan t secretary  of the organization announced tha t the 
newly-formed SWaNC would be conducted on the same princip les as the 
South African Native National Congress and that the organization would 
"always s o l ic i t  the guidance and fa therly  advice of the Native Affairs 
Department," A l i s t  of the o ff ic e  holders of the new organization was 
included. I t  shows a mixture of d iffe ren t tr ib a l groupings, including 
Namas, Hereros, Ovambos and various South African blacks, Jacob 
Jan tje s , a Nama who had been on the executive of the ICD, was lis te d  as 
chairman and Ncwana as "chief organizer", Ncwana stated  in Cape Town 
that he had consulted "the petty  chiefs of the d iffe ren t trib es  in South 
West" and that they had been favourable to the "extension" of the 
organization in the te rr i to ry .
According to the Luderitz Native Affairs Department which had in terrog­
ated members of the new organization, the SWANC "was the outcome of 
d issa tisfac tio n  on the part o f South African and South West African 
Natives with the I,C. Union (chiefly  dominated by Cape Boys) and the 
U.N.I. association ( introduced and d irected by West Indian and West
Coast natives) which is  continually ca llin g  for funds fo r American
propaganda purposes":
The Local Natives have apparently rea lised  that they were being made use of by the others and now wish to look a f te r th e ir own in te re s ts . I t  is  d i f f ic u lt  to ascerta in  what their aims in th is  d irec tion  were except tha t they were desirous of helping one another,68
According to Ncwana, the major grievances of Namibian blacks were the
"unsympathic adm inistration, no o u tle t for discussing native grievances,
unreasonable taxation considering the absence of p ro fitab le  work, and
the absence of native educational f a c i l i t i e s ."  Ncwana was apparently
also "emphatic in his professions of being desirous to work in harmony
with the au tho rities" :
"I have been a moving s p i r i t ,"  he said , "in the native move­ment, but never an ag ita to r. I did adopt an aggressive 
policy in my paper, but I found that i t  was not judicious, I dropped the paper and tried  to s ta r t  afresh on the lines of educating European opinion."69
Although the SWANC planned to adopt the constitu tion  of the SANNC, i t
was intended that the Namibian congress would be an en tire ly  separate
body and not a branch of the South Africa organization.
The adm inistration was not slow to re a lize  the poten tial usefulness of
an organization like the SWANC to i ts  attempts to curb organized black
resistance in the te rr ito ry , In a le t te r  informing the administration
in Windhoek of the formation of the SWANC, the o ff ic e r in charge of
Native A ffairs in Luderitz c learly  outlined the strategy  which the
adm inistration was to follow with considerable success.
In the absence of any law forbidding the formation of native unions the most th is  department can possibly do to  minimizethe dangers which may a rise  from such unions is  to endeavour
to  s p l i t  the membership into d iffe ren t factions - as has been done here - but there is  l i t t l e  doubt that determined e ffo rts  w ill be made by one of the older bodies to eventually bring them under the same banner ag a in ...
I t  is  probable th a t a purely native congress can be handled more ea sily  than the UNIA or the ICU - especially  with a few Union Natives, with an ingrained respect for the white man's authority  a t the head of a f fa irs  - and, i f  the congress were taken under the wing of the Government, a t  i t s  formation, with some unobtrusive, but e ffec tu al, provisions for Govt supervision i t  might be a good policy.
We are a t  present fighting the native union menace with ineffec tive weapons and I beg to submit tha t the question of control or prohibition should be d ealt with without delay .71
Key o ff ic ia ls  in Windhoek completely endorsed these views. The Native 
Commissioner, C.N., Manning pointed out in a note to the Secretary for
South West Africa that "under o ff ic ia l  guidance th is  new association of 
South African natives ( jv'c) might prove very useful in upsetting danger­
ous, irresponsible foreign doctrines". He added that the "combination of 
native races in South West Africa" had been "unknown in former years" 
and that th is was causing alarm among white residents of the 
te r r i to ry , The Secretary in turn endorsed without reservation the
views of the o ff ic e r in charge of Native Affairs in Luderitz:
. . .  the more so that th is Association appears to  be theoutcome of d issa tisfac tio n  on the part of South African and South-West African Natives against the ICU and the Negro Association I t  is also noted that th is  new Associationdeclares that i t  w ill "always s o l ic i t  the guidance andfa the rly  advice of the Native Affairs Department" . . .  i t  is thought that under d iscre te o f f ic ia l  guidance the new Assoc­
ia tion  referred  to might prove very useful in sp lit t in g  up p o li tic a l  combinations and upsetting dangerous foreign d octrines ,73
The organizational and leadership problems experienced by the ICU in 
Luderitz early  in 1923 should be seen against the background of th is 
s trategy  adopted by the administration, Already iso la ted  from the major 
labour force in the area, the ICU had only a small pool of leaders (and 
even members) to draw from, The emergence of a th ird  organization in a
d is tr ic t  which in 1921 had a to ta l black population of 2 155, must
have severely s trained  the human resources availab le to the ICU, Simil­
a r d i f f ic u lt ie s  must have been experienced by UNIA, p artic u la rly  a f te r  
Herero and other leaders broke away from the Windhoek branch of the 
organization.
Two other organizations, both of which were associated with the Cape
coloureds in the te rr i to ry  and were based in Windhoek, were launched in
the next three years, In February 1923, a branch of the African
People's Organization was launched in Windhoek "for the defence of the
social, p o litic a l and c iv il  righ ts  of the Cape Coloured Community
throughout the S.W. P rotectorate". In 1925 a branch of the African
Nation?.! Bond was also estab lished  in Windhoek with the broad objective
of furthering "the advancement of the Coloured Community." N otification
of the administration of the formation of the branch was accompanied by
a c irc u lar from the head o ff ic e  of the society which pointed out
the necessity  of getting our people well organised so as to 
enable us to hold our own in the future, as fa r as p o li tic a l , economic, and industrial righ ts are concerned.77
Although these two organizations had aims and s tru c tu res , which were 
adapted to an urban and in d u str ia l se ttin g , i t  is  clear that they 
confined th e ir a c tiv it ie s  to only one section of the population - the 
Coloured community - which although black, was not indigenous. Even the 
APO which in South Africa, under the leadership of Dr A, Abdurahman, had 
strong radical and n a tio n a lis t tendencies, appears to have re s tr ic ted  
i t s e l f  to representing the coloured community in South West Africa. In 
his 1924 report, the adm inistrator comments with obvious sa tisfac tio n  
that the APO branch members "have always been loyal supporters of the
Administration and do not appear to in terfere  with matters where th e ir 79 80own welfare is  not concerned." In a la te r  rrpo rt the adm inistrator
maintained that the APO had alligned i t s e l f  with the South African
Party, while the African National Bond alligned i t s e l f  with the National
The major weakness of a l l  the organizations discussed in th is  chapter
was th e ir iso la tio n  from the bulk of the Namibian population in the
smaller towns and ru ra l areas. All of these organizations had had th e ir
origins in South Africa and were more closely geared to the in te re sts
and needs of the more urbanized and proletarianized black population of
the Union. Although the South African ICU did penetrate into the rural .81areas of the Union in the mid-1920's, i t  was s t i l l  e sse n tia lly  an 
urban based organization in the early  1920's when the Luderitz and 
Keetmanshoop branches were functioning. Of a l l  the organizatio: in trod­
uced into Namibia during th is period, only the Universal Negro Improve­
ment Association was able to make an impact on the ru ral population. 
The penetration of th is organization into the Namibian countryside w ill 
be the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter six
GARVBYISN AND RESISTANCE IN THE NAMIBIAN COUNTRYSIDE
The Universal Negro Improvement Association in Luderitz
The Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities 
League (UNIA & ACL) was launched in Luderitz in 1921. The ca ta ly st for 
the formation of th is  branch of the Garveyist organization was a small 
group of West Indians who had se ttled  largely in the coastal towns of 
the te rr i to ry . The majority of th is  group orginated from Liberia, the 
Cameroons, S ierra Leone and the Gold Coast, and had been brought into 
the te rr i to ry  by the Germans before and during World War I, In 1910, 
for example, f i f ty  men and a number of women and children were deported 
from the German colony of Kamerun to Luderitz, following a mutiny among 
the black Schutztruppe in the West African colony. The m ajority of th is 
group were returned to West Africa a f te r  the occupation of Namibia by 
South African forces, but a number who were working in Luderitz stayed 
behind. Other West Africans, p artic u la rly  the Liberians, had been 
brought to Namibia by the Woermann shipping company. Some of these had 
been deck hands on the Woermann ships and had been stranded in Luderitz 
and other coastal towns when war broke out in 1914.
During the war members of the West African community in Nambia appealed 
to the administration to send them home. In response to pressure from 
the administration the Woermann Line arranged for the passage of some of 
these West Africans to Monravia, but refused to take any more a f te r  two 
of them deserted th e ir ship a t Cape Town. Although the administration 
appeared to be eager to be rid  of the West Africans, i t  was not prepared 
to foot the b i l l  for th e ir re p a tria tio n . Furthermore, a number of West
Africans were sk ille d  dock workers and therefore d i f f ic u lt  to replace. 
In 1925, for example, the South African Railways specia lly  recru ited  
twenty West Africans for the Walvis Bay docks on accoun of th e ir  sk ills  
as winchmen and because i t  was "impractical to employ white men on th is 
work, since they w ill have to learn the work under these Kroo men",
Although they intermarried with the local people, the West Indians and
Wes' Africans formed a d is tin c tiv e  segment of the Namibian population,
They were far more urbanized than the local population and some earned 
re la tiv e ly  high wages. Others lived on the fringes of th e ir  community, 
supporting themselves by gambling or petty  crime. The magistrates of 
Luderitz and Swakopmund complained frequently about the "gambling and 
thieving propensities" of the West Africans in th e ir d is tr i c t s .  The 
West Africans were "the cause of a lo t of troub le", the magistrate of 
Luderitz complained in 1920. Many of them lived "by swindling the
aborigines of th e ir hard-earned wages by card sharping". The police
believed that they were "corrupting" the local blacks and were the cause 
of an escalating crime ra te  in Luderitz, but perhaps most troublesome 
to the administration were the "p o litic a l inc lina tions" of some of the 
West Africans,
Although Marcus Garvey f i r s t  launched his organization in Jamaicain 
1914, i t  was only when he turned his a tten tion  to the United S tates that 
his e f fo rts  bore fr u it ,  Garvey arrived in New York in 1916 and by the 
end of the war had created the basis for the f i r s t  mass Afro-American 
movement. Conditions during and shortly  a f te r the 1914-1918 War were 
highly favourable for the launching of a mass movement amongst American 
Negros. World War I had created a r is in g  demand for American manufact­
ures and the Northern industries were c r i t ic a l ly  short of unskilled
labour because the war had stemmed the flow of immigrants from Europe.
At the same time re s tr ic te d  war-time markets for cotton, and in fe s t­
ations of the boll weevil helped to displace the poorer sectors of the
agrarian population in the South. As a re su lt a large-scale migration
of Southern blacks to the industria l c i t ie s  in the North took place.
Between 1916 and 1918 about ha lf a m illion blacks migrated to  the
North, where competition for housing and jobs resu lted  in in te r- ra c ia l 
tensions and co n flic ts . The end of the war was marked by an economic 
slump in which blacks generally found that they were the la s t  to be 
hired and the f i r s t  to be fire d . After the war there was a resurgence
of the Ku Klux Klan in both the North and South. The demobilization of
400 000 Black so ld iers added to the tensions that p recip ita ted  the wave 
of race r io ts  that swept the country in 1919. Although tiarveyism also 
took root among the ru ra l workers in the South, the black migrants, 
newly displaced from an ag ricu ltu ral economy and making the tran sitio n  
to an industrial p ro le ta r ia t, formed the basis for the Garveyist move­
ment in the United States
The f i r s t  formal connection between Namibia and the Garveyist organiza­
tion occurred in 1919 when the UNIA sent commissioners to the V ersailles 
peace conference in an unsuccessful attempt to  influence the plans being 
framed for the former German colonies. A sim ilar attempt was also 
made by Dr W.E.B. Du Bois, the organizer of the 1919 Pan-African 
Congress, Du Bois's plan was for the creation of an "internationalized" 
s ta te  consisting of the German colonies, the Portuguese colonies and the 
Congo, In 1920 the Declaration of Rights of the Negro Peoples of the 
World was adopted a t the f i r s t  international convention of the UNIA, 
The declaration called "upon the various governments of the world to
accept ana acknowledge Negro representatives who shall be sent to the 
said governments to represent the general welfare of the Negro peoples
of the world." In 1922 a UNIA delegation was sent to Geneva to
p etitio n  the League of Nations to turn the former German colonies over
to black leadership. The League was also urged to appoint a black repre­
sentative to the Permanent Mandates Commission. Another p e titio n  re la ­
ting to the Mandates was issued by Garvey in 1928, but enjoyed as l i t t l e  
success as the other attempts. Although Garvey’s ambitions for the 
former German Colonies fa iled  to have any impact, the ideas propogated 
by his organization were of considerable significance to Namibia. In 
fact Garveyism and i ts  various mutant versions provided the f i r s t  cohe­
re n t, i f  somewhat fanciful ideological framework within which the va­
rious Namibian communities could unite in th e ir e f fo rts  to re s is t  colo­
nialism.
The f i r s t  branch of the UNIA was established early  in 1921 in
Luderitz, not long a f te r  the f i r s t  African branches of the organization 
were established on the north-west coast o f the continent. Towards 
the end of 1921 the Luderitz branch had a membership of 311 and had
collected £41-10-n in subscription fees. These figures should be seen
against the size of the town's black population (there were 2155 black 
people in Luderitz, according to the 1921 ce n su s , the low wages, and 
ris ing  cost of living during th is  time. The organization catered for 
both the welfare and the p o litic a l needs of i t s  members, I ts  welfare
benefits included assistance in the time of sickness, funeral expenses, 
and assistance to re la tiv e s  of deceased members. I ts  membership covered 
the whole spectrum of black groups, both local and foreign,
From the information available on the UNIA in Namibia, i t  would appear
   « ... J
that the Luderitz branch was dominated by men who were both foreign and 
re la tiv e ly  w ell-off. Administrative o ff ic ia ls  * whose perceptions were 
often  clouded by ideological considerations) maintained that the 
Luderitz organization was dominated by West Africans and West Indians. 
Only two members of the UN1A executive are mentioned recurren tly  in the 
available documentation on the Luderitz branch: F itz  Headley, the pres­
ident, who was clearly  the dominant figure in the organization, and John 
de clue who was a prominent member of both the UNIA and the ICU. Both 
men were West Indians. John de Clue was the owner of a cafe in the 
blac1 township, while Headley was chief stevedore a t the Luderitz docks 
and earned a daily  salary of seven sh illin g s  plus ra tio n s . According 
to a summary of wages drawn up by the Native A ffairs Department of 
Luderitz from labour contracts approved by the Department, the average 
daily  wage for blacks ranged between one sh illin g  and 2/6. When 
members of the UNIA and ICU in Luderitz broke away from these two 
organizations to form the South West African National Congress, the 
reason given was that the two organizations were dominated by West 
Africans and South African blacks respectively.
Although Garveyism only made an impact on West Africa towards 1920, pan- 
African and ra c ia l-n a tio n a lis t ideologies were common in  West Africa a t 
lea st f i f ty  years before the appearance of Garveyism. From the 1860s 
Africanus Horton and Edward Blyden were spreading the doctrines of 
ra c ia l pride and African unity on the West coast o f the continent, 
Thus the West African and West Indian (Blyden, for example, was a West 
Indian) community in Namibia was the logical launching ground for 
Garveyism in the te rr ito ry ,
The issues taken up by the Luderitz branch of UNIA were also  indicative
of i t s  domination by in te re sts  d is tin c t from those of the overwhelming 
majority of the local black population. Although the Luderitz organiz­
ation  did c a ll for ra c ia l unity and freedom from colonial oppression on 
behalf of a l l  blacks, these appeals were ch a rac te ris tica lly  couched in 
the vaguest of terms. On the other hand the available documentation 
shows that where the Luderitz branch expressed more concrete grievances, 
i t  was representing the in terests  of a small and privileged minority, an 
iso la ted  and largely foreign black petty  bourgeoisie, This is  clearly  
illu s tra te d  by a le t t e r  w ritten by Headley as President of the Luderitz 
branch to the Negro VorJd in 1921. Headley begins his le t t e r  with a 
p ro test against the "tyran ica l system of serfdom and in ju stice"  applied 
in Luderitz and other parts of Namibia. Towards the end of the le t te r  
he c r it ic iz e s  the inadequate medical f a c i l i t ie s  provided for blacks in 
Luderitz,
However, sandwiched between th is show of altruism  and taking up the 
larger part of the le t te r ,  is  a clearly  spelt out appeal on behalf of 
black traders in Luderitz, This marginal trading class had established 
four small businesses in the black township, but were being threatened 
by white-owned stores operating on the periphery of the township. Sig­
n ifican tly  Headley asks the newspaper to note that the white businessmen 
concerned are "German Jews" - demonstrating the strong ra c is t  bent of 
h is ideological approach. The question of black trading righ ts in 
Luderitz was a leading issue for both UNIA and the ICU. When black 
delegations representing these organizations petitioned the magistrate
of Luderitz in 1921 and the Native Commissioner in March 1922, black 
3 6trading righ ts were a central grievance. This issue also  came up in 
correspondence between the Luderitz branch of the ICU and Kadalie. In
th is  regard i t  is perhaps sign ifican t that a t least one of the owners 
of the four black businesses in Luderitz, John de Clue, was a prominent 
member of both UNIA and the ICU.
The Luderitz branch of the UNIA most accurately reflec ted  the s tructure
of in te re s ts  and ideological approach of the wider Garveyist movement -
and in p articu la r the American base of the movement.
Garvey’s was the voice of the Negro petty  bourgeoisie, seek­ing to secure the leadership of the Negro people by subordin­ating th e ir national feelings and needs to class in te re s t.. . .  Planning to create a great Negro s ta te  in an in d u s tr ia l­ized Africa, Garvey was obviously speaking not merely in the vague, indefinable terms of "race", but in concrete and d efin ite  concepts of bourgeois nationalism. What he had in mind for Africa was some kind of rep lica of c a p ita lis t  society in the United S ta te s , . .28
Garveyism and m illenarianisa in the in te rio r
However, once the movement spread beyond Luderitz, i t s  composition and 
a c tiv it ie s  underwent fundamental changes. In p artic u la r, the Windhoek 
branch of the organization assumed a character markedly d iffe ren t from 
that of the Lud - i tz  branch, although the in itia tiv e  for i t s  formation 
had come from Luderitz and i t  was in i t ia l ly  run by West Africans. 
However, by January 1922 when the Windhoek branch applied to the local 
municipality for permission to erect a h a ll, the executive of the branch 
had already come under the control of local black leaders. Hereto lea­
ders, in p artic u la r, were prominent in the organization. These included 
Hosea Kutako, who was la te r  to emerge as the dominating figure in Herero 
p o litic s  and the most powerful indigenous leader in the police zone, 
Aaron (Johii) Munsiunda, the brother of Kutako, Traugott Maharero, the 
Herero leader in Okahandja, and Nikanor Hoveka, another prominent Herero 
leader and la te r  headman of the Epukiro Reserve. Although the Hereros 
appeared to be the dominant force in the Windhoek bra;ich, the leaders of
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